Financial and Economic Review 20. by unknown
Investors’ Reactions to Extreme Events in the 
Hungarian Stock Market
Klaudia Rádóczy – Ákos Tóth-Pajor
A Snapshot of the Ownership Network of the 
Budapest Stock Exchange
Márton Gosztonyi
Methodological Background of the  
New Motor Third-Party Liability Insurance  
Index of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank
Gabriella Merész – Norbert Holczinger – Koppány 
Nagy
Examination of Applicants for Home Purchase 
Subsidy for Families in Terms of Prior Commitment 
to Having Children and Extent of Property 
Acquisition, Based on the Data of a Credit 
Institution
Kata Plöchl – Csilla Obádovics
Thoughts on the Dilemma of When to Introduce 
the Euro in Hungary
Péter Gottfried
3 FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC REVIEW
September 2021
Vol. 20 Issue 3
Financial and Economic Review
Scientific journal of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank
Chairman of the Editorial Board:
BARNABÁS VIRÁG
Editorial Board:
TAMÁS BÁNFI, PÉTER CSILLIK, ÉVA HEGEDÜS, DAVID R. HENDERSON, GYÖRGY KOCZISZKY, 
PÁL PÉTER KOLOZSI, LEVENTE KOVÁCS, CSABA LENTNER, DIETMAR MEYER, KOPPÁNY NAGY, 




Assistant Editor: TÜNDE MÉSZÁROS
Proofreader: KENDALL LOGAN
Assistant: BERTA DRAPCSIK, NÓRA TAMÁS
Publisher: Magyar Nemzeti Bank
Publisher in Charge: ESZTER HERGÁR




Cover design: MARIANNA IZSÓNÉ BIGAI
© Copyright: Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the Central Bank of Hungary, MNB)
The papers in this issue contain the views of the authors which are not necessarily the 




Vol. 20 Issue 3
FINANCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC REVIEW
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC REVIEW





Dániel Palotai Editor-in-Chief: szemle@hitelintezetiszemle.hu
Endre Morvay Editor-in-Charge: morvaye@mnb.hu
Published regularly every three months. 
HU ISSN 2415–9271 (Print)
HU ISSN 2415–928X (Online)
Page setting and printing: 
Prospektus Kft.
H-8200 Veszprém, Tartu u. 6.
3
Contents
Vol. 20 Issue 3, September 2021
STUDIES 
Klaudia Rádóczy – Ákos Tóth-Pajor: 
Investors’ Reactions to Extreme Events in the Hungarian Stock Market . . . .  5
Márton Gosztonyi: 
A Snapshot of the Ownership Network of the Budapest Stock Exchange . . .  31
Gabriella Merész – Norbert Holczinger – Koppány Nagy: 
Methodological Background of the New Motor Third-Party Liability  
Insurance Index of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
Kata Plöchl – Csilla Obádovics: 
Examination of Applicants for Home Purchase Subsidy for Families  
in Terms of Prior Commitment to Having Children and Extent of Property 
Acquisition, Based on the Data of a Credit Institution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80
OUR VISION
Péter Gottfried: 
Thoughts on the Dilemma of When to Introduce the Euro in Hungary  . . . .  110
ARTICLES
Challenges of the 21st century
Katalin Kis: 
What Happened in the Neighbour? The Past Decade of Romania’s  
Economic Convergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  127
Market megatrends
Ádám Banai – Pál Péter Kolozsi – Sándor Ladányi: 




Levente Horváth – Alexandra Zoltai: 
Meeting Point of Great Powers: Southeast Asia 
(David Shambaugh: Where Great Powers Meet: America and China in  
Southeast Asia)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  147
Ferenc Tóth: 
Overcoming Financial Exclusion – a Critical Look 
(Samuel Kirwan: Financial inclusion)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  151
Balázs Sárvári: 
Humane Economics – from Adam Smith to Vernon Smith 
(Vernon L. Smith – Bart J. Wilson: Moral Sentiments and the Wealth  
of Nations for the Twenty-First Century) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  156
5
Financial and Economic Review, Vol. 20 Issue 3, September 5–30.
Investors’ Reactions to Extreme Events in the 
Hungarian Stock Market*
Klaudia Rádóczy – Ákos Tóth-Pajor
This paper examines investors’ reactions to extreme events in the Hungarian stock 
market. We seek to answer the research question whether following extreme events 
any overreaction of investors can be observed on the Budapest Stock Exchange. 
With a view to answering the research question, we identify extreme events based 
on extreme returns on the market portfolio and then – using an event study – we 
examine abnormal returns on winner and loser equities. After examining investors’ 
reactions, we inspect the performance of the contrarian strategy in the created 
event windows. The main result of our research is the presentation that – based on 
the analysis of the differences between the average cumulative abnormal returns 
after extreme events – investor overreactions can be observed in the Hungarian 
stock market. The loser portfolios relating to extreme events significantly outperform 
winner portfolios connected to the event. The excess return of the contrarian 
strategy cannot be attributed to differences in the market risk of winner and loser 
portfolios. The excess return of the strategy can be shown only under tighter extreme 
value thresholds. The clustering of the event windows with short-term reversal, 
high market volatility and extreme events is beneficial to the performance of the 
contrarian strategy. In addition, our research also shows that the purchase of loser 
portfolios or the development of a contrarian strategy after extreme events may 
generate profit for investors, since after extreme events the loser portfolios usually 
beat the market on a horizon of 21 days. 
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyse investors’ reactions to extreme events in 
the case of equities traded on the Budapest Stock Exchange. We identified extreme 
events based on the daily returns of the market portfolio that exceeded the salient 
returns of the market portfolio that could be identified in the prior period. The 
research aims to find out whether any investor overreaction can be observed as 
a result of extreme events in the Hungarian stock market. The research heavily relies 
on the work of Piccoli et al. (2017), who examined investors’ reactions to extreme 
events in the stock market of the United States. In their work, they presented the 
results of the contrarian investment strategy in periods after extreme events, relying 
on an event study. Similar studies were conducted for Hungary by Nagy ‒ Ulbert 
(2007) and Lakatos (2016), but their research did not focus on extreme events. This 
paper’s value added to Hungarian stock market analyses is the analysis of reactions 
to extreme events.
Major corrections can often be seen in stock markets, but when the market gains 
momentum, extreme positive returns are not uncommon. Crisis periods are a good 
example of corrections. During the 2008 global economic crisis, corrections of 
around 20 per cent could be observed, while in 2020 – after the outbreak of the 
Covid-19 pandemic – corrections as high as 50 per cent were not uncommon in 
stock markets. The investment strategy examined by us may provide investors with 
favourable performance during these turbulent periods.
In the research, extreme events are defined based on extreme returns of the market 
index, and then – relying on an event study – we examine the abnormal returns 
on winner and loser equities following the event. If in the period that follows the 
defined extreme event loser equities significantly outperform the winner equities, 
investors’ overreaction can be confirmed and the contrarian investment strategy 
may be profitable.
Our results show that investors in the Hungarian stock market overreact to extreme 
events. There are significant differences between winners and losers. The excess 
return of the contrarian strategy does not come from the differences between the 
market risks of the loser and winner portfolios. The excess return also exists with 
the factors underlying the systematic risk.
The paper first reviews the international literature relevant for the topic and then 
presents the results of Hungarian stock market research. After laying down the 
theoretical foundation, relying on the methodology of De Bondt ‒ Thaler (1985) 
and Piccoli et al. (2017), we perform a comprehensive analysis of the Hungarian 
stock market for the period from 4 January 2000 to 12 March 2021.
7
Investors’ Reactions to Extreme Events in the Hungarian Stock Market
2. Investors’ overreactions in the stock markets
Fama’s (1970) theory of efficient markets (Efficient Market Hypothesis) states that 
the capital market is efficient when information is immediately incorporated into 
the price of assets. In the case of capital markets, a semi-strong level of efficiency 
is most often observed, which assumes the incorporation of public information 
into asset prices. If this is accepted, investors cannot have information that would 
allow them to realise excess returns. Higher returns can only be achieved by taking 
higher risks. If the risk of the investment strategy corresponds to the risk of the 
market portfolio, it is impossible to beat the market. If market efficiency based 
on the CAPM1 model exists, the observed differences in returns stem from the 
difference in market risk.
According to the Uncertain Information Hypothesis, Brown et al. (1988) argue 
that positive abnormal returns can be observed in stock markets over a 60-day 
period following daily price changes of more than 2.5 per cent, after both negative 
and positive events. This phenomenon supports the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 
because according to the hypothesis positive abnormal returns are simply 
attributable to the increase in risk after the events. If the Uncertain Information 
Hypothesis is valid, abnormal returns should disappear when the risk is taken 
into consideration. According to the hypothesis, abnormal returns should appear 
following both positive and negative events. Corrado ‒ Jordan (1997) believe that 
the 2.5 per cent threshold is far too low. The authors found that the market reverses 
if a 10 per cent threshold was applied.
In their paper, De Bondt – Thaler (1985) examined underperforming and 
outperforming equities relative to market returns in distinct observation periods 
(without overlapping periods). Their fundamental assumption was that investors 
misprice equities in stock markets, despite the expected value of conditional 
probabilities (Bayes’ theorem), possibly overreacting to the value of the new 
information believed to be unique. Their main finding is that securities that 
performed poorly earlier will outperform securities that performed better in the 
past by about 25 per cent in the future. This phenomenon is the overreaction, 
which essentially disproves Fama’s (1970) Efficient Market Hypothesis. De Bondt ‒ 
Thaler (1985) explained the phenomenon of overreaction by the fluctuating nature 
of the positive and negative information environment, and linked it to Kahneman 
‒ Tversky’s (1979) overconfidence theory, according to which investors are overly 
confident when it comes to forecasting future prices, i.e. they believe that their 
investment decision will have a positive outcome in the future. De Bondt – Thaler 
(1987) also confirmed the Overreaction Hypothesis in their work 2 years later, and 
Daniel et al. (2004) also use this hypothesis to explain specific return patterns.
1  Capital Asset Pricing Model
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Shiller (1981) also dealt with the possibility of the Overreaction Hypothesis; however, 
he referred to the phenomenon when securities market investors overreacted to 
certain events or announcements as “excess volatility”. The Overreaction Hypothesis 
has been tested successfully on a number of occasions in several markets.
Alonso ‒ Rubio (1990) examined the Overreaction Hypothesis in the Spanish stock 
market. According to the results, the phenomenon can be definitively identified. 
The portfolios created based on De Bondt ‒ Thaler (1985) realise a profit that is 
24.5 per cent higher 12 months later for the loser portfolios, as compared to the 
winners. In the German stock market, Ising et al. (2006) examined the 100 largest 
companies for which the equity price change between 1990 and 2003 exceeded 
a negative or positive value of 20 per cent. According to their results, reactions after 
large price rises support the Overreaction Hypothesis, while there is underreaction 
to the subsequent price decrease. Chan (1988) points out that the Overreaction 
Hypothesis is very susceptible to the applied methodology. In his research, he 
applied risk corrections in the CAPM model.
The reversal shown by De Bondt ‒ Thaler (1985) (i.e. the formerly loser portfolio 
outperform previously winner portfolios) is also referred to in the literature as 
winner-loser effect, which is in fact the foundation of the contrarian or counter-
strategy. However, if the reversal does not occur, i.e. winner portfolios continue 
to realise high returns, it is advisable to apply the momentum strategy. With the 
contrarian strategy, we buy loser portfolios and short sell winner portfolios, while 
it is just the opposite with the momentum strategy.
Of the research related to the momentum strategies, Jegadeesh – Titman (1993) 
were the first to state that the price of equities that rose in the past is likely to rise 
in the future as well, and vice versa. After this, several empirical studies were built 
on proving both the reversal and overreaction hypothesis together with the related 
strategies and on identifying them in a variety of markets.
Pham et al. (2008) tested the overreaction hypothesis in the Pacific markets over 
the period 2001 to 2005. They examined the effects of price changes over short 
(3-day) and long (20-day) periods. Their research was able to validate both the 
short-term reversal and the overreaction hypothesis in the emerging market of 
Vietnam and in the developed Japanese and Australian markets. Himmelmann et 
al. (2012) examined the major European stock markets based on the EuroStoxx 50 
index. Their paper supports the efficient market hypothesis as they found that large 
price rises and falls are usually followed by average market returns.
Brooks ‒ Persand (2001) identified market anomalies with good results when 
they analysed five Southeast Asian stock exchanges. Chan (2003) tried to explore 
reactions to different news. His results show strong sideway drift after bad news, 
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with investors reacting slowly. On the other hand, he links the reversal linked to 
extreme price fluctuations to public news. Hart et al. (2003) underpin the reality 
of excess return realisable by applying the momentum strategy. They tested the 
theory on multivariate strategies with a positive result.
Examining the stock markets of the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan, 
Hudson ‒ Atanasova (2008) found that future returns depend on the magnitude and 
sign of previous price changes, but the effect gradually diminishes. After large price 
changes the market often turns around, while a momentum strategy is advisable 
in the case of small price changes.
The literature shows that loser portfolios outperform winner portfolios over 
a horizon of 1–4 weeks. The contrarian strategy may be profitable over this horizon, 
while in the case of the momentum strategy winner portfolios outperform loser 
portfolios over a horizon of 12 months (Jegadeesh ‒ Titman 1993). The reversal 
effect can also be observed over the longer horizon of 3‒5 years (Brown ‒ Harlow 
1988). When the transaction costs are also taken into consideration, investors 
give preference to investment strategies of longer cycle. The reversal effect can be 
detected in the case of larger, extreme price changes.
There is evidence of market anomalies, which prejudice the sometimes weak, 
sometimes medium and sometimes strong level of market efficiency, thereby 
facilitating insider trading, various trading strategies and also the development 
of stock market bubbles (Deev et al. 2019). However, back in 1998 Fama (1998) 
also argued that proven market anomalies appear depending on the applied 
methodology and they are often a mere coincidence.
In their work, Piccoli et al. (2017) examined the period between 1926 and 2013 
based on the daily returns on the equities included in the S&P 500, using the event 
study methodology. Having examined investors’ reactions to extreme events, they 
point out that investors’ overreaction in the US stock market can be observed after 
extreme events. After the events, loser equities outperform winner securities. As 
a result of the overreaction, the contrarian investment strategy may generate profit 
for investors.
Yuan (2015) highlights the fact that high-profile events, such as record highs in 
market indices, forecast investors’ behaviour and returns. When the market index 
is high, a high-profile event tends to prompt investors to sell equities, which has 
a negative impact on prices.
In their work, Baltussen et al. (2019) argue that systematic risk explanatory factors, 
well-known from asset pricing, based on cross sectional differences, are present 
regardless of the asset class and are able to explain changes in risk premiums, and 
thus the momentum effect can also be deemed significant. On the other hand, the 
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work of Piccoli et al. (2017) shows that the presence of extreme events rather calls 
for the contrarian strategy in the short run, due to investors’ reactions.
Since Hungary is a small, open economy, the bulk of its stock market turnover is 
constituted by a few securities. In addition, its liquidity is also low. A large part of 
Hungarian households invest their capital in domestic securities due to liquidity 
considerations. From the 1990s to the 2000s, several papers examined the efficiency, 
anomalies and returns of the Budapest Stock Exchange, reinforcing the legitimacy 
of the domestic securities market (Rappai (1995), Grubits (1995a;1995b), Andor 
et al. (1999) and Lukács (2003)). Molnár (2006) also analysed market efficiency, 
summarising the research on the efficiency of the Hungarian stock market. Having 
reviewed two decades of efficiency research related to the Hungarian market, he 
concludes that signs of market inefficiency can be identified on the Hungarian stock 
exchange, but those are not yet sufficient for developing trading strategies capable 
of realising stable extra return.
Stock market anomalies in the Hungarian stock market were analysed by Nagy – 
Ulbert (2007). In their study, they tested the hypothesis of momentum and reversal 
in addition to systematising stock market anomalies. Their study focused on the 
periods 1999–2001 and 2005–2007 and included nine equities. The analytical 
framework was based on the methodology developed for the winner and loser 
portfolios by De Bondt ‒ Thaler (1985), but their analysis also integrated the effect 
of dividends in the returns. Their results show very significant reversal phenomenon 
in the periods under review. They explain the fact that loser securities outperform 
previously winner securities in the longer run resulted by investors’ mental 
accounting and connect it to the overreaction hypothesis.
In his paper, Lakatos (2016) observed the winner-loser effect of De Bondt and Thaler 
on the Budapest Stock Exchange. In his analysis, he examined domestic Class “A” and 
Class “B” securities with outstanding turnover between December 1996 and March 
2015. His results show that the phenomenon of overreaction can be observed 
on Budapest Stock Exchange. Over a longer horizon, previously loser portfolios 
outperform the previously winner portfolios, i.e. the reversal phenomenon can be 
also observed in the market. He also highlights the fact that the anomaly identified 
by the study seems to disappear towards the end of the period, i.e. the difference 
between the abnormal returns of the winner and loser portfolios ceases to exist. 
Taking his research further, he examined periods of varying lengths, which showed 
that overreaction can be observed in the case of short periods, but there is no 
reversal.
Other research on the domestic securities market also touched upon the 
momentum strategy. In their paper, Mérő et al. (2019) reviewed the importance 
of factor models, and their empirical test confirmed that the momentum effect can 
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significantly explain future returns in the Hungarian stock market as well. Taking 
their paper further, Csillag ‒ Neszveda (2020) proved that in the period between 
1996 and 2018 companies that performed well in the past significantly outperform 
the returns of poor performing companies in the future as well.
Based on the review of the literature, we can state that investors’ overreaction can 
be observed in the stock markets of both the United States and Hungary.
In the following, we examine two research questions that can be tested empirically 
as well. On the one hand, we seek to answer the question whether following 
extreme events any overreaction of investors can be observed in the Hungarian 
stock market. On the other hand, we examine whether the contrarian strategy 
can be profitable after extreme events. Based on our preliminary expectations, we 
formulated the following assertions:
1.  Following extreme events, loser equities significantly outperform winner equities, 
which implies investors’ overreaction.
2.  Following extreme events, the application of the contrarian strategy generates 
profit.
3. Sample and descriptive statistics
Data for the empirical examination were collected from the Refinitiv database. 
As a starting point for our analysis, we downloaded the daily closing price data of 
equities traded on the Budapest Stock Exchange and the BUX index for the period 
from 29 December 1999 to 12 March 2021. The Refinitiv database contains price 
data for 43 equities listed in Hungary. Of the available data, we included in the 
empirical analysis equities for which the time series is complete, i.e. in the period 
under review they were available for trading on the Budapest Stock Exchange. As 
an additional selection criterion, only those equities were included in the sample 
for which the number of contiguously missing daily closing prices did not exceed 
8 pieces of data. This selection criterion ensured that only the more liquid traded 
equities were included in the analysis. The selection of the sample is based on 
the work of De Bondt ‒ Thaler (1985), where the criterion for the inclusion of 
equities in the sample for review is that a certain number of contiguous returns is 
available for them. Thus, the sample facilitated the analysis of larger companies with 
high turnover, also responding to the criticism that losers may have excess return 
because there are smaller companies among them. Banz (1981) argues that the 
equities of companies with low market capitalisation generate disproportionately 
high returns compared to companies with high market capitalisation. Zarowin 
(1990) also argues that overreaction is attributable to differences in size. In selecting 
the sample, we made efforts to include in the sample only equities that may be 
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a relevant investment target for investors. Filtering the data left us with 9 equities in 
the sample in total. Nagy ‒ Ulbert (2007) also worked with a sample of similar size 
in their domestic stock market research. On trading days when a particular equity 
was not traded, the closing prices were substituted for the last known closing price.
Table 1













BUX 0.041 1.486 0.028 395.63 5,289
Richter 0.047 1.824 0.026 409.639 5,289
MOL 0.044 2.053 0.021 238.286 5,289
MTelekom ‒0.013 1.701 ‒0.008 ‒76.836 5,289
Nutex 0.005 5.364 0.001 ‒99.921 5,289
OPUS 0.086 4.263 0.02 ‒11.074 5,289
OTP 0.069 2.338 0.03 806.694 5,289
PannErgy 0.014 2.112 0.007 ‒34.455 5,289
Rába 0.01 2.093 0.005 ‒45.416 5,289
Zwack 0.026 1.454 0.018 127.805 5,289
In Table 1 we present the descriptive statistics of daily returns. The daily returns 
were calculated from the daily closing prices for the period from 1 January 2000 
to 12 March 2021. The average daily return of the BUX index, used as market 
benchmark, was 4.1 basis points in the period under review, with a standard 
deviation of 1.486 per cent. The average daily return of Richter Gedeon and MOL 
were similar to the market return, while OPUS and OTP outperformed the market. 
In terms of cumulative returns in the period under review, BUX – with a cumulative 
performance of 395.63 per cent – registered almost 4-fold growth, while OTP 
registered 8-fold growth.
In Table 2 we present the descriptive statistics of daily abnormal returns calculated 
for the event study. Abnormal returns are defined as the difference between the 
daily returns on equity and the market return (market-adjusted excess return). We 
chose this method, because the explanatory power of proven asset pricing models 
(market model, CAPM) was acceptable only for blue chips (Richter, MTelekom, MOL, 
OTP). In the case of other equities the explanatory powers obtained were very low.
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Table 2
















Richter 0.006 1.46 0.004 ‒21.372 5,289
MOL 0.003 1.279 0.002 ‒24.86 5,289
MTelekom ‒0.054 1.44 ‒0.038 ‒96.77 5,289
Nutex ‒0.036 5.332 ‒0.007 ‒99.99 5,289
OPUS 0.045 4.267 0.011 ‒90.122 5,289
OTP 0.028 1.357 0.02 165.868 5,289
PannErgy ‒0.027 2.273 ‒0.012 ‒93.894 5,289
Rába ‒0.031 2.106 ‒0.015 ‒93.939 5,289
Zwack ‒0.015 1.917 ‒0.008 ‒83.066 5,289
In Table 2 we can observe positive average daily market-adjusted excess return for 
Richter, MOL, OTP and OPUS. While OTP outperformed the market by an average of 
2.8 basis points, OPUS outperformed the market by an average of 4.5 basis points 
per day. When examining the cumulated abnormal returns, it is clear that only OTP 
was able to outperform the market. OTP’s cumulated abnormal return in the period 
under review is 165.87 per cent.
In the next step, since the purpose of this paper is to examine investors’ reaction 
to extreme events, we looked for positive and negative extreme events in the 
Hungarian stock market. For this purpose, we used the methodology applied by 
Piccoli et al. (2017). We defined extreme events not on the basis of excess return 
on equities, but rather based on the excess return of the BUX index, used as market 
portfolio. Extreme events are events when the daily return of the market portfolio 
exceeded the extreme returns of the market portfolio observed in the previous 
period. Market portfolio returns were measured by the daily returns of the BUX 
index. 
We compared the returns of the index observed at time tth with the BUX index 
returns on the 500 trading days prior to time tth belonging to the 1st and 99th 
percentiles of the empirical density function, defining the extreme large positive 
and negative returns in this way. This procedure corresponds to the Value at Risk 
estimated by a historic simulation in the long and short position. This implies 
that the 99th percentile of the empirical density function determines the short 
position’s value at risk, while the 1st percentile of the same distribution determines 
the long position’s value at risk. According to our calculations, in the period under 
review the daily returns below the 1st percentile constitute the extreme negative 
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events of the period, while the daily returns over the 99th percentile constitute 
the extreme positive events of the period. Accordingly, the tested sample allowed 
the identification of extreme events between 7 January 2002 and 12 March 2021.
Table 3
Annual distribution of the identified extreme events
Year Number of trading days
Number of negative 
extreme events
Number of positive 
extreme events
2000 251 n/a n/a
2001 245 n/a n/a
2002 249 2 1
2003 250 1 0
2004 254 1 2
2005 253 6 4
2006 252 2 5
2007 245 2 1
2008 251 12 9
2009 251 0 0
2010 254 1 1
2011 253 3 3
2012 244 0 0
2013 246 1 0
2014 248 3 4
2015 249 2 5
2016 252 3 1
2017 251 0 1
2018 244 4 7
2019 246 0 0
2020 251 10 9
2021 50 0 0
Number of observations 5,289 53 53
We identified 106 extreme events in total, of which negative extreme returns and 
positive extreme returns were observed in 53 cases each. The highest number of 
extreme events was observed in 2008 and 2020 (Table 3). These two years can be 
considered as crisis years. In the two crisis years, in addition to the higher number 
of events, the number of negative and positive extreme events is almost the 
same. 41.5 and 34 per cent of all identified negative and positive extreme events, 
respectively, can be linked to these two years.
15
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In Figure 1 we show the extreme daily returns of the BUX index – applied as 
a market portfolio – calculated using the 500-day rolling VaR method. The figure 
illustrates the 1st and 99th percentiles belonging to the empirical density function 
of the BUX returns observed during the 500 trading days prior to time tth. Figure 1 
clearly shows that during the 2008 global economic crisis volatility in the Hungarian 
stock market was higher, which also increased the extreme values of daily returns. 
The same phenomenon can be observed in spring 2020 as well, i.e. the period of 
the Covid-19 pandemic.
4. Investors’ overreactions after extreme events in the Hungarian stock 
market
After identifying extreme events, we examined investors’ reaction using an event 
study. After defining the extreme event, we created a 21-day time window for each 
of the 106 events for the event study. For each event window, we constructed 
winner and loser portfolios according to the abnormal returns observed on the day 
of the extreme event, relying on the methodology of De Bondt ‒ Thaler (1985), with 
equal weighting. The 9 analysed equities were ranked according to the abnormal 
return observed on the day of the event for each event window, and then the 
equities in the upper tercile and in the lower tercile were allocated to the winner 
and loser portfolios, respectively. If the loser portfolios significantly outperform 
the winner portfolios in the period after the extreme event, it may imply investors’ 
overreaction.
Figure 1
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The allocation of equities to portfolios in this manner differs from that applied by 
Lakatos (2016), but it is in line with the work of Piccoli et al. (2017), who argue – 
following Brooks et al. (2003) and Coleman (2012) – that the market reaction to 
unexpected events is determined on the day when the event occurs. It should be 
noted that while De Bondt ‒ Thaler (1985), Nagy ‒ Ulbert (2007) or Lakatos (2016) 
determined the various test periods as non-overlapping periods, in our case certain 
time windows in the years of the crisis may overlap due to their rate of occurrence 
and higher frequency. Extreme events cannot be considered as independent of each 
other; accordingly, we also performed the analysis, following the work of Piccoli 
et al. (2017), on subsamples with no overlap and with different combinations of 
events.
After classifying the equities, we calculated the abnormal returns on the winner 
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where ARn,j,t(T) is the abnormal return of the portfolio j (winner or loser ) of the nth 
event window on day tth, wn,i,j is the weight of equity ith in portfolio jth, which is the 
same on each day of the nth event window, ARi,t is the abnormal return on equity 
ith on trading day tth.
Using the above formula, we obtain the same result as if we calculated the returns 
on the winner and loser portfolios and then took their difference with the returns 
of the BUX index. Thus, the abnormal return definition we used allows us to create 
an equivalent definition of the abnormal returns on winner and loser portfolios 
based on the above formula.
After creating the winner and loser portfolios, the next step was to calculate the 
cumulative abnormal returns. In equation (2) CARn,j(T) shows the (j) cumulative 
abnormal return on (n) winner or loser portfolio of the given event window on the 
Tth day of the event window, while ARn,j,t, denotes the abnormal returns on portfolio 
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After defining the cumulative abnormal returns, we calculated the average 
cumulative abnormal returns based on equation (3), aggregating it separately for 
the loser and winner portfolios, i.e. we derived the average cumulative abnormal 
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After calculating the average cumulative abnormal returns, we took the difference 
between the average cumulative abnormal return on loser portfolios and the 
average cumulative abnormal returns on winner portfolios based on equation 
(4). The significant positive difference in the averages of the cumulative abnormal 
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The methodology presented here is based on the work of De Bondt ‒ Thaler (1985) 
and Piccoli et al. (2017). Of the two works referred to above, it was the work of 
Piccoli et al. (2017) that applied the methodology to the analysis of extreme 
events. Their paper analysed the US stock market and their results show that the 
overreaction hypothesis can be confirmed in investors’ reactions also when making 
decisions on extreme events.
Figure 2 shows the averages of cumulative abnormal returns for the 21-day event 
window following extreme events. It illustrates the average cumulative abnormal 
returns on the created winner and loser portfolios for 106 extreme events. The 
figure clearly shows that after extreme events loser portfolios outperform winner 
portfolios. While winner portfolios perform below the market return for 6 days after 
the extreme event, the average cumulative abnormal returns on loser portfolios are 
positive. The average cumulative return on winner portfolios is once again positive 
on the 7th trading day. These results are in line with the conclusions of Piccoli et al. 
(2017). However, it should be noted that the reactions to extreme events in the 
Hungarian stock market are less pronounced than the results presented by the 
authors in relation to the US stock markets.
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The differences between the average cumulative abnormal returns of the loser 
and winner portfolios are presented in Table 4. The significant positive differences 
suggest that loser portfolios outperform winner portfolios, which implies that 
investors overreact after extreme events. When examining the contrarian strategy, 
i.e. buying loser portfolios and short selling winner portfolios, we find that on 
average significant positive abnormal returns can be realised in the Hungarian stock 
market compared to the market portfolio. After extreme events, the contrarian 
investment strategy may generate profit for investors in the short term.
Figure 2
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Table 4
Differences between the average cumulative abnormal returns





1 0.243 ‒0.326 0.568*** 19.633***
2 0.278 ‒0.654 0.931*** 24.121***
3 0.945 ‒0.843 1.788*** 38.298***
4 1.261 ‒0.759 2.020*** 34.224***
5 1.263 ‒0.178 1.441*** 21.883***
6 1.240 ‒0.063 1.303*** 19.280***
7 1.425 0.139 1.285*** 17.834***
8 1.775 0.193 1.581*** 21.668***
9 1.861 0.337 1.524*** 21.193***
10 2.212 0.524 1.688*** 22.805***
11 2.459 0.679 1.780*** 21.450***
12 2.727 0.865 1.863*** 21.111***
13 2.832 0.984 1.848*** 20.522***
14 3.003 1.181 1.823*** 19.663***
15 3.084 1.116 1.968*** 20.541***
16 2.816 1.495 1.320*** 13.204***
17 3.007 1.627 1.379*** 13.152***
18 3.215 1.752 1.463*** 13.766***
19 3.352 1.631 1.721*** 15.925***
20 3.535 1.210 2.325*** 20.690***
21 3.580 1.296 2.284*** 19.820***
Note: Asterisks at the differences represent the p-values from the Wilcoxon test. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, 
*p < 0.1.
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5. Performance of the contrarian strategy in the analysed event 
windows
Following the analysis of investor reactions, we also examined the performance 
of the contrarian strategy in the event windows after extreme events. With the 
contrarian strategy, we take long positions in loser portfolios and short sell winner 
portfolios. In this way, we expect that after the extreme events loser portfolios may 
outperform winner portfolios, and thus this strategy may help us realise a profit.
When examining the performance of the contrarian strategy, following the method 
of Piccoli et al. (2017), we sorted the returns on the winner, loser, contrarian and 
market portfolios in a panel dataset for 21 days of the event windows created 
during the analysis of the extreme events. Following this, we examined whether the 
portfolios thus created also earned excess returns over the market risk premium. We 
determined the portfolios’ beta and Jensen alpha indicators based on the equations 
of the CAPM model using Pooled OLS estimation. In the paper, we examine the 
performance of the portfolios in terms of market efficiency based on the CAPM 
model. Finding a positive significant Jensen alpha indicator in the case of the 
contrarian strategy implies that that excess return of the strategy is not generated 
by the difference in the market risk of the loser and winner portfolios. We estimated 
the Jensen alpha of the contrarian portfolio based on equation (5). The market 
risk premium was defined as the difference between the BUX index and the 1-year 
zero-coupon return converted into an overnight return. Zero-coupon risk-free return 
in the Refinitiv database was available only from 7 March 2002, and thus it was 
possible to include all 106 events in the analysis. This allowed us to perform an 
ex-post assessment of the portfolios’ performance after the event. At the time of 
the extreme event this information is not yet known for the investors, since then 





𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴#,%,& = 𝑤𝑤#,),%𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴),&*)+, ,	 (1)	
	
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴#,% 𝑇𝑇 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴#,%,&
/
&+0



















𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑇𝑇 >)? = 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑇𝑇 QRBAF − 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑇𝑇 S)##AF 	 (4)	
	
 (5)
where RL,i,t is the return on loser portfolios, RW,i,t is the return on winner portfolios, 
RM,i,t is the return of the BUX index, Rf,i,t is the 1-year zero-coupon return calculated 
for one day, α is the Jensen alpha, β is the ex-post market risk, εi,t is the error term, 
and i is used for the indexation of the extreme events, while t for the indexation of 
the days in the event window. 
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Table 5
Estimation results of the CAPM model
Samples Parameters Loser-Winner Loser Winner
Full










Adjusted R2 (%) 0.582 52.786 51.851
Number of 
observations 2,226 2,226 2,226
Negative 
extreme events










Adjusted R2 (%) 23.088 72.892 41.520
Number of 
observations 1,113 1,113 1,113
Positive 
extreme events










Adjusted R2 (%) 25.983 20.549 71.340
Number of 
observations 1,113 1,113 1,113
Note: standard errors according to Arellano (1987) are in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table 5 shows the results of the CAPM model estimates. The parameters were 
determined by Pooled OLS estimation. The Jensen alpha indicators and the 
corresponding standard errors are presented in the table in percentages. The 
explanatory power of the models is also provided in percentages. It is clear from the 
table that when all extreme events are considered, the contrarian strategy provides 
significant positive excess return. The Jensen alpha is 12.2 basis points (annualised2: 
35.77 per cent) and is significant at a 5-per cent significance level. On average, 
the contrarian portfolio generates this much more excess return compared to the 
market portfolio in the examined event windows. Piccoli et al. (2017), examining 
all extreme events, estimate a daily excess return of 14 basis points in the US stock 
market. When examining the full sample, it can be shown for the loser portfolios 
that they outperform the market after extreme events. The Jensen alpha indicator 
is 13.4 basis points (annualised: 39.94 per cent) and is significant at a 1-per cent 
significance level. The explanatory power of the model is 52.79 per cent. When 
examining the full sample, no significant excess return can be identified for the 
2  The annualised values are based on 251 trading days.
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winner portfolios. This suggests that the excess returns of the contrarian strategy 
may be attributable to the loser portfolios’ outperforming.
In the case of the subsample containing negative extreme events, the contrarian 
strategy also generates significant excess return. The Jensen alpha indicator is 
15.7 basis points (annualised: 48.16 per cent) and is significant at a 5-per cent 
significance level. Piccoli et al (2017) estimate a daily excess return of 18 basis 
points for the negative subsample in the US stock market. The explanatory power 
of the model in this case is already 23.09 per cent. By contrast, in the case of the 
subsample containing positive events, the contrarian strategy generates no excess 
returns. This implies that this strategy is more likely to be successful in the case of 
negative extreme events.
Loser portfolios beat the market under both negative and positive events. For 
the subsample of positive events, the Jensen alpha indicator is 11 basis points 
(annualised: 31.71 per cent) and is significant at a 5-per cent significance level. On 
the other hand, for the subsample of negative events, the Jensen alpha indicator 
is 14.8 basis points (annualised: 44.78 per cent) and is significant at a 5-per cent 
significance level. After the extreme event, the loser portfolios beat the market in 
all cases over a horizon of 21 days.
In estimating the models, we assume that the market risk is known in advance, and 
thus the β indicators illustrate the ex-post market risk. In the models, the market 
risk of the contrarian strategy is obtained as the difference between the market 
risks of the loser and winner strategies. If β is positive and significant, it suggests 
the market risks of the loser portfolio exceeds that of the winner portfolio, while in 
the case of negative significant  the market risk of the winner portfolio exceeds that 
of the loser portfolio. For the full sample the β of the loser portfolio is 0.77, while 
the market risk of the winner portfolio is 0.69. The market risk of the contrarian 
strategy is 0.08 and is not significant. This suggests that for the full sample the 
market risk of the loser and winner portfolios is not significantly different, i.e. the 
differences in returns are not attributable to the differences in market risks. In 
the case of the full sample, the very low explanatory power of the CAPM model is 
also attributable to the fact that the market risk of the contrarian strategy is not 
significantly different from zero. There is already significant positive difference in 
the subsample of negative events, but the positive significant Jensen alpha indicator 
estimated under the ex-post β suggests that the performance difference is not only 
attributable to the differences in the systematic risk of loser and winner portfolios. 
The work of Piccoli et al. (2017) and the results in Table 4 also highlight the fact that 
the risk factors included in the popular asset pricing models (CAPM, FF3, Carhart, 
FF5) do not explain the difference between the performance of loser and winner 
portfolios. This implies that investors’ overreaction to extreme events appears in the 
stock market as an explanatory factor for returns, independent of other systematic 
risk factors.
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6. Robustness tests
Extreme events are not independent of each other, and several extreme events may 
appear in a single event window. The analysis of overlapping events may bias our 
results. In the case of a market correction, loser equities are those that suffer the 
largest fall, and from a market efficiency perspective based on the CAPM model, 
these equities are also more susceptible to market changes, i.e. they have higher 
market risk (β). When the examined event overlaps with an extreme event of 
opposite direction and the market returns, this opposite event will trigger stronger 
reaction of loser equities. Then, the excess return of the contrarian strategy cannot 
be attributed to the overreaction, but rather to differences in the market risk of 
winner and loser portfolios. This is why we present the results in Table 5 on the 
subsample of the non-overlapping event windows under different extreme event 
definitions. The purpose of the various extreme event definitions is to control for 
the extreme event definitions that largely determine the strategy.
Table 6
Non-overlapping event windows according to different extreme event definitions
Samples Parameters Loser-Winner Loser Winner
Non-overlapping 
event windows 
(1 per cent, with 
500 days)










Adjusted R2 (%) 2.981 7.589 25.608
Number of observations 735 735 735
Non-overlapping 
event windows 
(5 per cent, with 
500 days)










Adjusted R2 (%) ‒0.026 9.309 15.462
Number of observations 1,071 1,071 1,071
Non-overlapping 
event windows 
(1 per cent, with 
250 days)










Adjusted R2 (%) 0.873 12.619 27.178
Number of observations 735 735 735
Non-overlapping 
event windows 
(5 per cent, with 
250 days)










Adjusted R2 (%) 0.551 6.932 20.068
Number of observations 840 840 840
Note: standard errors according to Arellano (1987) are in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 6 presents the results of the CAPM model estimations on subsample of non-
overlapping event windows by different extreme event definitions. The parameters 
were determined by Pooled OLS estimation. The Jensen alpha indicators and the 
corresponding standard errors are presented in the table in percentages. The 
explanatory power of the models is also provided in percentages. When extreme 
events are identified using the original definition, the Jensen alpha indicator of the 
contrarian strategy is 14.3 basis points (annualised: 43.27 per cent) and is significant 
at a 10-per cent significance level. Piccoli et al. (2017) estimate a daily excess return 
of 13 basis points on a subsample of non-overlapping events, which in their case is 
significant at a 1-per cent level. The explanatory power of the model is 2.98, which 
suggests that less than 3 per cent of the variance of the difference between the 
loser and winner portfolio returns is explained by the differences in market risk. 
The market risk of the loser portfolio is significantly lower than the market risk of 
the winner portfolio, and thus the difference in returns is not attributable to the 
differences in market risk. The excess return on the loser portfolio is 18.3 basis 
points (annualised: 58.07 per cent) and is significant at a 5-per cent significance 
level. This implies that the excess return of the contrarian strategy comes from 
the excess return of the loser portfolio also in the case of non-overlapping events, 
and the excess return is not attributable to the differences in market risk. Table 5 
shows that in the case of different extreme events, investor’s overreaction can be 
identified only for extreme events defined under a stricter, 1-per cent threshold. The 
performance of the contrarian strategy is clearly independent of the length of the 
time series selected for the purposes of defining extreme events; we can choose 250 
or 500 trading days. This suggests that the performance of the contrarian strategy 
increases under tighter extreme thresholds.
Table 7 shows the results of additional robustness tests. The parameters of the 
CAPM model were determined by Pooled OLS estimation. The Jensen alpha 
indicators and the corresponding standard errors are presented in the table in 
percentages. The explanatory power of the models is also provided in percentages. 
In the first case, we examined the subsample of event windows with short-term 
reversal. We selected the event windows so that the event window contained 
another extreme event of opposite direction. On this subsample, the Jensen alpha 
indicator of the contrarian strategy is 24.9 basis points (annualised: 86.65 per cent) 
and is significant at a 1-per cent significance level. Piccoli et al. (2017) identified 
an excess return of 19 basis points in the case of event windows with short-term 
reversal. The market risk of loser and winner portfolios does not differ significantly. 
The excess return of the contrarian strategy is attributable to the excess return on 
the loser portfolio. It is obvious here as well that the excess return is not attributable 
to the differences in market risk.
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In the second case, we examined the subsample of momentum event windows. We 
selected the event windows so that they contained another extreme event of the 
same direction. In this case, we identified no significant excess returns. The market 
risk of loser portfolios is significantly higher than that of the winner portfolios. In the 
case of the momentum event windows, the contrarian strategy generates no profit.
Table 7
Robustness tests














Adjusted R2 (%) 0.122 57.162 58.208
Number of observations 672 672 672
Momentum 
event windows










Adjusted R2 (%) 5.763 64.825 57.507














Adjusted R2 (%) 2.600 68.320 61.531














Adjusted R2 (%) 0.645 62.249 58.937














Adjusted R2 (%) 0.407 33.827 35.262
Number of observations 1,113 1,113 1,113
Note: standard errors according to Arellano (1987) are in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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In the third case we examined event windows with multiple extreme events. 
We selected the event windows such that there was an overlap of more than 1 
extreme events in the event window regardless of the direction of the events. On 
this subsample, the Jensen alpha indicator of the contrarian strategy is 26.5 basis 
points (annualised: 94.07 per cent) and is significant at a 1-per cent significance 
level. Piccoli et al. (2017) identified an excess return of 23 basis points in the case of 
event windows with multiple extreme events. The market risk of loser and winner 
portfolios does not differ significantly.
In the fourth and fifth cases, the event windows were grouped based on the 
volatility of market portfolio prior to the extreme event. Based on the work of 
Piccoli et al. (2017), volatility was measured by the standard deviation of the returns 
on the market portfolio over 126 trading days preceding the extreme event. The 
median of the measured standard deviations was used as a breakpoint. On the 
sample of event windows of high volatility, the excess return of the contrarian 
strategy is 15.7 basis points (annualised: 44.27 per cent) and is significant at a 10-
per cent significance level. On the sample of low volatility event windows the excess 
return of the contrarian strategy is not significant. No significant differences can be 
observed in market risks in either case.
Based on the robustness tests, we can state that contrarian strategy performs better 
in the case of event windows with short-term reversal than in the event windows 
with extreme events of the same direction. The clustering of high market volatility 
and extreme events is also beneficial to the performance of the contrarian strategy.
7. Conclusions
This paper examined investors’ reactions to extreme events in the Hungarian 
stock market. The literature has already demonstrated many times that investors’ 
overreaction can be observed in the stock market of both the United States and 
Hungary. Moreover, Piccoli et al. (2017) observed this phenomenon in the US stock 
market after extreme events as well. Based on this methodology, we investigated 
investors’ reactions after extreme events in the Hungarian stock market with a view 
to contributing to the existing Hungarian literature analysing investors’ reactions.
The research showed that after extreme events loser equities significantly 
outperform winner equities, and thus investors’ overreaction to extreme events can 
be observed. These reactions are in line with the reactions presented by Piccoli et 
al. (2017), but it is also clear that these reactions are less pronounced for Hungarian 
equities than in the US stock market. Negative abnormal returns in the case of 
winners can be observed on the first 6 days after the event. The average cumulative 
abnormal returns of the contrarian strategy increases significantly in the first 4 days 
after the extreme event, when we observe a cumulative abnormal value of 2.02 per 
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cent. Based on the analysis of the average cumulative abnormal returns, investors’ 
overreaction can be confirmed.
After examining investors’ reactions, we highlighted the fact that – due to the 
outperformance of the loser portfolios – application of the contrarian strategy after 
extreme events generates profit for investors. By purchasing loser portfolios and 
short selling winner portfolios we followed a contrarian strategy, and showed that 
these portfolios outperform the market portfolio over a 21-day trading horizon, 
particularly in the case of negative events. The excess return of the contrarian 
strategy is shaped by the excess return on loser portfolios, since these portfolios 
always beat the market on a horizon of 21 days. Furthermore, the significant positive 
Jensen alpha indicators suggest that the excess return of the contrarian strategy is 
not attributable to the differences in the market risk of loser and winner portfolios, 
which implies that investors’ overreaction to extreme events appears in the stock 
markets as a factor explaining returns, independent of systematic risk factors. Thus, 
the loser portfolios’ outperforming reflects investors’ overreaction rather than 
differences in market risk.
The robustness tests showed that the performance of the contrarian strategy 
can be identified under tighter extreme value thresholds. The clustering of the 
event windows with short-term reversal, high market volatility and extreme 
events is beneficial to the performance of the contrarian strategy. This suggests 
that overreaction and market volatility are not independent of each other. We can 
conclude from the results that buying loser equities or developing a contrarian 
strategy after extreme events may generate profit for investors in the short run in 
the Hungarian stock market.
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A Snapshot of the Ownership Network of the 
Budapest Stock Exchange*
Márton Gosztonyi
In this study, I use the toolkit of network research to explore the network of 
ownership relations of entities present on the Budapest Stock Exchange as issuers 
in 2020, applying static methods and exponential random graph modelling (ERGM) 
analysis. In the snapshot typology and simulation-based capture of the network, 
not only the network of relations between issuers present on the stock market is 
analysed, but also the ownership relations of companies connected to the network 
but not listed on the stock market; thus, the study addresses the ownership network 
associated with the stock exchange as a whole. The research results provide us 
with an accurate answer about the morphological characteristics of the network, 
the network factors determining centrality, the hierarchy of the network, and the 
evolution of the network with the help of simulations. The study may allow us to 
obtain a clearer picture of the interlinkages and clusters of companies listed on the 
stock market, which can be used as a basis for subsequent longitudinal analyses.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: H54, D53, L14
Keywords: Budapest Stock Exchange, complex systems, network analysis, company 
ownership
1. The stock market as a complex system
The Hungarian stock market (Budapest Stock Exchange — BSE) is a concentrated 
market, where many products are traded at agreed prices, subject to complex 
economic transaction systems. In my study, I examine the ownership structure of 
issuers in the spot market, one of the markets of the stock market, using network 
research methodology. Many studies on trading in the Hungarian stock market 
have been conducted, but up to now the system has not been examined much 
from the point of view of networks affecting ownership relations. This topic is 
particularly important, as a given company’s share price, performance and trading 
itself are influenced by the ownership relations of the company, i.e. its ties with 
other affiliated listed and unlisted companies (Onnela et al. 2004).
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The stock market generates a large amount of non-linear information1 between 
numerous actors, which makes it a complex system. Accordingly, its analysis requires 
a methodology that can minimise and capture this complexity, while preserving 
the fundamental linkages. One such approach is network analysis. In fact, the 
correlation structure of the stock market, together with the corresponding stocks, 
can be considered a complex network system, which, with a finite number of nodes, 
forms a directed and weighted, complete graph (Lee – Djauhari 2012). This also 
means that network data can be used to test a multi-type relation between actors 
(Wasserman – Faust 2010; Taghizadeh et al. 2020). Network-based analysis of 
capital markets can thus bring us closer to how actors access information on events, 
how the network can be clustered and what internal hierarchy it is characterised 
by, and by introducing exponential random graph modelling (ERGM), we can gain 
the knowledge to explore the formation of the network, using simulations of edge 
numbers. In fact, at a further stage, in a longitudinal analysis, this can be used to 
analyse which nodes have what impact on the evolution of cluster groups, or even 
on the stock market performance of issuing entities, and how the reaction of each 
actor to events affects the dynamics of the complex system.
The network-based approach to stock markets is not a novelty methodology. 
However, most of the academic literature focuses on trading on the stock market; 
thus, in general, this method is used to explore the behaviour of shares traded on 
the market, i.e. the relation between shares. Network researchers usually follow two 
network methodologies: (1) they perform their analysis based on the correlations 
between the logarithms of stock returns (Lee – Djauhari 2012), and (2) they analyse 
the sales network of stocks, using the minimum spanning tree (MST) method (Lee – 
Djauhari 2012; Mantegna 1999; Boginski et al. 2005). Such analyses have explored 
trading on the stock markets in a number of countries around the world; to highlight 
only the most important ones, the works of Boginski et al. (2006) and Roy and Sarkar 
(2011) have examined the US stock market, following the above methodology. In 
Korea, Kim et al. (2007) carried out this analysis, Huang et al. (2009) wrote about 
the Chinese stock exchange, Pan and Sinha (2007) performed an analysis for India, 
and finally, Tabak et al. (2009) analysed the Brazilian stock market, applying the 
above methods. Several studies have also addressed the network-based exploration 
of stock market trading in foreign exchange markets, using daily scales (Forbes – 
Rigobon 2002) and intraday scales (Münnix et al. 2010), as well as market indices 
1  Data organised in a non-linear data structure is considered a key feature of dynamic complex systems. In 
these data structures, the analysis of data points — due to their holistic interconnectedness and dynamism 
— follows a causality completely different from the Baconian and Cartesian cause and effect theories. 
Consequently, when we examine the coupling of system data, analysis categories between the theoretically 
presumed linear cause and effect are blurred; non-linear cause and effect relation systems emerge, in which 
cause and effect categories are often interchanged, and we can discern a blurring of the boundary between 
the two conceptual constructs (for more on this, see Atmanspacher et al. 1992).
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(Drożdż et al. 2001; McDonald et al. 2005). These studies have revealed that stock 
markets are structured along the lines of geographical activities.
Based on the results, a number of network topological analyses have been 
published. Huang et al. (2009) analysed cliques and independent actors emerging 
in the Chinese stock exchanges to explore the resilience of the network and found 
that stock markets display a topological robustness against random vertex failures, 
but are also fragile to intentional attacks. Having analysed the network typology 
of the Greek stock market, Dimitrios and Vasileios (2015) concluded that in 2007 
and 2012 the Greek market was a ‘shallow’ market made up of a large number 
of heterogeneous components, easily affected by a few centrally positioned, big 
investors or companies.
Much less academic attention is focused on capturing the role of the interpersonal 
relation network emerging in stock markets. In this vein, however, it is worth 
highlighting the works of Taghizadeh et al. (2020) and Kazemilari and Djauhari 
(2015), who find that more centrally positioned companies have fewer mediator 
relations and, consequently, easier access to available resources and information, 
and that these factors have a strong impact on the pricing mechanism of stocks.
Even fewer articles deal with the network-based analysis of the ownership structure 
of listed issuers, mainly due to the difficulty of accessing the data. In this conceptual 
framework, the director board networks of listed companies have been the subject 
of most research (Mahdavi Ardekani et al. 2019; Rezaee et al. 2018; Rotundo – 
D’Arcangelis 2010). The relation network of directors has been used to examine the 
structure of the relations and the identity of the economically efficient or key actors 
in the given networks. Studies provide compelling evidence of a strong correlation 
between the quality of corporate governance and stock market performance across 
stock markets (Khorshidvand – Sarlak 2017; Khodami – Bazraie 2013; Babu – Kumar 
2011; You et al. 2015). Examination of the network of director boards is also of 
crucial importance for the analysis of ownership relations, because such analyses 
interpret the nature of the formation and functioning of the network by drawing 
on theories of social capital and relational capital. In fact, board interlock relations 
affect the activities of organisations at many points, such as the rights and benefits 
of the director board, governance system, organisational structure, and quality 
control, all of which have an effect on the behaviour of stock markets, reflecting 
the results of mutual interactions between participants seeking to maximise their 
interests (Borgatti – Foster 2003). Peng et al. (2015) studied the relation between 
the interlocking directorates of Chinese companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange and stock market performance. Their findings show that board interlocks 
improve the stock market performance of companies. Sankowska and Siudak (2016) 
studied the network of directorates of large companies and corporate directors 
in the Polish stock market. The results showed the characteristics of the stock 
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market network to be identical to those of the small-world networks. Finally, Singh 
and Delios (2017) analysed the relation between board structure and risk-taking 
behaviour of emerging companies.
From this brief academic literature review it is clear that the exploration of the 
ownership network of listed issuers is still in its infancy even at the international 
level; the basic analytical focus is not on this topic. However, it may also be an 
explanatory factor for many of the complex, systemic movements seen in the stock 
market.
Thus, in my study I conduct a new network-based analysis for issuers present on 
the Hungarian stock exchange, seeking to answer the question of what network 
typology, clustering and hierarchy can be discovered in the ownership network of 
listed and unlisted companies and firms in December 2020. The analysis provides 
a comprehensive picture of the structure of the Hungarian stock exchange and the 
related network of companies, treating the actors as a specific, complex graph. 
Exploring the network structure can help identify stock market risks, and non-linear 
analysis can also be of practical value, e.g. in portfolio optimisation based on it.
2. Network research and ERGM
Network analysis is based on the graph theory, in which a graph G is composed 
of two sets (N and E) (Paparrizos 2003). Elements N are called nodes, vertices 
or simply points (nodes), which are arranged in ordered or unordered pairs of 
elements, and are interconnected by edges, arcs or links (edges). Graph G = (N, E) 
is connected if there exists a path from any vertex of set N to any vertex of that set. 
When analysing a graph, we determine the size of the entire graph, the size of the 
connected component, the degree and distribution of vertices, the clusters of the 
graph, which are formed on the basis of edges, and the hierarchy of the network. 
It is easy to visualise a graph, where nodes are usually drawn as points or circles, 
while edges as directed arrows or simple lines (Dimitrios – Vasileios 2015).
Networks can always be characterised by a kind of structuring, a topological 
structure, according to the ordering of edges, which is measured by a number 
of metrics. One such metric is network density, the other is degree distribution. 
When calculating the density indicator of networks, we divide the fully connected 
theoretical edge number by the measured number of edges. The degree distribution 
of nodes, which forms the clusters and hierarchy, is not uniform for empirical 
networks measured with real data, and theoretical graphs. In contrast to random 
network described by Erdős – Rényi (1960), where degree distribution follows 
a normal curve, for small-world networks and scale-free networks, the majority 
of vertices have a small degree, while a mere minority of them have an extremely 
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high degree distribution; their distribution deviates significantly from the normal 
curve. Nodes in the central positions of scale-free networks are often called hubs, 
which make it possible to calculate the clustering coefficient of a network, i.e. 
the closely interconnected cliques and communities. Empirical investigations of 
networks measured with real data show that they are characterised by a higher 
network clustering coefficient than stochastic networks of the same size. Based 
on the high clustering coefficient measured on scale-free networks, a theoretical 
network model, known as ‘small-world’ (Watts – Strogatz 1998), and the scale-
free theoretical network were developed (Barabási – Albert 1999). With these 
theoretical networks, it is possible to validate the measured networks, i.e. to 
determine to what theoretical model the network typology diverges. Clusters, 
however, not only help to identify the cliques in the network, but also trace out 
the hierarchy of the network itself. In fact, the hierarchy of a network (measured 
by K-core metric) can be inferred from the internal connectivity of the cluster parts 
(Newman et al. 2006).
However, network analysis includes not only static but also dynamic methodologies; 
one such methodology — currently used by several network researchers concerned 
with stock markets — is the method of exponential random graph modelling, i.e. 
ERGM. ERGM falls into the scope of statistical exponential network modelling. The 
class of exponential random graph models includes Markov random graphs of edge 
and dyadic independence models, and many other graph distributions (Frank and 
Strauss 1986). Of these, ERGM allows the joint and controlled study of the effects of 
network parameters. In other words, ERGMs provide an opportunity to understand 
in dynamic models how and why network connections are formed.
Network connections are organised into patterns, and the presence of some 
connections (ties) promotes the appearance of others. The ERGM analyses these 
endogenous effects, often referred to as ‘structural’ effects, i.e. it interprets the 
internal processes of the network relation system, complementing them with the 
exogenous effects of the network, such as the effects of attributes associated with 
nodes (Lusher et al. 2013). Based on the findings of Watts (1999), ERGM works 
with randomness and probabilistic random graph modelling. By incorporating 
randomness, statistical models work with expected values, from which we can draw 
conclusions about whether the observed data are consistent with the theoretical 
(anticipated) data. Markov random graphs are defined by a particular dependence 
structure between network ties (Robins et al. 2007); thus, during an ERGM, we 
estimate the presence of network edges from several predictor variables, and use 
model parameters to estimate its given effect, direction, and significance in the 
studied network (Lusher et al. 2013).
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For this reason, ERGM models network effects of interest in the formation of 
edges, e.g. the effect of transitive triads, the k-star effect, the effect of assortativity 
(homophilic, heterophilic relations), the effect of distributions, the effect of degrees 
and the effect of attribute variables. It also compares the models formed on the 
basis of the effects of these network variables with the observed network in an 
effort to reveal the causes of network edge formation.
To capture exponential random graphs, I use the notation and terminology 
prescribed by Robins et al. (2007). Each pair i and j of actor n in set N is denoted by 
the expression Yij, which is a network connection variable, whose value is Yij = 1 if 
there is a network connection from i to j, and Yij = 0 if there is no connection. We 
specify yij as the observed value of Yij, with Y being the matrix of all variables, while 
y being the matrix of observed connections, i.e. our observed network itself. Y may 
be directed or undirected. A configuration is the totality of nodes and the subset of 
connections between them. For example, a 2-star shape is a set of three nodes in 
which one node is connected to the other two, whereas a triangle is a set of three 
nodes connected to each other. The configurations are defined hierarchically in the 
model; thus, a triangle contains as many as three 2-stars.
The general form of (homogeneous) exponential random graph models is as follows:
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where: (i) the summation is applied to configuration type A, whose different sets 
represent different models (e.g. dyadic independence or Markov random graph); 
(ii) ηA is the parameter corresponding to type A configuration; (iii) gA(y) is the 
network statistic corresponding to configuration A (for a homogeneous Markov, this 
is the number of type A configurations observed in the network: e.g. the number of 
triangles); (iv) κ is a normalising factor ensuring that (1) is a probability distribution. 
The model represents the probability distribution of a graph on a fixed set of 
nodes, where the probability of a graph being created depends on the presence 
of different configurations expressed by the model. ERGM can thus be used to 
interpret the structure of a typical graph as the result of a cumulation of specific 
and local configurations, with the parameters providing information on the presence 
of structural effects observed in the network data.
Based on Chatterjee and Diaconis (2013), the exponential graph formula has been 
revised in recent years, resulting in the following general form of the class of 
exponential random graph models:
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The premise of the equation is that Gn is the space spanned by all simple graphs on 
n-labelled vertices (‘simple’ means undirected, with no loops). Thus, Gn contains 2 
elements. In the equation, β = (β1, ..., βk) is a vector of real parameters, T1, T2, ..., 
Tk are functions on Gn, and ψ(β) is a normalising constant. Usually, Ti is taken to 
be the totality of various subgraphs, e.g. T1(G) = edge number in graph G, while 
T2(G) = the number of triangles in G. Frank and Strauss (1986) showed that when Ti 
is treated as edges, triangles and stars of different sizes, the resulting random graph 
edges form a Markov random field. Wasserman and Faust (2010) and Rinaldo et al. 
(2009) developed a geometric theory of models. The statistical applications of the 
ERGM and the development of network analyses of practical relevance have been 
elaborated by Snijders et al. (2006) and Robins et al. (2007).
In my study, the network descriptive statistical and morphological analyses and 
the ERGM analyses were performed with the R software package and the MPNet 
software (Wang et al. 2009).
3. Data used for the stock market network analysis
The data used for the analysis are based on listed issuing companies on the BSE in 
December 2020.2 At the time of the investigation, a total of 96 different companies3 
made up this base population. With the help of the OPTEN database,4 I developed 
the corresponding ownership network, using a code written in Python, as a result 
of which a complete network of 96 entities and their associated private owner 
companies could be analysed.5
However, it is important to point out that the list of issuers on the BSE, i.e. the 
base population comprises all issuers, including corporate bond issuers, mortgage 
bond issuers or investment unit issuers, each of which must meet different 
liquidity parameters or publicity criteria; consequently, it was important to clarify 
why I was actually managing these companies in a network, as companies issuing 
different shares are characterised by totally different market conditions, attitudes, 
commitments and approaches.
2  https://bse.hu/pages/issuers. In my analysis, I analyse all issuers listed on the stock market, irrespective of 
the instrument they might hold.
3  It is important to touch on the question of how much the presence of the Hungarian State may distort the 
sample. My study focuses on ownership linkages, so I have investigated to what extent the basic parameters 
of the network change if the Hungarian State is excluded from the base population. For the network test, 
I performed a regression based differential network analysis (R-DNA) in line with Schmidt (2019), and the 
test results showed that the presence of the Hungarian State does not substantially affect the basic network 
typology for company ownership, so I did not exclude it from the analysis. As regards the network of private 
individuals, for obvious reasons, no private persons were connected to the Hungarian State; hence, this 
issue did not arise in that network.
4  https://www.opten.hu/?lang=en 
5  Given the robustness of the database and my limited access to OPTEN, a cross-sectional data capture was 
feasible based on the data; thus, changes in the past are not discussed in my study due to lack of data. 
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My goal was to conduct a network-based research that considers the stock market 
as a whole market, based on ownership relations.6 This is not a unique approach 
in the academic literature; Cont (2001) followed this methodology in his famous 
article on price variations in various types of financial markets. To do this, he first 
discussed the issue on the basis of a list of total issuers, and later, he analysed 
the different statistical properties of asset returns separately. Mehra and Prescott 
(1985) also worked with this base population in their famous longitudinal study 
of US regulations on share issuance, covering the 1889–1978 period. Indeed, the 
same modelling is also often seen when artificial neural network (ANN) modelling 
is used to analyse stock market exchange rates for aggregate and different share 
issuers (see Moghaddam et al. 2016).
With all this, of course, I would like to point out that my model — and the 
modellings referred to above — works with a robust model specification, which, 
of course, allows and requires a number of subsequent specified modellings for 
different share issuers. As Raddant and Kenett (2021), who also followed the same 
robust modelling and pattern, note in their paper, the financial system is a highly 
complex entity with cross-border interconnections and interdependencies; thus, 
robust modelling sheds (may shed) light primarily on how closely interconnected 
the environment is where the different markets operate, and, as a consequence, 
how shocks and events in the market can be easily amplified and turned into general 
(in their paper: global) events.
The robust modelling method allowed the analysis of two networks: (1) company 
ownership network of listed firms with 6,806 nodes (firms) and 8,363 edges 
(ownership linkages), and (2) private individual network of the same listed firms 
with 5,902 nodes (owners) and 6,083 edges (ownership linkages). Network data 
can then be regarded as complete networks or complete graphs. In my analysis, 
therefore, each company or private individual corresponds to a node, and a linkage 
from node i, pointing to node j, exists if node i has an ownership share in the 
case of j. Consequently, in my analysis, I work with directed graphs, following the 
methodological works of Garlaschelli et al. (2005), Chapelle and Szafarz (2005) and 
Salvemini et al. (1995).
The OPTEN database also provided a possibility to use the geospatial software 
ArcGIS to analyse the ownership distribution of the given networks according to 
the municipalities in Hungary for companies and private individuals.
6  However, here again I consider it important to emphasise the limits of my research results in terms 
of interpretation. I do not undertake, for example, to make findings on trade and ownership relations 
themselves; my aim is to explore ownership relations on a network basis, which could, of course, later be 
a source of a number of further research opportunities.
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4. The ownership network of the Budapest Stock Exchange from the 
companies’ perspective
Companies that are issuers in the Hungarian stock market and the overall network 
of firms owned by them consist of a total of 6,806 nodes and 8,363 edges, the 
network representation of which is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 clearly shows the emergence of a huge network of firms around the issuers 
present in the BSE, which strongly determines the stock market position of the share 
issuing companies. A key feature of the network is that it is a fully interconnected 
network, and not decomposed into subnetworks, which indicates a particularly high 
level of network interdependence between companies and markets. In the chart, 
actors with a central position have been magnified by their degree, which shows 
that centrality positions are rather unevenly distributed in the network, where 
we find a very small number of actors with a very high company ownership share, 
and a very large number of actors who, quite the opposite, are characterised by 
remarkably few ownership linkages. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the 
degree distributions of the whole graph in log-log curves and histograms.
Figure 1
Ownership network of issuers present in the Budapest Stock Exchange (N = 6,806)
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From the log-log curves and histograms it can be seen that the overall degree 
distribution and the outdegree follow a much more uneven and centralised 
distribution than the indegree distribution. This is because the stock market network 
is characterised by a rather low density (0.0002), but a high centrality index. If we 
look at the centrality index and examine the network by hub and by authority, we 
arrive at Figure 3.
Figure 2











































































































































0 400 800 1,200 0 400 800 1,200
41
A Snapshot of the Ownership Network of the Budapest Stock Exchange
At the centres of the networks constructed on the basis of centrality indicators 
we find companies characterised by significantly different ownership relations, 
compared to other nodes. For companies in a central position, these overarching ties 
result in (1) an appropriate communication and business space, and (2) a monopoly 
over information. In addition, companies in the central tiers communicate with 
fewer intermediaries, which gives them relatively fast access to data. However, 
there are differences in the number of central actors in relation to hub and authority 
networks. Both centrality indicators were created on the basis of the eigenvector 
centrality, but while in the case of the hub, the index indicates which central actors 
are connected to many other well-positioned central actors, the authority indicator 
shows which actors, although not in a central position, are owned by a very large 
number of central actors. It is clear from this that, while well-positioned firms 
among listed and unlisted firms have relatively little contact with each other, each 
well-positioned firm is surrounded by a fairly broadly owned network of firms.
This brings us straight on to the identification of the subgroups of network clusters; 
however, due to the large number of elements, from this point on I will not make 
the whole network the object of analysis, but only the subnetwork of 845 nodes 
capturing the central core of the network. Once the analysis is narrowed down to 
this subgraph, the characteristics of the network can be more accurately captured. 
Using hierarchical cluster analysis to analyse this subgraph, we arrive at Figure 4.
Figure 3
Centrality — hub and authority (N = 6 806)
Hub network                                                                    Authority network
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The density of the network has increased accordingly (0.031), compared to the 
overall network density, and the subnetwork is clearly decomposed into 14 
clusters. Given the studies on hub and authority, this high clustering coefficient 
is not surprising. These 14 cliques actually make up a set of companies engaged 
in different economic activities; one in the banking financial field, another in 
real estate business, still another cluster in asset management, and the area of 
communications is also represented. The typology of clusters is shown in Table 1.
Figure 4
Subnetwork on the basis of hierarchical clustering (N = 845)
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Table 1
Network cluster typology
Cluster Name of cluster Main actors Node Per cent
1 Banks 1 OTP, MKB, K&H, CIB 165 19.5
2 Lending, Real estate Fund Finance, K 85, GRABOPLAST 138 16.3
3 Asset management OPUS GLOBAL 107 12.7
4 Banks 2 Erste 90 10.7
5 Banks 3 Gránit, MFB, Budapest Bank, Export-Import Bank 71 8.4
6 Former socialist system large enterprises
Magyar Posta, MÁV, T-MOBIL, 
Airport 48 5.7
7 Communications firms
Vodafone, GIRO, Magyar 




Stock market,  
Asset management, 
Electricity
Budapest Stock Exchange,  
MAVIR Magyar Villamosenergia, 




Informatics, Former  
socialist system  
large enterprises 2 
IQSYS Informatika, RÁBA, 
VOLÁN 33 3.9
10 Banks 4 Raiffeisen, UniCredit 31 3.7
11 Banks 5 Citibank, Takszöv, Exporthitel 22 2.6






14 Agriculture Bonafarm 16 1.9
TOTAL: 845 100
At first glance, we get a really interesting network cluster typology. This is because 
cluster typology has been constructed by the distance between the edges, i.e. 
a network-based inclusion of the ownership aspect has shed new light on those 
trading.7 The table reveals that banks form various clusters in accordance with 
ownership aspects. In fact, they can be divided into 5 distinct clusters, with quite 
different central positions. It is also worth noting the close clustering of companies 
that were state-owned large enterprises under the socialist system (RÁBA, VOLÁN; 
or Magyar Posta, MÁV). The clusters show a strong predominance of clusters 
engaged in financial activities, real estate business or wealth trade. Furthermore, 
it can be concluded that the presence of clusters producing a specific product is 
relatively low. In fact, the table reveals that there are three major clusters in the 
7  In this case, of course, not only entities that are issuers are included in the analysis, but also companies 
whose products are not admitted to the stock market. It is precisely for this reason that cluster typology 
attempts to typologise the network of firms surrounding the issuers of the stock exchange.
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ownership network: the first one mainly consisting of banks (OTP, MKB, K&H, CIB), 
owning about 20 per cent of the total network; the second one engaged in lending 
and real estate business (with an ownership of 15 per cent); and the third one 
engaged in asset management (OPUS GLOBAL), whose ownership share is around 
13 per cent. These clusters own about half (48.5 per cent) of the total network, 
which indicates an extraordinarily high concentration of ownership.
After identifying the clusters, it is worth reviewing the hierarchy of the network, 
whose circular network diagram, log-log statistics, and histogram are summarised 
in Figure 5. 
Figure 5
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Not surprisingly, based on the clustering indicators of the network, a highly 
hierarchical network is formed by the network of company ownership. As shown 
in Figure 5, on the basis of the K-core value, the network can be hierarchically 
divided into three levels: the core, the semiperiphery and the periphery, i.e. the 
part where connections are dense, semidense and scattered. The central core has 
a closed structure and is made up of 24 companies with the strongest ownership 
linkages to the remaining elements of the network. These companies are listed by 
name in Table 4 in the Appendix. The core level has high connectivity and centralised 
influence across the network as a whole, and it has strong ownership linkages 
to semiperipheral and peripheral companies as well. In terms of the number of 
elements, peripheral firms constitute the largest K-core group, but these firms play 
a negligible role in the evolution of the overall network. 
5. Validation — Or: What theoretical network does the Hungarian stock 
market network resemble?
Before moving on to the ownership network of private individuals, I would like to 
make a small digression on how similar the ownership network of the Hungarian 
stock market is to the theoretical networks. The validation method can be used to 
obtain a reference point on the structure and typology of the network. I compare 
the company ownership network with three theoretical networks; (1) the Erdős–
Rényi random network, (2) the small-world network, and (3) the Barabási scale-free 
network. The log-log diagram of the degree distribution of the theoretical networks 
simulated with identical node numbers is shown in Figure 6, and its main statistics 
are summarised in Table 2.
Figure 6
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Figure 6 clearly indicates that both the stock market network and its subnetwork 
converge to the degree distribution of scale-free networks. After an OLS regression 
analysis, it can be seen that the stock market network is significantly different 
from the random network and the small-world network. In neither case do we 
obtain a significant F-value for the ANOVA test, nor is the t-value of regression 
significant. By contrast, the network is found to be significantly consistent with 
Barabási's theoretical scale-free network. Indeed, based on the OLS regression, 
the F-value of the ANOVA is significant (16.593), and the regression t-value (4.073) 
also shows a significant result. All of this means that the stock market ownership 
network is a scale-free network. From the statistics in Table 2, it can also be seen 
that theoretical and real networks are characterised by sharply different edge 
numbers, average path lengths and densities.
Table 2
Validation statistics
Node number Edge number Density Average path length
Stock market 6,806 8,363 0.0002 3.15
Random 6,806 4,633,959 0.2002 1.80
Small-world 6,806 6,806 0.0003 35.39
Scale-free 6,806 6,805 0.0003 11.038
It is clear that (unsurprisingly) the random network is characterised by the largest 
number of edges, from which the stock market network differs significantly. 
However, roughly similar densities can be identified across the small-world network, 
the scale-free network and the stock market network. The difference between these 
networks lies in the average path length, as the value of the average path length is 
much lower in the stock market network than in either the scale-free network or 
the small-world network.
In summary then, the stock market network shows neither random network 
features nor small-world network characteristics; it mostly resembles the scale-free 
network, but has typically a much smaller average path length than the theoretical 
reference network. It follows that while the scale-free network is known for its 
high hierarchy, if we add to this the low average path length measured, the stock 
market ownership network is found to have an even higher centralisation and an 
even sharper hierarchy than the theoretical model, i.e. the network displays an 
extremely large number of nodes with extremely few connections, and very few 
nodes with a very high number of connections. This also means that for the actors 
in the central core, a faster information flow and a higher number of connections 
can be measured in comparison to the theoretical network.
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6. The ownership network of the Budapest Stock Exchange from the 
perspective of private individuals
In the following, I briefly turn to the relation network of companies and private 
individuals trading in the stock market, which is illustrated in Figure 7.
The network of private individuals shows a much less centralised and interconnected 
network than what we have seen for companies. The total network consists of 
5,902 nodes and 6,083 edges, with a density roughly equal to that of the company 
network (0.0002), but for all other metrics, it is characterised by much lower values. 
This means that far more clusters (32 in number) can be identified in the network, 
and it is characterised by a much smaller ratio of cores (5 in number) than that 
shown for the company network. The hierarchy of the network is simpler, as in 
terms of element number, we can observe far more peripheral nodes and far fewer 
semiperipheral nodes. This means that the ownership network in the stock market 
is a much more loosely, much less tightly interconnected network when analysed in 
relation to private individuals, but at the same time, from a hierarchical perspective, 
it traces out a network that is even more centralised and that provides an even 
narrower range of opportunities for core actors.
Figure 7
Network and hierarchy of private owners (N = 5,902)
Network representation                                       K-core hierarchy
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7. Spatial distributions of networks
The geostatistical distributions of the networks can be used to reveal how 
ownerships are distributed in Hungary at the level of municipalities, and which 
municipalities have outstanding values. Figure 8 shows the networks of company 
ownership and private individual ownership in a GIS diagram with kernel 
distribution, projected onto the map of Hungarian municipalities. 
Figure 8
Kernel distribution of networks
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Figure 8 shows that the capital city plays a prominent role for both the company 
and the private individual networks. 65.8 per cent of the companies are registered 
and 38.1 per cent of private individuals live in this municipality, which reflects 
a particularly high concentration in Budapest. In addition, large cities and their 
catchment areas are home to firms, but only to a negligible proportion, compared 
to the capital. At the county level, for companies, the counties of Pest (7.3 per cent), 
Fejér (2.4 per cent), Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (2.4 per cent) and Hajdú-Bihar (2.4 per 
cent) are the counties where companies are registered; and for private individuals, 
Pest (17.9 per cent), Hajdú-Bihar (3.9 per cent), Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (3.3 per 
cent) and Fejér (3.3 per cent) are again the counties where the owners most live, 
apart from the capital. The dominance of the capital is not affected by the fact that 
for the company network the network includes 586 municipalities in Hungary and 
for the private individual network 793, as compared to Budapest, the ratio of these 
municipalities is completely insignificant. The same can be observed in the case of 
municipalities outside Hungary, where the ratios are again very low. For companies 
a total of only 9 different companies (0.1 per cent) and for private individuals 53 
foreign municipalities (0.8 per cent) can be found in the network.
This indicates that the share of foreign-registered firms in the company-ownership 
and private-individual-ownership stock market networks is negligible, as both have 
a share of less than 1 per cent, and for both networks the capital plays a role as 
a priority municipality.
8. Exponential random graph modelling
At the end of my study, I present the results of the ERGM simulations performed 
for the whole network. The parameter estimates of the ERGM were compared 
with 10,000 individual Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) network simulations. 
MCMC simulations produced networks with the same node number and density 
as the observed network. From comparison with these, the MPNet software 
generated parameter estimates of the model, which indicate the strengths and 
direction of endogenous network patterns. The parameter estimates of the network 
are presented in Table 3. Significant parameters are marked with an asterisk (*). 
A positive (negative) estimate indicates a larger (less) configuration in the network 
than expected, with other effects of the model taken into account. The magnitude 
of parameter estimates cannot be directly compared along the different effects, as 




Parameter estimates for ERGM simulations











Hub (degree effect) 22.428*
Multiple 2-paths 71.058*
Transitivity (closure of transitive paths in the case of 
multiple 2-paths) –1.501
Alt-edge triangle –1.243
Note: * = the parameter estimate is twice the absolute value of the standard error, which means that the 
effect is significant.
Based on the ERGM, the network is characterised by a negative arc effect (–0.041), 
but this effect is not significant. In short, pairwise interconnections do not play 
a dominant role in the network architecture. What plays an important role in the 
development of the network, though, is the affiliation to centrally positioned actors 
and clusters. We can see this in the network-forming power of the 2-, 3-, 4- and 
even 5-star shapes, which all have positive and significant values. This means that 
network centres play a crucial role in the development of the network, and they 
are surrounded by a multitude of poorly interconnected companies. The same 
result is also supported by the hub effect, i.e. the positive and significant effect of 
degree distribution (22.428).
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The strong centralisation effect of the network is further supported by the negative 
and non-significant value of the triad effect, as this means that triple-closed 
connections do not materially shape the network. This is, however, contradicted 
slightly by the positive and significant role of quadruple-closed connections (84.170), 
but this can be explained by the fact that quadruple ties are formed quite often 
between hubs, which also points to a strong centralisation of the network.
The multiple 2-path effect is also positive and significant, indicating that in 
the measured network, due to the other effects of the model, there are more 
2-paths than we might expect, i.e. the network is formed by a greater number of 
connections with central nodes that are linked to the same companies. On the other 
hand, the transitivity effect (transitive triad effect) is negative and non-significant, 
suggesting that these 2-paths do not close but condense around specific nodes. 
We observe the same lack of closure between actors in the finding that we do not 
obtain a significant value for alternative-edge triangles either.
9. Conclusions
In my study I analysed the ownership network of Hungarian stock exchange issuers. 
In an attempt to provide a complete yet robust network analysis, I have analysed 
not only the relation network of listed companies, but also the ownership relations 
that do not appear in the stock market. I looked at the network from two angles: 
(1) from the companies’ perspective and (2) from the perspective of private 
individuals. I examined the detectable network characteristics of the Hungarian 
stock market by applying a methodological approach, namely network research and 
network simulation, which is perhaps less represented in the Hungarian academic 
literature, but is gaining ground in related literature abroad. However, I do not think 
by any means that my analysis gives a complete picture of the current situation. 
I believe that, at a further stage, it would definitely be worthwhile to complement 
the data with longitudinal analysis, to compare and analyse network typologies in 
terms of different markets, and to broaden the interpretative horizon of the analysis 
by including additional variables and indices.
From the companies’ perspective, we can see that a huge network of firms is 
emerging around the issuers listed on the BSE, which strongly determines the 
network position of the issuing companies. Network analyses have shown that there 
is a high network interdependency between firms. From a clustering point of view, 
although the network is decomposed into several major clusters, a clique of three 
clusters owns about 48.5 per cent of the total network of companies. This results in 
a very highly hierarchised and centralised network typology. The same result is also 
supported by the ERGM simulation analysis, which shows that network formation 
is significantly influenced by network clique affiliation and ownership structure. 
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The network relies on a vast number of tightly interconnected and centralised 
network morphological shapes; thus, the morphology of two-, three-, four- and even 
five-star shapes has a particularly strong influence in terms of network formation, 
meaning that with respect to ownership, a very large proportion of firms are owned 
by a small number of firms. We see the same in the network-building power of 
the multiple 2-path-effect graph in contrast to the triad effect, which also suggests 
that the ownership structure is distributed between few nodes, but firms are 
simultaneously connected to several centrally located firms. Finally, the significance 
of square connection indicates that in terms of ownership, we can also measure 
strong cross-ownership between centrally located firms, which plays an important 
role in the formation of the network.
By contrast, for private individuals, we find a much more loosely interconnected 
network, which is, however, even more centralised than the company network. The 
few core actors in the hierarchy have even higher information flows and relational 
capital at their disposal than what is seen for firms. Furthermore, both networks 
are highly dominated by domestically owned firms, and within these, mostly by 
firms registered in the capital, Budapest.
What all of this seems to imply is that the ownership network of the Hungarian 
stock exchange is a scale-free network, which shares many similarities with 
the networks of the ‘shallow’ Greek and the topologically robust Chinese stock 
markets. In Hungary as well, the structure of ownership relations of the entities 
present as issuers in the Budapest Stock Exchange is characterised by a large 
number of heterogeneous components, which can easily be affected by a few 
centrally positioned actors or companies. It is also clearly evident that these 
ownership linkages go far beyond a single issuance market, showing a strong 
interconnectedness across markets. This is evidenced by both static and dynamic 
analyses. However — as the Chinese and Greek examples have shown — this also 
implies that the Hungarian stock market network is characterised by a typology that 
is fragile and not very resilient to environmental changes. In fact, from a network 
perspective, the academic literature agrees that on the one hand such highly 
centralised robust graphs can provide a very fast flow of information to network 
members, but on the other hand they may limit the appearance and success of new 
entrants in the system, and in the event of shocks, if centrally positioned actors do 
not react appropriately, the network can easily become vulnerable.
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List of companies with a place in the core
Name Degree Outdegree Indegree K-core value
Cluster 
number
OPUS GLOBAL Plc. 86 8 78 8 1
Appeninn Vagyonkezelő Holding Plc. 106 5 101 8 1
4iG Plc. 96 3 93 8 1
OTP Bank Plc. 275 14 261 8 2
MKB Bank Plc. 170 12 158 8 2
Kereskedelmi és Hitelbank Ltd. 11 11 0 8 2
OTP Ingatlanlízing Ltd. 8 8 0 8 2
OTP Jelzálogbank Ltd. 99 6 93 8 2
OTP Alapkezelő Ltd. 76 4 72 8 2
OTP Ingatlan Befektetési Alapkezelő Ltd. 98 3 95 8 2
CIG Pannónia Életbiztosító Plc. 43 3 40 8 3
MKB-Pannónia Alapkezelő Ltd. 66 3 63 8 3
Richter Gedeon Plc. 62 2 60 8 4
Citibank Ltd. 12 12 0 8 5
MTB Magyar Takarékszövetkezeti Bank Ltd. 10 10 0 8 5
Magyar Exporthitel Biztosító Ltd. 9 9 0 8 5
Takarék Jelzálogbank Plc. 44 5 39 8 5
Raiffeisen Bank Ltd. 11 11 0 8 7
GRÁNIT Bank Ltd. 12 12 0 8 9
MFB Magyar Fejlesztési Bank Ltd. 142 11 131 8 9
BUDAPEST Hitel- és Fejlesztési Bank Ltd. 9 9 0 8 9
Magyar Export-Import Bank Ltd. 68 7 61 8 9
Erste Bank Hungary Ltd. 145 9 136 8 10
MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Plc. 95 7 88 8 12
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Methodological Background of the New Motor 
Third-Party Liability Insurance Index of the 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank*
Gabriella Merész – Norbert Holczinger – Koppány Nagy 
In order to provide an accurate description of developments in the Hungarian motor 
third-party liability insurance (MTPL) market, as well as to inform the public and 
stimulate competition, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the Central Bank of Hungary, 
MNB) has elaborated an index to indicate the MTPL premium level. The method 
offers a comprehensive picture of changes in average premiums, as it uses data 
from the central itemised MTPL database to cover not only the population switching 
insurers but also remaining contracts and new entrants. It reduces bias due to 
seasonal effects and trends by eliminating changes in the stock composition. It 
can also illustrate how much the premium has changed in relation to the change 
in the magnitude of claims, taking into account the estimated average change in 
claims. In our study, we present the statistical and methodological considerations 
used in the calculation of the MTPL index and describe the relevant characteristics 
of Hungarian MTPLs.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Codes: C18, C51, G14, G22
Keywords: insurance, non-life insurance, motor third-party liability insurance, MTPL 
index, MTPL premium level, use of claims
1. Introduction
The market for compulsory motor vehicle insurance started on 1 July 1991; up 
to then it had been a charge built into the price of fuel and thus paid for at every 
refuelling. Since 1 July 1991, risks have been covered by a standalone, compulsory 
insurance contract to be taken out separately for each motor vehicle. Motor third-
party liability insurance (MTPL) is currently regulated by Act LXII of 2009.1 Due to 
its compulsory nature, it is the product with the largest number of contracts in the 
*  The papers in this issue contain the views of the authors which are not necessarily the same as the official 
views of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
Gabriella Merész is a Senior Actuary at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. Email: mereszg@mnb.hu
Norbert Holczinger is a Head of Division at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. Email: holczingern@mnb.hu
Koppány Nagy is a Director at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. Email: nagykoppany@mnb.hu.
The Hungarian manuscript was received on 18 March 2021.
DOI: http://doi.org/10.33893/FER.20.3.5979
1  Act LXII of 2009 on motor third-party liability insurance https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a0900062.TV
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Hungarian insurance market, as MTPL accounted for 40 per cent of the 14.5 million 
insurance contracts outstanding on 31 December 2020. In 2020, the 5.8 million 
outstanding, in-force contracts accounted for one fifth of the gross premium income 
(HUF 247 billion) in the non-life segment and for more than one quarter of profit 
after tax (HUF 23 billion). The pandemic situation played a significant role in the 
extent of the latter, but even after eliminating the one-off effect of Covid-19, the 
result would have been substantial, in line with the previous 3-year, sector-level 
business profit of over HUF 10 billion. 
The significant weight of the MTPL business line is not specific to Hungary. Although 
its extent varies more widely across countries, the product accounts for 16 per 
cent of total non-life insurance premium income in Europe (EIOPA 2021). Although 
we were unable to find sufficiently detailed, up-to-date data in the course of our 
research, previous information suggests that in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
weight of MTPL contracts regarding non-life insurance segment exceeds the EU 
average, but this share is decreasing compared to 2004, due to the strengthening 
of property insurance products (Wieczorek-Kosmala 2016). Premium income in the 
MTPL market in the countries covered by Insurance Europe grew 1 per cent in 2015 
and 4 per cent in 2016 to reach EUR 61 billion. The increase is mainly attributable 
to Turkey (76 per cent), Poland (43 per cent) and Hungary (34 per cent) (Insurance 
Europe 2019). Nevertheless, average premiums in Hungary remained below the 
European average in 2016. There may be several reasons for this, such as different 
vehicle stock and varying service and labour fees, but a detailed analysis of this is 
beyond the scope of this study.
Overall, MTPL is a business line that affects a broad cross-section of society and also 
has a substantial impact on insurers’ performance. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that the study of this product, and in particular of changes in premiums, is receiving 
a great deal of attention from the professional community and the wider public.
Prior to 1 January 2010, the announcement of MTPL premiums was concentrated in 
a campaign period (the November preceding the reference year), which was then 
replaced by continuous premium announcement. The insurance anniversary for 
vehicles purchased after the abolition of the single end-of-year anniversary, i.e. after 
1 January 2010, is no longer 31 December, but the date on which the MTPL for the 
vehicle was taken out, which is, of course, a different date during the year for each 
motorist. This also made it more difficult to compare premiums. However, there was 
a market and societal need to compare changes in premium levels, i.e. to establish 
a reference point. In the past, some brokerage firms developed methodologies and 
published data in this respect, but these cannot give an accurate picture of market 
developments, as the intermediaries only have information on the contracts they 
mediate.
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The reports produced by international organisations also contain data on the 
evolution of MTPL premiums, but these cannot usually provide accurate answers 
to questions about changes in the average premium. Moreover, in our experience, 
a detailed methodology for the published data is not available, and the frequency 
of updating the reports is not necessarily sufficient for up-to-date monitoring of 
developments. The annual Consumer Trends Report published by the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), for example, only shows 
the evolution of total premium income, with no information on average premiums 
(EIOPA 2021). In the case of the data in the report published by the professional 
organisation of European insurers, the Insurance Europe, the main problem – apart 
from methodological issues – is the timeliness of data. The last report was published 
in 2019 (Insurance Europe 2019). However, the wide range of information available 
to the MNB has made it possible to create a comprehensive MTPL price index that 
provides a complete, up-to-date overview of changes in average premiums.
In this study, we describe the statistical background of the index, especially the data 
used for the calculations, and the methodology. In the second section, we present 
the key features of the central itemised MTPL database (KKTA) created and operated 
by the MNB, which forms the basis for the calculations, and analyse the data used 
in the light of the main factors determining the MTPL premium. Section 3 presents 
the methods used to determine the premium level of the MTPL index, while fourth 
section considers the indicators for the average premium level of other vehicle 
categories. In the fifth section, some weaknesses of the method are discussed, and 
the results are then described in the sixth section.
2. Available data
According to the amendment to Act LXII of 2009 on MTPL, adopted in the autumn 
of 2018, the itemised motor third-party liability insurance contracts and claims 
database (KKTA) created and operated by the MNB will assist all actors in the MTPL 
market. In addition to supervisory use, insurers performing KKTA data supply can 
request aggregated data. Motor third-party liability insurance contracts and claims 
are submitted to the KKTA in an itemised form on a quarterly basis by insurers 
obliged to supply data. Since 1 January 2011, the database has been collecting data 
on all domestic MTPL contracts and claims, with a level of detail adapted to legal 
and professional actuarial standards. The system currently has data available on 
nearly 22 million contracts and 1.5 million claims; thus, the database offers a wide 
range of possibilities for actuarial calculations and analyses.
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Data quality requirements are ensured by a three-level data check. Submission 
of data is possible if the format of the data is in accordance with the XSD schema 
available on the MNB’s website.2 If data provision has passed the formal check, 
the next step is a content check for acceptance, in the course of which the system 
checks the completeness of the required data and basic quality compliance. In the 
last step, content errors that do not prevent acceptance are displayed to the MNB, 
which may request correction if a content error is confirmed. This three-step check 
ensures that the data is correct and usable. Despite the automatic processes built 
into the system, data quality problems cannot be completely ruled out, but the 
checks carried out by the MNB’s experts and the multi-stage review of the data 
used for publications minimise the likelihood of major errors.
We are not aware of a supervised database with the same level of detail, but 
it is worth noting a similar example from abroad. In Estonia, there is a register 
of MTPL contracts, which contains contracts for Estonian vehicles and insurance 
events occurring in Estonia. The database includes a number of queries, such as 
information on the claims history of a vehicle, the validity of motor third-party 
liability insurance, or even a map showing the location of claims. The queries are 
available free of charge.3
The KKTA provides a comprehensive database of the full range of contracts in the 
market at the end of the given period (quarter), including new contracts and those 
in which the insurer did not change. Since MTPL insurance is required by law, we 
obtain a nearly complete picture of the motor vehicles in use. This is true even 
if we know that not all motor vehicles have an MTPL contract. Indeed, based on 
the available data, the number of uninsured motor vehicles is relatively low, at 
around 2 per cent (MABISZ 2020), i.e. the database covers virtually all domestic 
motor vehicles. Our goal is to create a metric that objectively measures changes 
in premiums. Objectivity also requires that the impact of portfolio composition 
changes on premiums be eliminated from the data. To this end, we examined in 
detail the portfolio of domestic MTPL contracts, which consisted of 5.8 million 
contracts as on 31 December 2020. The segment affecting the population, and 
within it, passenger cars accounted for 69 per cent of the portfolio in terms of the 
number of cars and 65 per cent of it in terms of the 12-month regular premium4 as 
at 31 December 2020 (see Figure 1).
2  The technical guidelines for the central itemised MTPL database (KKTA) are available on the MNB’s website. 
https://www.mnb.hu/felugyelet/adatszolgaltatas/biztositok/2018-evre-vonatkozo-adatszolgaltatasok/a-
kozponti-kgfb-teteles-adatbazis-kkta-technikai-segedletei
3  Motor Insurance Register, Eesti.ee. https://www.eesti.ee/en/traffic/traffic-management/motor-insurance
/#motorinsuranceregister8 
4  12-month regular premium: the premium for insurance policies valid during a given period for one insurance 
period (one year) in the insurer’s statistics.
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The MTPL index measures the changes in the average premium of passenger cars; 
thus, in the following, we look at the data on MTPL contracts for passenger vehicles. 
For each contract, the number of contracts with an anniversary date in the given 
quarter is known, which shows strong seasonality due to the campaign period 
previously regulated (before 2010). One fifth of the contracts are still linked to 
what is known as ‘31 December – 1 January’5 or calendar anniversary stock. This 
stock differs significantly from the others in terms of its characteristics, as it consists 
mostly of contracts in bonus-malus ratings B8 and B10, and the vehicle keepers 
are older persons. The composition of vehicles is also different from the average, 
as the overall portfolio composition has shifted towards more powerful vehicles in 
recent years, while these motor vehicles are typically less powerful. The specific 
characteristics of the portfolio are also reflected in the insurance premiums; thus, if 
we examine the quarterly series, and changes in premiums during the year, seasonal 
and trend-like effects can cause bias (see Section 3 for details). In order to analyse 
the average premium level and to draw the right conclusions, it is thus necessary 
to eliminate these effects.
5  Although the initial recognition date for these contracts is 1 January, for administrative reasons, some 
insurers set 31 December as the anniversary date, while other institutions set 1 January.
Figure 1
Distribution of the number and 12-month regular premium of MTPL contracts by main 
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Before further investigation, it is useful to clarify the principles of premium 
calculation. The insurance premium is the compensation given for services and 
claims payments provided by the insurer, i.e. for risk bearing. In simple terms, 
we can think of the insurance premium as being something that should include, 
as a minimum, cover for claims and technical risks, called the risk premium part, 
plus the insurers’ costs, profit expectation and tax liability, also known as the 
entrepreneurial premium part. The traditional calculation of premiums is based 
on mathematical models; the most commonly used and simplest principle for 
calculating non-life insurance premiums is the expected value principle. Traditional 
non-life insurance premium calculation techniques are reviewed by Arató (2001).
For passenger car MTPL premiums, insurers apply a number of differentiating 
factors, which are basically related to the vehicle keeper or the insured motor 
vehicle. In our experience, the most important elements are:
•  the vehicle keeper’s
–  age 
–  place of residence 
–  bonus-malus rating
–  the date the vehicle keeper obtained the driving licence (driving experience) 
•  the vehicle’s 
–  make
–  engine power
–  fuel type
–  age
As the KKTA does not cover all of the above criteria (MNB 2018) and does not 
include information on driving experience and the vehicle’s make, fuel and age, we 
are not in a position to analyse their evolution over time. However, it is possible 
to examine the stability of the stock in relation to the other elements. We have 
chosen the first quarter of 2016 as the starting point, because for the sake of stable 
results, this is also the period that (1) represents a time series of sufficient length 
to provide a benchmark for the MTPL index, and (2) is less distant in time from the 
introduction of the KKTA, thereby increasing the reliability of the data. The last 
data are from the fourth quarter of 2020, allowing us to examine the evolution and 
possible seasonality of the above factors over the last five years.
The age of vehicle keepers can be considered stable over the time span under 
review, with changes of 1–2 percentage points in the six age groups we have 
examined. For example, the weight of the 40–49-year-old age group, i.e. the largest 
group of vehicle keepers, has ranged between 26 and 27 per cent throughout the 
period (Figure 2).
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Regional distribution is similar, i.e. the address distribution of vehicle keepers is 
stable in terms of regions: the share of those with a Budapest address ranged 
between 15.6 and 16.5 per cent in the period under review, which represents 
a minimal shift (Figure 3).
Figure 2
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By contrast, there has been a major shift in the engine power of insured passenger 
cars in recent years towards more powerful passenger vehicles (Figure 4). This 
phenomenon is well illustrated by the fact that the share of cars with an engine 
power of 71 kW or more was only 40.9 per cent in the first quarter of 2016, which 
rose to 53.7 per cent by the fourth quarter of 2020.
The bonus-malus (BM) rating cannot be considered constant over time (Figure 5), as 
it typically varies depending on the claims in the given year: in the case of no claims, 
the rating will improve year by year until it reaches the most favourable category 
(B10), whereas if damage occurs, the rating goes down by 2 categories all the way 
to category M4. In addition to the anniversary bonus-malus variation, the seasonal 
effect of the calendar anniversary stock mentioned earlier is also important. To 
exclude these, variations in the bonus-malus ratings need to be addressed.
Figure 4
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Thus, our analysis suggests that among the principal factors affecting the MTPL 
premium, bonus-malus rating and vehicle power have changed substantially over 
time, i.e. they may bias the results when we examine changes in average premiums. 
For this reason, these effects should be eliminated in the premium change analysis. 
By contrast, the age and regional distribution of vehicle keepers remains stable over 
time and therefore do not affect the analysis of the changes in premiums and the 
interpretation of the results.
3. Index relating to the average premium level for passenger cars
The purpose of creating the MTPL index was to define a measure that would allow 
the public to be informed about changes in average premiums. In this context, it 
was also important to condense the information properly. To achieve this, an index 
showing the average variation in percentage terms was deemed an appropriate 
choice. It is not overly complex; hence no insurance expertise is needed to interpret 
it, but it does describe the market and its developments well.
Figure 5
Distribution of MTPL contracts with an anniversary date in the respective quarter by 
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3.1. Average premium level
For the sake of stable results, the base for the MTPL index is the first quarter of 
2016, which (1) represents a time series of sufficient length, and (2) is less distant in 
time from the introduction of the KKTA, increasing the reliability of the data. In the 
calculation, out of the outstanding and in-force or suspended contracts at the end 
of the given quarter, essentially those with a positive 12-month regular premium 
and an anniversary date in the given quarter were taken into account. This also 
includes those new contracts for which the initial recognition date is in the given 
quarter. We looked at the 12-month regular premium of these contracts in terms of 
forint value, summed it up and divided it by the number of contracts to obtain the 
average 12-month regular premium. This allows us to observe the actual changes 
in the average 12-month regular premium.
There is significant seasonality in the current values: due to the aforementioned 
calendar anniversary stock, in the year-end roll-over campaign, the fourth and 
first quarters all have lower average premiums. In our view, this effect should be 
eliminated from the data set, as it strongly biases the results. To do this, as a first 
step, we tried to smooth out the curve by using a simple moving average, i.e. the 
average of the previous three quarters. What we found, however, is that although 
this procedure dampens the seasonal effects, it does not remove them, but only 
prolongs them. In other words, it is not able to follow market changes adequately; 
noticeable changes can be seen only after a time lag or with a delay. A good example 
of the lagged effect is the incorporation of insurance tax into the MTPL premiums, 
Figure 6
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which can be identified by a comparison of average premiums in 2018 and 2019 
(Figure 6).
3.2. Smoothing the average premiums for passenger cars
Several parameters were considered in the data to determine whether there could 
be observed marked stock transformation over the five years under review, or 
significant seasonality in the anniversary ratio (see Section 2). On this basis, the 
composition of passenger cars by power category and the seasonality caused by 
the old campaign period need to be smoothed out in order to arrive at a premium 
level. This smoothing is performed by projection on the stock composition, i.e. 
based on our preliminary analysis, at the end of the given quarter, we clarify the 
stock in relation to two factors for passenger car power ratings and bonus-malus 
rating. This adjustment also corrects for changes in the average premium level due 
to the transformation of stock composition by power rating; as described earlier, the 
composition has been moving from lower towards higher powered vehicles. With 
this composition, we smooth out the previous quarters, multiplied by the effective 
average 12-month regular premiums of anniversary contracts in the current quarter 
concerning the segments (Figure 7). Therefore, this shows us what the average 
premium would have been for previous periods, if in previous quarters, there had 
been a stock composition corresponding to the current stock composition at the 
end of the quarter. The query is based on quarterly updated data, and the stock 
composition may change; hence the back data may also be subject to modification. 
These are always taken into account in the method, because filtering applies to 
contracts that are outstanding and have an anniversary date (start) at the end of 
the given quarter. First, we considered the entire passenger car stock, including fleet 
vehicles and also those not in normal use. Fleet contracts, however, are typically 
calendar anniversary contracts, which may cause seasonal bias; moreover, their risks 
may differ from those of individual contracts. The latter is also true for passenger 
cars not in normal use, as it includes, for example, taxis, which have a different 
risk from that of normal-use, ordinary cars. Hence, in order to achieve the most 
robust and reliable results possible, the stock covered by the index was limited 
to individual and normal-use vehicles. Thus, we confined ourselves to residential 
contracts for the most part.
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For the aforementioned reasons, the index was calculated not only for the total 
domestic stock, but also for a Budapest and non-Budapest disaggregation (Figure 8). 
Several approaches were explored as to what regional groupings might be useful. 
We found, however, that further disaggregation of areas outside the capital into 
county seats and other cities does not provide much additional information 
compared to the ‘non-Budapest’ disaggregation: both the absolute value of average 
premiums and their variation show a very similar picture.
Figure 7
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In the fourth quarter of 2020, the national average premium for normal-use 
passenger cars was HUF 44,523, while in Budapest it was HUF 63,213, compared 
to the premium of HUF 38,908 for contracts outside the capital. Budapest premiums 
are thus much higher, a phenomenon explained by the different risks involved. Our 
calculations show that the difference in premiums can be almost entirely attributed 
to the difference in damage probabilities.
3.3. Adjusted MTPL index
In addition to establishing the MTPL index, we also created a so-called adjusted 
index, which shows a kind of net premium level change. Indeed, the interpretation 
of nominal changes in MTPL premiums may in itself be misleading, since – because 
of the equivalence principles mentioned above – the premiums are required 
to follow the movements in the insurer’s expected expenses, such as claims 
expenditure and costs, also including tax payments.
For motor third-party liability insurance – under various headings – a tax liability 
has been incurred since 2013. The rules on the accident tax were contained in 
Chapter II of Act CIII of 2011 on the Public Health Product Tax (Neta Act). The 
amount was collected by the insurers from the clients and was forwarded by them 
to the state; thus, it had to be paid to the insurer together with the insurance 
premium or instalment, but administratively, the insurance premium and the tax 
were separated. The basis of the tax was the annual motor third-party liability 
insurance premium, and the tax rate, in principle, was 30 per cent of the annual 
MTPL premium. However, there was an upper limit, according to which the annual 
tax could not exceed HUF 83 per day per motor vehicle, which the insurer had to 
charge for each day of the period of risk bearing involved: thus, the tax rate was 
maximised.
From 2019, the legislative background changed: due to the changes to the tax law 
announced for 2019, the accident tax was abolished from 1 January 2019, and 
gradually replaced by the insurance tax with the anniversary of the MTPL contracts. 
In 2019, this tax type was incorporated into the premiums, meaning that the two 
items are no longer separate; hence the tax change represents a jump in relation to 
the average premium level. However, this amount received is paid by the insurers 
to the budget in the form of a tax after collection. The premium level increase 
due to the one-off tax effect should be ignored, as this phenomenon can lead to 
incorrect conclusions.
To exclude the tax effect, we looked at the tax rate to be taken into account for the 
average 12-month regular premiums instead of the itemised adjustment, since the 
KKTA only includes the premium plus insurance tax (12-month regular premium), 
and not the premium without tax. We therefore examined on a group-by-group 
basis, whether 23 per cent of the 12-month regular premium or the daily limit of 
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HUF 83 determines the insurance tax. Based on itemised data filtered for different 
months, we estimated the effective, empirical value of the tax (i.e. taking into 
account the daily limit of HUF, 83 in addition to the 23 per cent tax rate) at 21 per 
cent, and, to reflect this simplification, adjusted the index values after 31 March 
2019 by 21 per cent.
Another important component of the adjustment is the estimated claims 
expenditure for the given segment at the time of index calculation. The total claims 
expenditure is the combined amount of the overall claims payment volume for 
each claim and the RBNS reserve applicable for the given reference date (and for 
annuitants, even the annuity reserve and the annuities paid), less the value of 
recovery and regress reserve, to which the insurer is entitled in the case of statutory 
conditions. We looked at these amounts in terms of forint value.
In some cases, the increase in the average premium may be due to non-insurance-
specific developments. This could include an increase in the euro exchange rate, 
which has an impact (1) on international claims settlements, but more importantly, 
(2) on the costs of servicing and repairing motor vehicles. This is often reflected in 
the price of spare parts mostly purchased from abroad. There is also an increase 
in the labour costs for damage repair. The bias effect due to a possible increase in 
claims expenditure per contract can also be adjusted.
However, claims settlement is a time-consuming process, as there can be 
a considerable time lag between the incurrence and the reporting or actual claims 
payment. This necessitated an estimate of already incurred, but not yet reported 
claims. Therefore, for each quarter, we looked at the amount of claims expenditure 
for the quarter of incurrence in the given quarter: we examined the run-off of 
claims in a kind of claims-run-off triangle. In this, the amount in a given row was 
the total claims expenditure for claims incurred in the relevant quarter, with the 
diagonal showing the claims expenditure recognised and/or paid in the quarter 
of incurrence. We analysed the dynamics of how the claims expenditure for the 
quarter of incurrence compares to the total claims expenditure incurred in a given 
quarter. The dynamics show a substantial divergence in the last four quarters, as 
the full run-off is not yet visible in these quarters (Figure 9).
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The closer this value is to 100 per cent, the higher the percentage of the total claims 
expenditure is in the quarter of incurrence. This becomes higher and higher as we 
get closer to the current quarter, since we do not yet have data for those that would 
appear in, say, quarters 2 to 4 after the incurrence. Thus, we looked at the claims 
expenditure for the quarter in which the claims were incurred as a percentage of 
the total claims expenditure in the quarters preceding the last four quarters. An 
overall ratio was calculated from the average of these values. In order to also take 
into account late claims reporting or the effects of claims reviews, we multiplied 
the data for the last four quarters by this value. This is how we obtained the total 
claims expenditure for each quarter. The value of claims expenditure also includes 
the reserves built up; thus, when a claim is paid, the actual payment may be higher 
or lower than this, or, in practice, there are reserve reviews that may result in 
significant reserve release or build-up. This phenomenon may even lead to large 
fluctuations in the claims expenditure, with a seasonal effect due to the typically 
year-end review of reserves. To exclude this bias effect, moving-average smoothing 
was applied (Figure 10). The decline in the last four quarters is likely to reflect the 
impact of the coronavirus, i.e. the effect of reduced turnover due to working from 
home and curfew restrictions can be seen. The impact of this will be felt in the long 
term, but it shows up here too.
Figure 9
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When calculating the MTPL index for the average 12-month regular premiums, 
we also took into account changes in the composition of annual and infra-annual 
stocks, the impact of which may also affect claims. As there are today a higher 
proportion of more powerful vehicles on the roads compared to the first quarter of 
2016, we can also assume that larger vehicles cause more damage. Therefore, we 
adjusted the value of the claims expenditure with the current stock composition, 
more precisely, with the bonus-malus and the vehicle power, thus obtaining the 
estimated claims expenditure corresponding to today’s stock composition for the 
previous quarters. In other words, we also used this to calculate the average claims 
expenditure for a given contract. The obtained values were compared to the first 
quarter of 2016, and the MTPL index was divided by the resulting number. This is 
the adjusted MTPL index (Figure 11).
Figure 10
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Using the itemised database, the method can show not only the population 
switching insurers, but also the evolution of the 12-month regular premium of the 
remaining contracts and new entrants, thus providing a more detailed picture of 
the market premium level. On the other hand, the adjusted index shows the index 
without tax and claims expenditure, which essentially reflects how much of the 
increase in the average 12-month regular premium is not explained by the increase 
in tax and claims expenditure.
4. Other vehicles
The change in passenger car premiums directly affects the largest part of the 
population, but the evolution of the average MTPL premium for other types of vehicles 
may also be of interest. The distribution of fleet and individual contract premiums is 
different for these other vehicle categories, as most of the trucks and trailers used for 
transport belong are covered by fleet contracts concluded by transport companies 
with individual offers. This is also the case for the stock of larger buses. In view of this, 
other vehicles with the largest stocks are examined separately. For these vehicles, we 
distinguish between the average 12-month regular premium and number of units for 
the total stock and for individual contracts, and also highlight the types of vehicles 
with a larger stock. For these categories, instead of looking at the quarterly change, 
we look at the annual change, comparing the current quarterly average premiums 
with the same period of the previous year to exclude seasonality due to the calendar 
anniversary. Since the basis of comparison is the previous year, and not the first 
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as the premiums of the earlier years taken as a basis of comparison already include it. 
In the case of the first publication, the basis for comparison is the anniversary stock in 
the fourth quarter of 2019, the 12-month regular premium of which already includes 
the tax effect; thus, this does not alter the comparison.
For other MTPL vehicles, it was decided to use a narrower data set, and therefore, in 
the public publication we present figures for the units, average premium and annual 
change for the vehicle relating to normal-use passenger cars and taxis, motorcycles, 
mopeds, buses (with a breakdown into smaller and larger buses, as their premiums 
are quite different), lorries, trucks and heavy trailers. These categories are shown 
both on an individual and on a fleet basis.
5. Limitations of the model
The MTPL index measures the changes in average premiums and thus condenses 
information. Premiums for individual contracts can differ markedly from the average 
premium; in fact, the degree of their change can also vary considerably from the 
average. We looked at how 12-month regular premiums are distributed by bonus-
malus rating. The empirical distribution of premiums shows that market pricing is 
not concentrated around an average value, but that there are also 12-month regular 
premiums even quite far from the average. Currently, most of the contracts fall into 
bonus-malus categories A0 and B10; hence we present the results for these two 
BM ratings in Figure 12.
Figure 12
Distribution of passenger car premiums for A0 and B10 BM ratings by HUF 5000 
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It is clear that while the B10 stock with a favourable claims experience is more 
concentrated at a lower average 12-month regular premium level, this can show 
much higher values typically for vehicle keepers who are new to the market.
One possible way of excluding the above phenomenon is to use a model-point 
approach, i.e. to look at the premium variation for type contracts. A similar 
methodology is used by insurers in the case of the annual cost ratio (ACR) to be 
calculated for savings life insurance policies, where the calculations need to be made 
for an insured person aged 35 (MNB 2015). However, for the MTPL, we believe that 
the index can provide more accurate information. The primary reason for this is 
that the number of parameters used to calculate premiums for MTPL contracts is 
several times higher than the number of assumptions used for savings life insurance 
policies, making it difficult to define the parameters of a typical contract. The 
other reason is that – unlike life insurance policies – in the case of MTPL, the KKTA 
provides the opportunity to create a representative index.
For claims expenditures, a 5-year data period may not necessarily cover the time 
span for total late claims, but the claims history is expanded with each passing 
quarter. Other limitations of the model include the fact that quarterly data provision 
does not yet capture contracts where the month turn is the last day of the 3rd 
month in the quarter and the new 12-month regular premium will only apply from 
the first day of the following quarter. These are negligible in quantity and do not bias 
the MTPL index materially. With several insurers, the 12-month regular premium 
for the March anniversary contracts are still included in the KKTA with the reference 
date of the previous year. For this reason, the actual quarterly premiums are not 
obtained on the reference date at the end of the quarter. Also, the premiums for 
the current quarter containing the month of the anniversary are usually higher 
than what we see in the following quarters. This may be explained by the higher 
average premium for cancellations in the period following the anniversary date, 
particularly cancellations due to non-payment of premiums. If contract holders 
with a higher average premium ‘do not pay’, they are cancelled; thus, their average 
premium is omitted from the next quarterly query. Finally, we have not considered 
the potentially significant exchange rate impact of cross-border claims. Thus, it can 
be seen that the model has several limitations, but we believe that none of them 
causes a serious bias in the results.
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6. Conclusions
In this study, we described the methodology and statistical and mathematical 
background of the MTPL index. In our opinion, the main advantage of the index is 
that it expresses the changes in average premiums in a concise and understandable 
way. It is also informative in the sense that it employs the current stock composition 
by bonus-malus rating and vehicle type, and is sufficiently comprehensive in that 
it uses the itemised data available in the database since the first quarter of 2016. 
The adjusted MTPL index shows how the index has changed without the tax effect 
and in proportionality to claims expenditures.
The results indicate that in the fourth quarter of 2020, average MTPL premiums 
were 73 per cent higher than the average premiums in the first quarter of 2016. 
Around one half of the increase is due to the incorporation of the accident tax into 
MTPL premiums in 2019. Compared to the same period of the previous year, there 
was a 9-per cent increase in the premiums for anniversary contracts. However, the 
increase in average premiums is typically related to passenger vehicles in Budapest. 
Based on the adjusted index, between the first quarter of 2016 and that of 2019, 
the increase in average MTPL premiums was in line with the evolution of claims and 
the tax change. The rise that started in 2019 accelerated from the second quarter 
of 2020; thus, the scissors opened: the adjusted index moved from around 110 per 
cent to 140 per cent. The main reason for this is the more favourable claims trend 
in the wake of the pandemic situation: although individual claims expenditure and 
claims utilisation have increased in recent quarters (likely partly due to the rise in 
the euro exchange rate), the smaller number of damage records led to an overall 
decrease in claims expenditure. By contrast, a large share of the entrepreneurial 
premium part appears as a fixed cost for insurers, rising with general inflation and 
wage inflation; thus, it cannot necessarily keep up with a one-off expected reduction 
in claims expenditure due to extreme situations. The increase in the adjusted index 
indicates that insurers view the reduced claims expenditure associated with the 
curfew restrictions caused by the Covid-19 virus as a one-off effect.
It is hoped that following its first release in 2021 for other vehicle types (MNB 
2021), the regular, quarterly publication of the MTPL index and that of the data 
will increase the transparency of the MTPL market, and thus also can help to 
increase public confidence. A further additional effect could be the stimulation 
of competition, to which the aggregated data available to insurers from the KKTA 
may also contribute through the reduction of information gaps and consequently 
by more accurate premium calculation.
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Examination of Applicants for Home Purchase 
Subsidy for Families in Terms of Prior  
Commitment to Having Children and Extent 
of Property Acquisition, Based on the Data of 
a Credit Institution*
Kata Plöchl – Csilla Obádovics
By examining a credit institution’s database for the period 2016–2020, the authors 
aimed to discover the extent to which Home Purchase Subsidy (HPS) for families 
applicants use the subsidy received in return for committing to having children in 
Hungary. The current study also examines which social groups the HPS provides essential 
assistance to with home purchasing, and at which income level and property value the 
subsidy motivates the purchase of a second home. Using cluster analysis, the authors 
found that groups with modest incomes and housing are the most likely to commit 
to having children in advance. Though the subsidy assists this group the most with 
housing, the amount received from the subsidy is small. Moreover, the current study 
revealed that 8 per cent of applicants used the subsidy to purchase a second property.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: H31, G51, R21, J13
Keywords: HPS, housing subsidy, family support, housing need, childbearing willingness
1. Introduction
The importance of home ownership in Hungary dates back to the socialist regime. 
For 80 per cent of Hungarian families, a privately owned residential home is not only 
the main asset, it also represents a secured standard of living that is often the result 
of several generations of work. In accordance with European traditions, Hungary 
is currently engaged in a universal redistribution program, one with economic and 
social dimensions (Dániel 1997; Dániel 2004; Csermák 2011; Levi 1993; Rothstein 
1998; Bényei 2011; Kováts 2007; Békés et al. 2016). As part of the program, the state 
assumes an allocation role in developing higher quality home ownership. Assuming 
self-provision, the subsidy scheme allocates public funds to existing private capital with 
the aim of making housing objectives more affordable (Sági et al. 2017; Maleque 2019).
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Hungarian housing policy has oscillated between extensive periods supporting home 
ownership and lean periods during which home ownership was barely addressed at 
all. Housing policy measures taken while a government is in office generally extend 
well beyond an election cycle, which, due to the protracted nature of housing 
subsidies – difficult to calculate and particularly hard to regulate – underscores the 
significance of responsible policy making.
Opinions concerning a subsidy scheme’s degree of differentiation vary; however, the 
consensus holds that any potential subsidy scheme should be selective, long-term, 
and sustainable. Such a subsidy may operate efficiently in a global framework of 
home construction, improvement, maintenance and funding and, in addition to the 
short-term objectives, sets clear medium- and long-term targets for all economic 
agents under the prevailing housing situation (Csermák 2011; Mayo 1993).
The Hungarian government has addressed the country’s demographic issues in 
a comprehensive manner since 2010. In this sense, the current Hungarian family 
policy has a dual objective. On the one hand, it aims to help young people bear as 
many children as they wish. On the other hand, it also strives to support those who 
already have children (Novák 2020). The policy acknowledges that demography has 
a major impact on the future of countries (Singhammer 2019). The importance of 
demographic objectives is evidenced by the fact that the fertility rate in Hungary – 
but also across Europe – is declining, and thus so is the population (Beaujouan et al. 
2017; Dorbritz – Ruckdeschel 2007; Neyer et al 2016). The overarching goal behind 
demographic policies is the revival of childbearing willingness, which will reverse 
the declining fertility rate and contribute to population growth (Sobotka 2017). 
Lesthaeghe (2011) identifies the existence of a home as a key factor influencing 
demographic trends. Housing policy, in terms of both the quality and quantity of new 
housing, has a positive impact on the number of children born (Fitoussi et al. 2008). 
The incentive is even greater if the housing subsidy is coupled with preferential 
loans due to the flow of families with children to settlements on the fringes of cities, 
which has a positive effect on the agglomeration population trends (Székely 2020).
2. Features of the 2016 new housing policy; key changes since its 
introduction
The improved performance and greater fiscal stability facilitated the launch of 
a more intensive housing policy campaign. The government launched the current 
Family Protection Action Plan in 2016, building upon the meagre housing policy that 
had been in place since 2005. The programme does not stray from the ambitions 
of previous housing policies (Hegedűs 2006; Kiss – Vadas 2006; Mádi 2008, 2017). 
More specifically, it continues to prioritise the purchase of new property, but also 
focuses on the purchase and improvement of used homes. In addition to supporting 
the creation of new homes, its objectives include the encouragement of childbearing 
(Szikra 2016), boosting construction, improving the property market (Tóth – 
Horváthné 2018), and stemming the tide of depopulation in small, rural villages.
82 Study
Kata Plöchl – Csilla Obádovics
Table 1 lists the eligibility criteria for the HPS for families. These conditions are 
stipulated in Government Decrees 16/20161 and 17/20162 and in their respective 
amendments. 
Table 1
Basic conditions for applying for HPS, including changes in conditions, between 2016 
and 2020
CONDITION STATUTORY REQUIREMENT
Eligible applicants •  Hungarian or foreign citizen
•  member of a building community, owner of an undivided share in 
common property (effective: Government Decree No 273/2016 (IX. 15.))
Eligible applicant based on 
age
•  18-40 years: for existing and anticipated child 
•  over 40 years: only for existing child
Applicant’s place of 
residence or documented 
proof thereof
•  registered residence in Hungary
•  residence permit in Hungary that extends beyond 3 months
•  immigration permit
Applicant’s marital status •  married, cohabitation, single, divorced, widowed
Comfort level of the property •  suitable to meet housing needs
Employment-related 
requirements
•  at least one partner must be employed upon application. 
•  legal relationship for auxiliary activity (effective: Government Decree 
No 686/2020 (XII. 29.))
Existence of prescribed 
minimum period of 
continuous social insurance 
relationship (interrupted for 
no more than 30 days) 
•  180 days in the case of 1–2 child/children
•  365 days in the case of 3 children
•  180 days in the case of used property, irrespective of number of children
•  365 days in the case of applicants in a favoured small region (effective: 
Government Decree No 109/2019 (V. 13.))
Subsidy may be used for •  construction or purchase of new property, purchase of used property
•  expansion of existing property with at least one room (without new 
commonhold unit title) 
•  development of new living quarters: loft conversion, adding a storey to 
the house
•  in the case of favoured small regions, also for renovation (effective: 
Government Decree No 109/2019 (V. 13.))
Age of supported child •  24-week foetus, up to 20 years of age
•  12-week foetus, up to 25 years of age (effective: Government Decree 
No 273/2016 (IX. 15.))
Supported children include •  own child, foster child, child adopted by the applicant
•  child under the applicant’s guardianship for minimum 1 year (effective: 
Government Decree No 273/2016 (IX. 15.))
Ownership in subsidised 
property may be held
•  only by the supported person(s)
•  by the supported person’s child through inheritance (effective: 
Government Decree No 686/2020 (XII. 29.))
•  in the case of married couples (cohabitants) it must be owned jointly 
by the partners
Minimum floor area New flat (house) Used property
for 1 child 40 (60) m2 40 m2
for 2 children 50 (70) m2 50 m2
for 3 children 60 (80) m2 60 m2
for 4 or more children 60 (80) m2 70 m2
Source: Based on Government Decrees 16/2016 (II. 10.) and 17/2016 (II. 10.), and their amendments.
1  Government Decree No 16/2016 (II. 10.) on the state subsidy for the construction and purchase of new homes
2  Government Decree No 17/2016 (II. 10.) on the Home Purchase Subsidy for Families for the purchase and 
extension of used homes
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Subsidy exclusions and restrictions to reduce the number of opportunistic applicants 
were also introduced (Table 2). Nevertheless, the majority of these restrictions have 
been eased or cancelled since their introduction.
Table 2
Other conditions for applying for HPS and changes therein between 2016 and 2020
CONDITION STATUTORY REQUIREMENT
Disqualifying reasons •  outstanding taxes and dues
•  Central Credit Information System negative debtor list
•  obligation to repay subsidy if conditions of a previous subsidy 
have not been fulfilled
In the case of subsidy drawn down 
in respect of specific child
•  any subsidy drawn down earlier must be repaid or no subsidy 
may be requested for the child
•  the applicant may choose the more favourable option 
(effective: Government Decree No 46/2019 (III. 12.))
Precondition for applying for 
subsidy in respect of an anticipated 
child
•  the child anticipated under the subsidy received by the 
applicant prior to HPS must be born by the time the HPS 
application is submitted
Deadline for the birth of the 
anticipated child
•  4 years in the case of 1 child
•  8 years in the case of 2 children
•  10 years in the case of 3 children (this option is only available 
for new property)
Sanction for unborn children or for 
fewer children than anticipated 
•  the amount drawn down unlawfully must be repaid together 
with the default interest specified in the Civil Code
•  if the applicant committed to having three children, the subsidy 
must be repaid with fivefold interest
Maximum property price limit •  no limit for new property
•  HUF 35 million in the case of used property (repealed by: 
Government Decree No 46/2019 (III. 12.))
Maximum ownership interest in 
existing property
•  no restriction for new property
•  min. 50 per cent in the case of used property (repealed by: 
Government Decree No 26/2018 (II. 28.))
Use of proceeds from sale of 
property purchased with previous 
subsidy
•  no restriction for new property
•  in the case of used property, the proceeds from the property 
sold within 5 years 
must be reinvested in the property purchased with the current 
subsidy (repealed: Government Decree No 26/2018 (II. 28.))
Mandatory stay in the subsidised 
property
•  minimum 10 years residence, only for the owners and the 
subsidised persons
•  it may be registered as the registered office of the owner 
(effective: Government Decree No 152/2019 (VI. 26.))
Source: Based on Government Decrees 16/2016 (II. 10.) and 17/2016 (II. 10.), and their amendments.
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Although the level of the subsidy has not changed since its announcement, the 
subsidy for the favoured small regions – and the high subsidy amount meant to 
foster the realisation of the complex objective – had a favourable impact on those 
wishing to move to such locations (Table 3).
Table 3
HPS rates and changes therein between 2016 and 2020
SUBSIDY RATE
In the case of non-favoured 
small regions
New property Used property
for 1 child HUF 0.6 million HUF 0.6 million
for 2 children HUF 2.6 million HUF 1.43 million
for 3 children HUF 10 million HUF 2.2 million
for 4 or more children HUF 10 million HUF 2.75 million
In the case of favoured 
small regions
•  with a complex objective, it corresponds to the subsidy applicable for 
new property
•  with a specific objective, 50 per cent of the subsidy applicable to new 
property
In the case of a subsidy 
already claimed in respect 
of a specific child
•  the subsidy claimed earlier must be repaid or no subsidy may be 
requested for the child 
•  from the options above, the one more favourable for the applicant may 
be chosen (effective: Government Decree No 46/2019 (III. 12.))
Subsidy for children 
subsequently born 
•  in the case of used property, HUF 0.4 million for each child 
•  no extra subsidy in the case of new property
Subsidised loan •  HUF 10 million for new property and 3 children
•  HUF 10 million for new property and 2 children (effective: Government 
Decree No 209/2018 (XI. 13.))
•  used property: for 3 children: HUF 15 million and for 2 children: HUF 10 
million children (effective: Government Decree No 46/2019 (III. 12.))
Source: Based on Government Decrees 16/2016 (II. 10.) and 17/2016 (II. 10.), and their amendments
3. Data and methodology
Purposes of the analysis: to provide a comprehensive overview of families that 
benefited from HPS-based subsidies and the effect this had on the number of 
existing and anticipated children and type of property purchased; to assess the 
childbearing willingness of these families; to identify the similarities and differences 
in applicant groups based on the relationship between income and property value. 
Secondary information was processed within the context of laws and technical 
articles on housing subsidies.
Using a credit institution database covering the period 2016–2020, we performed 
the analysis using anonymous data of 625 households who have benefited from 
the housing subsidy in the regions of western Hungary, Central Transdanubia, 
and central Hungary. The relevant information for the analysis from the database 
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includes the time of the subsidy drawdown, the number of anticipated children, and 
subsidised property type and location. Information related to the family’s disposable 
income, the market value of the purchased property, and the existence of previous 
property is available only in the case of those applicants who took a loan as well 
(391 households). In this paper, the segmentation of the families by size always 
includes the number of existing and anticipated children.
This study provides a general characterisation of HPS beneficiaries based on the 
number of children, propensity to have children, and the type of property purchased 
with the subsidy. A cluster analysis was used to group the population of those applying 
for a loan in addition to the non-refundable HPS, based on the relationship between 
family income and property value. The measurement scales of the variables are the 
same, but their value range differs significantly. This prompted standardisation before 
the procedure. Since cluster analysis is sensitive to outliers, we excluded cases that 
distort modelling, resulting in 371 applicants being analysed. The “best solution” is 
elusive in the clustering procedure (Obádovics 2009); accordingly, we performed the 
hierarchic cluster analysis using several procedures (centroid, cluster average, and 
Ward’s method). The centroid method returned the cluster with the highest number 
of unique features. Based on the hierarchic cluster analysis, we estimated the number 
of distinct groups to be between five and eight. Following the hierarchic method, we 
finally accepted seven cluster results based on the K-means clustering procedure. The 
lower, five cluster solutions were rejected, as three groups comprised 91 per cent of 
the total population. While the key objective of the analysis was to identify unique 
characteristics, the cluster characteristics could not be precisely defined due to the 
high number of elements. In the case of more than seven clusters, there were also 
clusters with a single element, and thus these solutions were also rejected.
4. Analysis of HPS beneficiaries
4.1. Overview of national data among HPS applicants
According to the analyses prepared by the Mária Kopp Institute for Demography 
and Families (KINCS), almost 170,000 people applied for the subsidy by the end of 
2020 (KINCS 2019, 2020b; Papházi et al. 2021). Ninety per cent of the beneficiaries 
of the non-refundable subsidy already had at least one child when applying for the 
subsidy: 15 per cent of them had one child, 47 per cent had two children, and 38 per 
cent had or planned to have three or more children, also taking anticipated children 
into account. The ratio of large families among HPS beneficiaries is several times 
higher than the ratio of large families in Hungary (8 per cent). More than a third of 
the applicants plan to have additional children (59 per cent have one, 39 per cent 
have two and 2 per cent have three). The highest childbearing willingness is among 
those who will become two-child families once the anticipated child is factored 
in (58 per cent), and 38 per cent among those agreeing to have three children 
(KINCS 2019). Furthermore, 14.9 per cent of the applicants were only motivated 
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to have additional children due to the subsidy’s incentive effect (KINCS 2020a). In 
terms of property type, the purchase of used property tends to dominate both the 
applicants who anticipate having children (69.2 per cent) and the applicants already 
with a child or children (68 per cent), with the higher propensity to have children 
associated with used property (KINCS 2019).
According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) database, the positive 
impact of the subsidy on the number of children is not detectable from 2016 to 
2019. Although 3.3 per cent more children were born in 2020 compared to the 
previous year, this still falls short of the 2016 figure (HCSO 2021b).
Several papers have addressed the positive impact of the subsidy on the number 
of children born. Based on these studies, the HPS may still improve childbearing 
willingness in the future, but the success of family policy in this respect strongly 
depends on living standards as well as other moral and ethical norms (Sági – Lentner 
2020; Tatay et al. 2019).
The average amount of the disbursed subsidy is HUF 2.4 million (HUF 5.2 million for 
the purchase of new property, HUF 2.4 million for the purchase of used property). 
78 per cent of the subsidised amount is linked to new property and 2 per cent to 
the expansion of existing real estate. Between 2016 and 2019, one in six property 
purchases (44 per cent of new properties and 12 per cent of used properties) relied 
on the HPS (HCSO 2021a; KINCS 2019).
According to the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s (the Central Bank of Hungary, MNB) 
November 2020 Housing Market Report, subsidised borrowing has experienced steady 
growth; however, a decline in the financing of both new and used properties occurred 
from the second half of 2020. This decline may be attributable to the uncertainty 
caused by the coronavirus pandemic. According to the data, 77 per cent of applicants 
for the non-refundable subsidy supplement the subsidy with a loan. Until the end of 
June 2020, 134,000 people applied for HPS loans totalling HUF 400 billion (MNB 2020).
The emergence of HPS caused increased real estate demand, which led to soaring 
property prices that consumed almost 75 per cent of the subsidy disbursement 
amounts (Banai et al. 2019), thereby further complicating the housing opportunities 
of young couples (Elek – Szikra 2018).
According to the research of Sági et al. (2017), the social perception of the subsidy 
is positive, as more than 60 per cent of the respondents believe the subsidy will 
help them buy a home. This is also confirmed by the research of KINCS (2020a, 
b), and Tóth – Horváthné (2018). Although individual family policy measures 
may improve young people’s propensity to have children, other factors, some of 
which have a greater effect than housing conditions, also influence childbearing 
willingness. Some of these factors include overall quality of life, a stable economy, 
employment and partnership, inflation, unemployment, income factors, health, 
87
Examination of Applicants for Home Purchase Subsidy for Families in Terms of Prior...
religion, ethnicity, moral standards, and the lingering effects of the communist 
past. This is particularly true for couples who are extremely uncertain about having 
children. Targeted housing policy decisions have little influence on many of the 
abovementioned factors (Kapitány – Spéder 2018; Spéder et al. 2017; Sági – Lentner 
2020; Szikra 2016; HCSO 2016).
4.2. Analysis of the beneficiaries of non-refundable HPS
Among the regions, the West Transdanubia region has the highest net income per 
capita and the lowest unemployment rate. In terms of GDP per capita specified at 
a regional level, 44 per cent of GDP is generated by the three examined regions 
(HCSO 2018a, 2020a, 2020b). With the exception of 2020, the number of housing 
subsidy applications is steadily rising (Figure 1). The decline experienced in 2020 is 
attributable to the uncertainty caused by the pandemic and was not restricted to 
these regions, but occurred nationwide. This effect appears to be slightly stronger 
in the western part of the country as pandemic measures partially restricted the 
movement of Hungarians working in Austria.
The greatest demand for the housing subsidy occurred in 2019. The factor driving 
the demand was likely the interest-subsidised loans that became available to two-
child families. This indicates that a decrease in interest payable has a favourable 
impact on the property market. The distorting effects of the state interest subsidy 
reduce the borrower’s exposure to increased interest servicing triggered by 
potential negative cyclical developments (Kiss – Vadas 2006). Of the total number 
of applicants, 234 families (37 per cent) only used the non-refundable subsidy, 
while 63 per cent of the applicants supplemented the state subsidy with a loan.
Figure 1
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Regarding the number of children, 44 per cent of the applications were submitted 
under a two-child family model (including existing and anticipated children) (Table 
4). Families wishing to have three children comprised 43 per cent. The ratio of 
families with one child was a mere 13 per cent.
Table 4
Distribution of HPS applicants in the period 2016–2020 based on the number of 
children and the number of anticipated children
One-child 
family model
Two-child family model Three-child family model
children









Applicants (number) 81 81 277 178 51 48 267 221 26 17 3
Without taking 





7 7 163 69 46 48 221 181 23 15 2
Of those who took advantage of the subsidy, 32 per cent did so for one child, 49 per 
cent for two children, and only 19 per cent for three children. Only two per cent of 
one-child families took on a loan. This is likely due to the low subsidy amount and 
the lack of interest-subsidised credit (Horváthné Kökény – Tóth 2017). Large families 
represent the highest ratio (57 per cent), which is attributable to the availability of 
the interest-subsidised loans throughout the programme. Nationally, 36 per cent 
of families have one child, 22 per cent have two, 6 per cent have three, and 2 per 
cent have four or more children. Among HPS beneficiaries, the ratio of families 
with two children is several times higher than the national sample and even higher 
for families with three children (HCSO 2012a). According to the national data of 
the HCSO, childless (32 per cent) and two-child families (30 per cent) account for 
the largest ratio of residential mortgage borrowers. These are followed by families 
with one child (26 per cent). Large families represent the lowest percentage (12 
per cent) of borrowers (HCSO 2018b), which is the opposite of the distribution by 
number of children among the HPS beneficiaries.
The government also intends to use the programme to foster the attainment of 
demographic objectives, i.e. to increase the number of births. HPS applicants 
can best contribute to this by having children in addition to the ones they have 
already planned. Only 23 per cent of state subsidy beneficiaries make an advance 
commitment to having children (Table 4), which falls short of the national 
childbearing willingness rate of 33 per cent (KINCS 2019). A total of 68 per cent of 
those agreeing in advance wish to have two children, while 32 per cent intend to 
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have three children in the future. Seventy-seven per cent of the applicants apply 
for the subsidy after bearing children. Those who anticipate having children are 
considered to have contributed to population growth only if they have committed 
to having a child they had not previously planned to have before the subsidy, rather 
than just bringing forward their previously planned childbearing. The highest 
childbearing willingness (36 per cent) is among the applicants who intend to have 
up to two children (including the anticipated child). Seventeen per cent of families 
committed to having three children promise to increase their number of children 
to three by the statutory deadline. By the end of 2020, 62 per cent of all those 
anticipating further children had fulfilled their commitment, i.e. they bore a child 
they had committed to having. Only one applicant who took the subsidy in 2016 was 
unable to fulfil the childbearing commitment by the deadline date. If a young couple 
fail to fulfil their commitment to having children, or fulfil it only partially (with the 
exception of confirmed health reasons), the used subsidy amount must be repaid 
to the state together with the default interest, plus five times the penalty interest 
if they committed to having three or more children. This is how the government 
intends to prevent unfounded commitments to having children, which would only 
be designed to claim the higher subsidy amounts.
Forty-five per cent of all applicants who committed to having children in the future 
plan to have two more children (12 per cent plan to have a second and third child, 
accounting for 2 per cent of all applicants) and 2 per cent commit to having a third 
child (Table 5). The rest of them plan to have one more child.
Table 5
Ratio of two-child and large families committed to having additional children within all 




anticipates 1 child  
(second child) 35%
anticipates 2 children  
(first and second child) 33%
Large family
anticipates 1 child  
(second child) 18%
anticipates 2 children 
(second and third child) 12%
anticipates 3 children  
(first, second and third child) 2%
Total number of applicants making advance commitment




anticipating 1 child 53%
anticipating 2 children 45%
anticipating 3 children 2%
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The positive changes in the subsidy conditions that appeared in 2019 are reflected 
in the number of applications and in the increase in the number of applicants who 
supplement the subsidy with a loan (Table 6).
Table 6
Drawdown of HPS by family size and year of application
Large family Normal-sized family
Total (no.)
without a loan with loan without a loan with loan
2016 (no.) 10 13 20 9 52
New properties 74% 45% 30
Used properties 26% 55% 22
2017 (no.) 16 38 50 8 112
New properties 41% 76% 66
Used properties 59% 24% 46
2018 (no.) 12 59 52 28 151
New properties 34% 38% 54
Used properties 66% 63% 97
2019 (no.) 2 64 44 96 206
New properties 33% 58% 103
Used properties 67% 42% 103
2020 (no.) 6 47 22 29 104
New properties 51% 41% 48
Used properties 49% 59% 56
Total (no.) 46 221 188 170 625
The ratio of used properties increased for both family models over the years. In 
2019, there was a further increase in demand for used properties among large 
families, and a moderate decrease among those committed to the two-child 
family model. We assume these changes are attributable to the fact that since the 
beginning of 2019, the subsidised loan for new properties has become available 
to families with two children and, since the middle of the year, for the purchase of 
used property as well, which inspired large families to consider the subsidy. Overall, 
58 per cent of large families and 47 per cent of normal-sized families purchased 
used property with the aid of the subsidy.
Following the abolition of the HUF 35 million maximum property price limit for 
used properties, 40 per cent of the properties above this limit are now used 
properties. Overall, however, the volume of high-value property purchases has 
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not increased, and the stock of used and new properties exceeding HUF 35 million 
shows a downward trend compared to the period before and after 2019.
Prior to 2018, subsidy applicants with an existing property could not apply for HPS 
to purchase used property while simultaneously keeping an existing property. This 
provision was cancelled in 2018. Subsequently, more than 90 per cent of those 
who applied for an HPS subsidy with an existing property used the direct HPS to 
purchase used property; the ratio of these applicants declined to 61 per cent in 
2019. Also considering the propensity to have children, we found that only 2 per 
cent of those who committed to having children in advance used the subsidy to 
buy another property in addition to their existing one.
Property purchases in the favoured small regions are below 5 per cent in the 
sample; accordingly, the effect of the subsidies is not reflected in any growth in 
the sample element numbers. This may be due to the low number of subsidised 
small regions in the regions under review, while their level of development exceeds 
the national average.
Forty-eight per cent of those applying for a direct subsidy use the funds to finance 
new property (a total of HUF 1.5 billion, HUF 5 million/property on average), forty-
five per cent to finance the purchase of used property (a total of HUF 485 million, 
HUF 1.7 million/property on average), and 7 per cent to finance expansion work on 
existing real estate (a total of HUF 67 million, HUF 1.5 million/property on average) 
(Figure 2). The distribution by child in the case of new property purchases is 15 
per cent (HUF 26 million in total, HUF 0.6 million/property), 48 per cent (HUF 377 
million in total, HUF 2.6 million/property) and 37 per cent (HUF 1 billion in total, HUF 
10 million/property), respectively. In the case of purchasing used property, these 
figures are 13, 35 and 52 per cent, respectively. Three quarters of the subsidies 
are disbursed for investment in new property. Half of the disbursed subsidies is 
concentrated at 18 per cent of the eligible applicants (14 per cent without those 
committing to having children in advance), due to the fact that these applicants are 
large families and thus receive a non-refundable state subsidy of HUF 10 million 
for the purchase of new property. Families with two children, who comprise 23 
per cent of all applicants purchasing new property, receive less than 20 per cent of 
the disbursements, even though they represent a large number of new property 
purchase transactions. The reason for this is that the state provides a subsidy of 
HUF 2.6 million to help with the purchase in their case.
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Those making advance commitments to having children (anticipators) receive 24 
per cent of the subsidies (HUF 495 million). From this group, 55 per cent buy new 
property and 39 per cent buy used property, while 6 per cent use the funds to 
expand their existing house with additions. Fifty-seven per cent of the anticipators 
with 2 children (including the anticipated child) and 52 per cent of anticipators with 
three children (including the anticipated child) use the subsidy to purchase new 
property. The distribution of both family models is almost identical among those 
investing in new property and making an advance commitment to having children. 
However, there is a significant difference in disbursed subsidy amounts, to the 
benefit of large families. The amount of the subsidy realised by those who become 
large families via an advance commitment is 48 per cent of the amount disbursed to 
all anticipators. In the case of families with two children, the figure is 30 per cent. 
The number of families becoming families with three children did not increase 
in excess of the families becoming two-child families as a result of the advance 
commitment, despite the high incentive of the HUF 10 million subsidy applicable 
Figure 2
Number of applicants for direct HPS and their share in the disbursed subsidy amount 
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to new properties. Fourteen per cent of large family applicants use the subsidy to 
buy a new property and already have three children at the time of the application.
4.3 Classification of applicants by income and property price depending on family 
size
We obtained income data for 391 households. After eliminating the outliers, we 
analysed 371 families. A higher proportion of the borrowers (57 per cent) were large 
families. Seventy-two per cent of normal-sized families realise their first-time home-
buying objectives below a property price of HUF 35 million (Figure 3). Eleven per 
cent of two-child families and 5 per cent of large families (including the anticipated 
child), purchase a property with a value that exceeds HUF 50 million.
Normal-sized families usually buy new property with a smaller floor area (Table 7). 
The same applies to 60 per cent of large families who tend to buy slightly larger 
used properties because the family is larger.
Figure 3
Value of property purchased with subsidy, by family size (N=371)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
More than
50.1 million
45.1 – 50 million
40.1 – 45 million
35.1 – 40 million
30.1 – 35 million
20.1 – 30 million
15.1 – 20 million
%

















Kata Plöchl – Csilla Obádovics
Table 7




















by large families by 
floor area
under 60 m2 16% 4% 10% 3% 5% 4%
61–70 m2 5% 4% 4% 12% 4% 7%
71–80 m2 15% 30% 22% 24% 15% 18%
81–90 m2 11% 23% 17% 14% 16% 15%
91–100 m2 15% 12% 13% 35% 15% 22%
101–110 m2 4% 9% 6% 4% 7% 6%
111–120 m2 5% 4% 4% 0% 8% 5%
121–140 m2 4% 3% 3% 3% 9% 7%
above 141 m2 27% 12% 19% 6% 21% 16%
Total investment in new and used property relative to family size
Property 
investments 52% 48%  37% 63%
Nationwide, 32 per cent of privately owned properties have a floor area below 60 
m2. Due to the statutory requirements, the property size cannot be below 60 m2 in 
the case of HPS applicants. Forty-three per cent of the total Hungarian population 
lives in properties 60–100 m2 in size. The ratio of properties exceeding this size is 
almost 35 per cent among HPS applicants, while it is 25 per cent nationally. The 
data show that the HPS increased the floor area of the property purchased (HCSO 
2012b).
When dividing the family income into five income groups with an identical number 
of elements, we found that among those with loans, the ratio of large families (57 
per cent) exceeds that of normal-sized families. This is because in income band 3 
and above, their ratio exceeds (and to the largest degree in income band 4) that of 
the normal-sized families (Table 8).
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Table 8
Distribution of those who took a loan in addition to HPS, by income category, family 
size and childbearing willingness
Family income 
band
































in advance as 
percentage of 
anticipators
Band 1: HUF 
0–418,000 53% 64% 81% 47% 17% 19%
Band 2: HUF 
419,000–487,000 53% 63% 83% 47% 14% 17%
Band 3: HUF 
488,000–607,000 39% 68% 61% 61% 27% 39%
Band 4: HUF 
608,000–760,000 27% 50% 50% 73% 19% 50%
Band 5: HUF 
761,000– 43% 38% 67% 57% 14% 33%
Total applicants 
with a loan 43% 57% 70% 57% 18% 30%
Those committed to the two-child family model aim to buy a home with more 
moderate family income. One reason for this is the higher net income available 
through the tax allowance for larger families, as well as the family allowance and 
child-care/infant-care benefit, which are included in the family income. Eighty-two 
per cent of three-child families already had their children when they submitted 
their applications. The same applies to 43 per cent of two-child families. Those 
making an advance commitment to having children usually belong to the lower 
income groups, and 62 per cent of these purchase cheaper property, i.e. HUF 35 
million with a useful floor area below 80 m2. This suggests that the subsidy makes 
it possible for those from lower income groups to buy their own home.
The government gives priority support to families with three children for the 
purchase of new homes. However, the households surveyed in the western region 
are dominated by households with two children or those who become two-child 
families by having an additional child, generally by acquiring new property. Contrary 
to our expectations, large families (with a child anticipated in the future) tend to buy 
used property. A smaller proportion agreed to have an additional child in order to 
become large families, and the number of people who have another two children 
in addition to an existing child is low.
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Seventy-eight per cent of applicants declared that they did not own a residential 
property when they applied for the subsidy. Fourteen per cent did, but sold it to 
improve the family’s housing conditions by using the subsidies (Table 9).
Only 8 per cent of the applicants (77 per cent of these are large families) kept 
their previous home and bought an additional property using the subsidies. These 
families belong to the top three income brackets. Few of these families were able to 
draw the direct subsidy of HUF 10 million, since merely 24 per cent of the property 
transactions were for new property, and of these, not all buyers were large families.
Table 9
Distribution of applicants by family size and income band according to whether 
a subsidised property transaction occurred in addition to an existing property
Family income band
No existing property, or it is sold and 



















Band 1:  
HUF 0–418,000 53% 47% 100% 0% 0% 0%
Band 2:  
HUF 419,000–487,000 53% 47% 100% 0% 0% 0%
Band 3:  
HUF 488,000–607,000 39% 61% 99% 0% 100% 1%
Band 4:  
HUF 608,000–760,000 27% 73% 84% 25% 75% 16%
Band 5:  
HUF 761,000– 48% 52% 77% 24% 76% 23%
Total applicants with 
a loan 45% 55% 92% 23% 77% 8%
Based on applicant family income and the market value of the property purchased 
using the subsidy, we created seven distinct groups using cluster analysis. The three 
largest groups concentrate 83 per cent of the elements in the analysed sample. 
Based on the variance values and the distance between the clusters, the seven-
cluster solution also shows the highest similarity within the group.
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Our analysis aimed to discover which social groups the subsidy provides essential 
assistance for in achieving housing objectives, and at what income level and 
property value it encourages the purchase of a second home.
Figure 4






































Market price of real estate (million HUF)
Centroid method 2 3 4 5 6 71
Note: The analysed data were edited in SPSS
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Group 1 has the highest population with a share of 38 per cent (Table 10). This group 
also owns the cheapest properties, with an average price of HUF 26 million (Figure 
4), and has the lowest income (HUF 429,000). Accordingly, this group relies on the 
subsidy to buy a first property. Group 1 has the highest number of families with 
two children (52 per cent). Similar to Group 4, Group 1 also has high childbearing 
willingness (42 per cent), which may have been partly induced by the acquisition 
of property due to the low-income level (Table 10).
Table 10
Share of the individual groups and their composition based on family size, advance 






















Large family 68 48% 18% 0




Large family 56 71% 23% 9




Large family 57 66% 7% 10




Large family 14 54% 36% 0




Large family 4 67% 0% 4




Large family 3 50% 33% 0




Large family 10 40% 40% 0
Normal-sized family 15 60% 33% 0
It is evident that families with lower incomes are more likely to commit to having 
additional children. Over 70 per cent of the households used the subsidy to purchase 
a used property (Table 11). This also contributes to the fact that this moderate-
income group benefits the least from the direct state subsidy of HUF 10 million 
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(15 per cent), since the share of new property is minimal for family houses and only 
41 per cent for flats. More than half of the new property purchases (54 per cent) 
are made in villages (Table 11) due to the lower real estate prices. This group is in 
great need of the subsidy, as even with the subsidy they can only afford the most 
modest of homes. The amount of direct non-refundable state subsidy per capita is 
HUF 3.1 million, which is the second lowest value compared to the other groups.
Table 11
Groups by property characteristics
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7
Distribution by type of property (house/flat) (units, per cent)
House (units) 60 69 43 25 5 0 21
New houses 15% 38% 33% 64% 0% 0% 71%
Used houses 85% 62% 67% 36% 100% 0% 29%
Flats (units) 82 10 44 1 1 6 41
New flats 41% 60% 73% 100% 0% 50% 100%
Used flats 59% 40% 27% 0% 100% 50% 0%
Distribution by settlement type and property type and quality (per cent, units)
VILLAGE 49% 18% 62% 50% 50% 50% 12%
used (units) 47 4 28 9 3 2 3
new (units) 23 10 16 4 0 1 0
TOWN 51% 82% 38% 50% 50% 50% 88%
used (units) 52 43 13 0 3 1 3
new (units) 20 22 20 13 0 2 19
Distribution by useful floor area (per cent)
below 60 m2 9% 8% 7% 0% 0% 0 0%
61–70 m2 8% 1% 10% 0% 0% 0 0%
71–80 m2 30% 1% 26% 0% 17% 6 0%
81–90 m2 26% 11% 11% 0% 0% 0 12%
91–100 m2 18% 15% 26% 12% 50% 0 4%
101–110 m2 3% 18% 2% 12% 0% 0 0%
111–120 m2 2% 10% 3% 15% 0% 0 0%
121–140 m2 0% 10% 5% 19% 0% 0 8%
above 141 m2 4% 25% 8% 42% 33% 0 76%
Group 2 has a share of 21 per cent and is the group with the third highest population 
(Table 10). This group has the highest proportion of large families (71 per cent). With 
an average monthly family income of HUF 580,000, applicants in this group buy 
property at around HUF 40 million as their first property (Figure 4). These typically 
belong to the categories over 90–110 m2, but the distribution of larger properties 
100 Study
Kata Plöchl – Csilla Obádovics
is also even (Table 11). Eleven per cent of families in this group have an existing 
residential property (Table 10). They have the third highest childbearing willingness 
(following Groups 4 and 1). Fifty-four per cent of applicants opted for used houses 
in urban areas (Table 11). As in Groups 3 and 4, the ratio of those with two loans is 
high (53 per cent) here as well. On average, they agree to a market-based loan of 
HUF 14 million, in addition to the subsidised loan, which is the highest loan value 
of all groups. Twenty per cent of the group members are able to take advantage of 
the HUF 10 million direct subsidy, as they typically look for used houses in urban 
areas. In this group, the amount of direct non-refundable state subsidy per capita is 
HUF 3.5 million. This is the third lowest value when compared to the other groups.
Families in this group are considered to be in the mid-range both in terms of income 
and property, and they undertake higher indebtedness for a house in an urban area 
(their income situations permit this). Thirty-eight per cent of applicants buy new 
houses (Table 11), while in Group 4, 36 per cent of families purchase used homes. 
The main difference between the two groups is that Group 2 buys smaller houses 
and flats in urban areas under higher income conditions and higher indebtedness, 
while those in Group 4 purchase new and bigger property in rural areas. These 
groups clearly reflect the additional costs incurred in towns compared to villages.
Twenty-three per cent of applicants belong to Group 3 (Table 10). Large families 
comprise 66 per cent of this group, which is the second most populous group for 
large families. Families in this group have higher income than those in the mid-range 
and buy cheaper 90–100 m2 houses and 60–80 m2 flats (Table 11). Fifty-two per 
cent of the applicants in this group also take out market-based loans – in addition 
to the subsidised loans – with an average amount of HUF 7.5 million.
Group 3 has the highest share of rural properties (62 per cent), resulting in 
a decrease in the ratio of new properties (Table 11). The families moving to villages 
are motivated to buy used property, while newly built flats are the more popular 
choice in urban areas. Seventeen per cent of the applicants in this group own or 
have owned real estate and do not use the subsidy to buy their very first home 
(Table 10). With a stable livelihood, this group has the highest number of applicants 
(33 per cent) and receive the highest direct subsidy of HUF 10 million. However, in 
return, many (18 per cent) tend not to commit to having additional children. The 
amount of the direct non-refundable state subsidy per capita in this group is HUF 
4.7 million, which is the highest amount compared to the other categories even 
though Group 3 does not have the lowest income.
Group 4 includes 7 per cent of the applicant families (Table 10), who – under low-
income level conditions – buy properties of above average value at HUF 46 million, 
which is high compared to their income level (Figure 4). Half of those in Group 4 
make an advance commitment to having children (54 per cent), which is the highest 
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commitment to childbearing among all groups. This may be positively influenced by 
the difference between income and the value of the property to be purchased. The 
average indebtedness over the amount of the subsidised loan is HUF 8.3 million. 
Forty-six per cent of the families in this group hold two loans.
Almost all applicants in Group 4 buy a family house, and all those with two children 
buy new property (Table 11). As is the case with Group 7, families in Group 4 
also tend to buy new property. Due to their income position, almost half of the 
applicants (46 per cent) opt to move to a village to secure a spacious home for 
the family. The properties purchased are over 90 m2, but a good number of the 
applicants (35 per cent) own properties with floor space over 151 m2 (Table 11). 
Only 19 per cent of this group are able to draw the highest subsidy amount of HUF 
10 million. The amount of the direct non-refundable state subsidy per capita in 
Group 4 is HUF 3.8 million, which is the third highest value compared to the other 
groups.
With Group 4, it may be assumed that the commitment in advance to having 
children was partly motivated by the acquisition of property, as higher childbearing 
willingness is accompanied by low income and high-value property. However, 
despite the high number of large families, only a few were able to take advantage 
of the HUF 10 million subsidy. In our view, these families would have not been 
able to buy a higher value property without the subsidy – they did not own 
a property before, as the mortgage burden of property is significant even with the 
high property price. This group reflects the highest tendency to make an advance 
commitment to having children. Nevertheless, this group does not receive the 
highest subsidy amount, even though their income situation would justify it.
Group 5 includes only a few families, merely 2 per cent of borrowers (Table 10). 
Each member of this group, which mostly comprises large families (67 per cent), 
belong to the highest income category. They usually purchase used houses with 
useful floor areas of 90–100 m2 or over 141 m2 (Table 11) as second properties 
(Table 11) (only one applicant replaced their home with a higher quality home) at 
an average price of HUF 37 million (Figure 4).
People in this group already owned a home at the time of application, which they 
retained despite purchasing the subsidised property (Table 10). In addition to the 
direct subsidy, they also make full use of the subsidised loan. Families with two 
children (50 per cent) were not yet eligible for the subsidised loan at the time of 
the application, and thus they took a market-based loan. None of the members 
in this group commits to having additional children. In this group, the amount 
of direct non-refundable state subsidy per capita is HUF 1.9 million, which is the 
lowest compared to the other groups. Families in Group 5 maximise the use of the 
subsidy, and with minimal additional debt they increase their living standards with 
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the additional property, all without committing to having more children. Due to the 
existing property they already owned, these families would have not been able to 
benefit from this allowance in 2016 and 2017.
At 2 per cent, Group 6 consists of the smallest portion of applicants (Table 10). 
Within this group, the distribution by family size is even, with 33 per cent committing 
to having additional children. All families utilised the maximum amount of the direct 
state subsidy and drew down the subsidised loan, without supplementing it with 
additional market-based loans. The properties purchased by this group include flats 
below HUF 30 million, with a useful floor area of 70–80 m2 (Table 11). The applicants 
declared that they had not previously owned a property, although they have the 
highest disposable family income in the examined sample (Table 10). Indeed, in 
their case, income of HUF 1 million (Figure 4) is accompanied by properties of the 
lowest value, all of which are flats (Table 11). In this group, the amount of direct 
non-refundable state subsidy per capita is HUF 4.6 million, which is the second 
highest value compared to the individual categories.
We believe this property could be more of a second home purchase, for which the 
available state subsidy offered a good opportunity, thereby increasing the already 
stable living conditions of these families. Their favourable financial circumstances, 
the use of the subsidy elements, and the lack of other loans indicate that they did 
not necessarily need the subsidy to finance the property transaction. However, 
without the subsidy, these households might not have embarked on a property 
investment. This group well reflects the property incentive effect of the subsidy, 
but it is unlikely to generate additional childbearing.
Seven per cent of families belong to Group 7 (Table 10). They buy large properties 
that cost over HUF 65 million and are in a high-income bracket (HUF 867,000 on 
average) (Figure 4). Applicants who already owned property sold it and used the 
proceeds to purchase new property. The ratio of large families is the lowest in 
this group (40 per cent), while childbearing willingness is 36 per cent. All but one 
of the applicants were already eligible for subsidised loans, which they used to 
the maximum extent. In this group, the amount of direct non-refundable state 
subsidy per capita is HUF 3.7 million, which is the fourth highest value compared 
to the other groups. The extension of the subsidised loan to families with two 
children created a very favourable opportunity for the members of this group. This 
is evidenced by the fact that all but one of the two-child families embarked on the 
property purchase trail after the subsidised loan became available. This significantly 
reduced their exposure to market-based loans, and thereby their debt servicing. 
This group of purchased properties includes larger flats (80 m2), while 48 per cent 
of the family houses have a useful floor area over 171 m2 (Table 11). Sixteen per 
cent of the applicants were eligible for the highest non-refundable state subsidy 
of HUF 10 million, which was not accompanied by an advance commitment to 
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having children as a positive effect. This group contains the highest number of 
urban inhabitants (88 per cent) and the number of those purchasing new property 
is high as well (Table 11).
Based on our analysis, we named and characterised the individual groups of 
applicants as follows (Figure 4):
1)  Needy small families buying used flats – lowest income – cheapest property 
price – no high commitment to having children
2)  Buyers of urban used houses, large families – medium income – medium property 
price – high advance commitment to having children
3)  Upper-middle class large families – benefiting from the HUF 10 million subsidy 
– medium to high income – more modest property – low propensity to have 
additional children
4)  Buyers of new houses in villages – lower income – high property prices – highest 
advance commitment to having children
5)  House buyers for investment, in addition to an existing property – high income 
– medium property price – without committing to having additional children
6)  Investment property buyers – high income – low property price – without 
committing to having additional children
7)  Small families living in new, luxury urban flats – high income – highest property 
price – without committing to having additional children
5. Summary and conclusions
Our study, conducted for the western and central regions of Hungary using an 
anonymous credit institution database, found that 44 per cent of those applying 
for a subsidy chose the two-child family model, and 43 per cent the large family 
model. Childbearing willingness is 23 per cent, i.e. slightly lower than the national 
rate of 33 per cent, but there is no significant difference in the number of children 
committed to in advance, nor the preferred family size. In the regions surveyed, 68 
per cent of those who made an advance commitment to having children opted for 
the two-child family model. Childbearing willingness is of great importance, since 
there is a possibility of agreeing to have more children than originally planned, 
thereby supporting the realisation of the government’s demographic objectives. 
More than half of those committing to giving birth to a child in the future agree to 
have one more child. The number of those committing to three children is minimal, 
at only 2 per cent.
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Seventeen per cent of those buying a new property and making an advance 
commitment to having children would like to become a large family, while 38 per 
cent aim for a two-child family. Those committing to having children – opting for 
the large family or two-child family model – tend to buy new and used property 
from the subsidy in an almost in equal share, i.e. half and half. This implies that the 
high subsidy – HUF 10 million – has not been a significant incentive for families to 
become large families or to invest in a new property. The childbearing willingness 
was supported to a greater degree by the existence of the subsidy. This finding is 
supported by the fact that at the national level the rate of childbearing willingness is 
almost the same among those opting for new and used property. The government’s 
demographic objectives are least supported by the large families (14 per cent) that 
do not commit to having additional children and use the subsidy for buying new 
property.
The absence of an income cap for subsidy drawdowns encouraged 8 per cent of 
the applicants to buy a second property. The number of these applicants could 
be reduced by the reintroduction and comprehensive application (extending it to 
new properties) of the restrictions on property ownership in excess of 50 per cent, 
which had been enforced until 2019. In this regard, we agree with the proposal of 
Banai et al. (2019) and suggest it would be advisable to revise the eligibility criteria 
in this respect.
We identified seven distinct groups based on property values and family income. 
The analysis shows that Group 1 combines the lowest income and property price, 
under high childbearing willingness. A high quality, new property is unaffordable 
for families in this group. Consequently, we considered families in this group to be 
most in need of a subsidy to purchase a home. Group 1 benefits from a small share 
of the disbursed subsidies, despite the fact that, on a social basis, families grouped 
here need the most support. The availability of the HUF 10 million subsidy does 
not generally improve the situation for families in Group 1 because the benefits 
extended for smaller family sizes and used property purchases are limited.
The childbearing willingness is higher in the lower income groups (1, 2 and 4). These 
groups are also more likely to draw smaller subsidies, move to the agglomeration or 
villages, and show a higher interest in family houses. Group 3 received the highest 
state subsidy despite their medium to high income level. We identified three groups 
(5, 6 and 7) for whom the state subsidy is not a matter of necessity, but often only 
a means for purchasing an additional property to add to their existing one, which 
places them in an even more advantageous position compared to other applicants.
However, an undisputed advantage of the subsidy scheme is the support for families 
and the purchase of used property. Support for large families has been a priority 
in all previous housing support schemes, but it has never been of this magnitude 
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before. Accordingly, in the future we aim to analyse how many of the applicants who 
made an advance commitment to having children have indeed been encouraged 
to have additional children.
Given the economic stimulus and employment creation effect of the subsidy and 
the strong interest in it, efforts should be made to ensure its long-term sustainability 
since it contributes to the predictability of housing investment for families. To this 
end, consideration should be given to harmonising the subsidy amounts depending 
on the number of children, with the exclusion of the possibility of the accumulation 
of properties, and introducing an income cap. Providing housing subsidies to ensure 
that housing policy objectives meet the expectations related to higher birth rates 
is not enough. A stable and favourable macroeconomic environment must be 
continued to provide. Accordingly, we clearly confirm previous research findings 
that emphasise the predictability and purposefulness of family policy support.
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Thoughts on the Dilemma of When to Introduce 
the Euro in Hungary*
Péter Gottfried
In its EU accession treaty, Hungary committed to introducing the euro without 
a legally binding deadline. The question is therefore not whether the country will 
introduce the common currency, but when it will do so, and what factors play a role 
in the decision. Developments in recent years have confirmed that the euro system is 
able to weather a crisis, but also highlight that the euro does not in itself guarantee 
sustainable convergence. In addition to accession, members’ rights and obligations 
have also changed considerably, and these changes have not been completed. 
There are examples for successful economic policies without the euro and also 
for frustrated growth with the euro. Only one area has been identified where the 
advantages of membership are indisputable: yield spreads. In today’s international 
environment, this is much less important than in the past, but it is impossible to 
know how long this situation will last. Accordingly, the Hungarian strategy should 
target sustainable convergence, rather than the introduction of the euro. If the 
country can substantially reverse the increase in the government deficit and debt 
and keep them low, it would be worth waiting until the development paths related 
to the euro are outlined more clearly, while continuing with convergence. If this is 
not possible, the option to join the euro area as soon as possible should be preferred, 
which offers greater security but less room for autonomous manoeuvre.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: E58, F36, F42, F45, H63, N14, N24, N44, 
N90, N94, O40, O52, O57, P43
Keywords: EU, euro area, EMU, euro, European integration
1. Introduction
In its Treaty of Accession to the European Union,1 Hungary undertook to strive to 
establish the conditions for introducing the euro and initiate its use when the time 
is right. This commitment will mark its 20th anniversary in 2022, as the accession 
talks ended in 2002. 
*  The papers in this issue contain the views of the authors which are not necessarily the same as the official 
views of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
Péter Gottfried is a Member of the Monetary Council. Email: gottfriedp@mnb.hu 
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1  Promulgated by Act XXX of 2004, entered into force on 1 May 2004. The negotiations were concluded at the 
Intergovernmental Conference tied to a meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen in December 2002.
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The legal situation is straightforward. In recent years, the Hungarian public has 
passively acknowledged the timing of joining the euro area. Opinion polls show2 
that the Hungarian public has a generally positive attitude towards introducing 
the euro at some point. The government also assumes that it will happen if the 
conditions are right. Nevertheless, the exact conditions and parameters that have 
any relevance to a future decision, including the timeframe in which the Hungarian 
euro can be expected, seem to be less “settled”. The question now is not whether 
the euro will become the Hungarian currency, but under what conditions and in 
what timeframe this should be expected.
During the past almost two decades, there were periods when a concrete target 
date was set. In the first decade, the “obscure object of desire” was determined 
several times, and in the end, following several necessary postponements, what 
stuck in people’s minds was something like “we are always five years away” from 
introducing the euro. In the second decade, Hungary’s perspective changed. In light 
of the euro area crisis following the global economic meltdown, introducing the 
euro started to be seen in a more nuanced manner. Experts and policymakers no 
longer ask when Hungary will become “worthy” of joining, but whether it is “good 
for the country”, and if so, when Hungary should join.
Until recently, no meaningful debate occurred on the aspect that the single 
currency cannot in itself be deemed useful or harmful from the perspective of 
a country already using it or one on the brink of joining the currency club, without 
analysing competitiveness. Likewise, no major objection was heard from experts 
to the approach that appropriate competitiveness can be captured as about 85–
90 per cent of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (today this indicator 
is at approximately 73 per cent). This argument is partly based on the fact that 
experience has shown that hurriedly joining the currency area due to political 
pressure sooner or later poses problems, first to the country joining the club, and 
soon perhaps even to its partners that are already members. Joining the currency 
bloc is intended to provide extra resources to Hungary and to its partners, rather 
than cause a headache for anyone. This is probably the reason why Hungary’s 
partners within the euro area are not pushing for those still outside the bloc to 
join. (Apart from some brief efforts, such as when the Juncker Commission, in its 
draft budget for 2020–2027, referred to its idea about technical assistance as an 
“irresistible offer”. Of course, it is the responsibility of the aspiring member to 
provide the necessary conditions and to take the legal initiative, and those in the 
currency club accept the bid if the conditions are deemed to have been met.)
2  See the Eurobarometer survey from October 2019, in which 66 per cent of Hungarian respondents were 




Shifting the focus slightly, this paper does not examine when and how Hungary 
can become able to introduce the euro, but rather merely highlights some 
considerations in the following areas:
•  the extent to which the countries that already use the euro and the system as 
a whole have met the expectations;
•  the possible development paths for the system;
•  and the conclusions that can be drawn from this regarding the timing of Hungary’s 
euro accession.
The author raises some future questions that are relevant for Hungary. The past and 
the present are mentioned only to the extent they are considered important from 
the perspective of the future when assuming trends. The aim is not to comment 
on earlier decisions, but to provide input for a solid vision.
2. Change and stability 
Much has changed in the past two decades – or three, if one starts counting from 
the birth of the concept of the euro. These changes are important for at least three 
reasons.
First: the economic and theoretical framework of the single currency area has 
changed.3 One need only recall the unbelievably rapid transformation that has 
occurred between the economic policy management of the euro area crisis 
following the 2008–2009 meltdown and today’s pandemic crisis management. Of 
course, the nature of the two crises is different, just as the nature of the vicious 
sovereign–bank–corporate debt triangle and economic policy priorities have also 
undeniably changed. Suffice it to mention the statements in which the key figures of 
the earlier crisis management, the members of the “troika”, warned the world about 
returning to normalcy too early. Let us not forget, today’s situation is characterised 
by quantitative easing, the suspension of deficit and debt rules, and the easing of 
public support rules. Much has changed in the tone since the times when the recipe 
of the EU/ECB/IMF bailout packages was to guide distressed countries towards 
balance through fiscal austerity.4
Second: the situation within the euro area has changed. The initial unbridled 
optimism was tempered by the fact that while the system proved to be resilient to 
crises, not much has been achieved in terms of the main objective. The downward 
trend in the share of the EU and the euro area within the global economy and 
3  This was already discussed in the 1990s; see, for example, Bordo – Jonung (1997).
4  Press conference by Christine Lagarde following the meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council on 
11 March 2021.
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world trade has not stopped, and no convergence within the euro area has been 
accomplished (see, for example, Bongardt et al. 2013). Experiences differ, not only 
in the case of newcomers, but also of the founders. There were failed attempts to 
eliminate the structural factors that regenerate the balance of trade and balance 
of payments surpluses and deficits within the euro area and that broaden the 
gap between the northern and southern parts of the bloc in terms of GDP per 
capita, rather than narrowing it. The political necessities arising from this lead 
to forced compromises and contingency solutions; see, for example, the joint 
borrowing, which was planned to be a one-off. In general, the acceptance and 
diffusion of responsibility has separated members into groups that are permanently 
at loggerheads (Acocella 2020).
Third: the considerations of EU members not currently using the euro have also 
changed. Brexit has significantly reduced the ability of this country group to 
promote their interests. The group already using the euro has ample voting power 
to decide the overwhelming majority of questions within the European Union, even 
in issues unrelated to the euro. At the same time, on average the EU-27 performs 
better in most real economy indicators (growth, employment, balance indicators) 
than the euro area. In other words, joining the bloc confers no special prestige if 
it is not warranted by a sensible cost–benefit calculation. This can be based on 
others’ experiences, but the factors involved are so wide-ranging that they should 
be treated carefully, considering the features of the country concerned.5
While there are huge changes, the geopolitical considerations are largely unaffected 
and stable. Hungary’s geopolitical stance and links to alliances were set in stone by 
the EU and NATO accession. It follows from this that joining the euro area does not 
bring about change from this perspective.
Undoubtedly, in the given moment, the democratically elected leaders made all 
the past decisions considered the best, based on the advice from the best possible 
experts. The only goal here is to contribute to a discussion that serves this purpose 
under the new conditions. One thing is certain. The success of the euro area is in 
Hungary’s best interest, whether Hungary is outside it or inside it. Despite being 
a non-euro area member, Hungary’s trade and economic integration with the club is 
among the highest and is higher than in the case of most members within the bloc. 
Therefore, the country should probably continue to refrain from interfering with the 
solutions to the current problems, and to hope for success, because Hungary has 
a vested interest in that. On the other hand, the country should offer and defend 
its opinion on the issues pertaining to the future. This essay intends to highlight 
some political, geostrategic, integration policy and economic issues, before drawing 
conclusions from them.
5  Eurostat annual national accounts
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3. Where is the euro area now? Political, geostrategic and European 
policy considerations
The creation of the common currency is perhaps the greatest achievement of 
European integration so far. Just as European integration itself is a political project 
implemented with economic instruments, the euro is one, too.
For many centuries, European politics and history were characterised by the search 
for balance. The decision on European integration, produced by deeply political 
ideas following the Second World War, was a response to this search for balance: 
some kind of balance between European powers seemed to emerge for a few 
decades from time to time, but it was always undermined. These periods of balance 
were times of peace, while the disruption of and renewed search for balance meant 
wars in Europe. The “founding fathers” wanted the national powers that formed the 
basis for the defence industry at that time, such as the coal and steel industry, to 
be jointly exercised by the participating nations, especially Germany and France. In 
effect, the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community was to serve 
as a check on building capacities that could have been used against each other. (Let 
us not consider the issue to what extent this idea was inspired by Americans, which 
would be difficult to clarify today anyway.) In other words, the limited customs 
union that emerged, the quotas and other economic instruments served a political 
purpose.
Similarly, the idea of creating the euro was based on political considerations. The 
fall of the Iron Curtain and the imminent prospect of German reunification and the 
slightly more distant perspective of uniting Europe once again raised the issue of 
the European balance of power. In particular, it led to the French concern that the 
new conditions may lead to German dominance, which would jeopardise the new-
found stability, based on the assumption that Germany’s presence in the Central 
and Eastern European region would become more intensive. The French wanted 
guarantees that this would not upset the balance. The common currency was to 
serve this purpose and to be a condition that ensures, like a steel hoop on barrel, 
enduring cohesion under the new conditions, at least in Franco–German relations.
Although it concerned a country that had not introduced the euro, Brexit brought 
about important changes in European political relations, at several levels and to an 
extent that cannot be accurately measured yet. The exit of a permanent member of 
the UN Security Council, a G7 member and a nuclear power dramatically reduces 
the EU’s global power and also affects the power relations within Europe. Beyond 
the immediate effects, for Hungary the indirect consequences – arising from the 
fact that the balance between economic philosophies has been undermined – 
may be even more important. In the face of the continental French and German 
thinking not wary of greater state engagement restricting, or at least regulating, 
115
Thoughts on the Dilemma of When to Introduce the Euro in Hungary
competition, the group comprising the Netherlands, Nordic and Baltic countries 
and the Visegrád Group6, headed by the UK and favouring free trade relations, as 
free competition as possible and limited state intervention, was a balancing factor. 
This balance seems to have been disturbed in the absence of the UK. The so-called 
New Hanseatic League led by the Netherlands is making some efforts, but the 
coordination and influence of the German–French–southern group seems to be 
increasing. At the same time, difficult compromises need to be forged in issues, 
such as the appropriate ratio of preventing and sharing financial risks or the method 
and extent of solidarity.
4. The euro is a work in progress
The current structure of the euro area is still a work in progress. Although it has 
proved to be more resilient to crises than many people had thought, having 
withstood the debt crisis, and it also seems to be weathering the pandemic crisis 
well, there is a widespread argument that the structure cannot be sustained for 
long at its present state of completion. A step needs to be taken, either backwards 
or forwards. However, neither of these steps are easy (Erhart 2021). Taking a step 
backwards would cause incalculable political and material losses. This is attested 
by Mario Draghi’s famous “Whatever it takes” speech7 and the approximately EUR 
280 billion spent on various Greek bailout packages so far. It seems that despite the 
expectations about dissolution of the euro area, the disintegration of the system 
or an exit by individual members, even temporarily, are politically unrealistic. 
Therefore, a step needs to be taken forwards to stabilise the structure. But this 
is also not simple or free of contradictions. Recent years have seen major steps 
that could assist in crisis management without taking a significant leap in the most 
critical issue, namely the new ratio of risk prevention and dispersion. While one 
group, let us call it the north-western school, cites individual responsibility, the 
other one, let us refer to it as the Mediterranean school, cites solidarity. A large 
portion of the instruments and institutions have been established that could be 
created without changing the frontlines. The banking union has been set up, with 
the exception of common deposit insurance, and the  European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), and thus also the intricate system of backstops, has received an extended 
mandate. However, attempts to venture beyond this red line, towards a fiscal 
union, have always failed. On account of the dilemmas about the future and also 
because Hungary was directly concerned, it is important to note that the plan to 
create a separate, albeit not too large, part within the EU-27’s budget for euro area 
6  Visegrád Group or V4 Group: Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
7  Mario Draghi’s speech at the Global Investment Conference in London on 26 July 2012.
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members, which would have mainly had theoretical significance, failed to succeed. 
This was replaced by the Reconstruction Fund for the EU-27.8
In this respect, special attention should be paid to the European Reconstruction 
Fund.9 It is, on the one hand, a significant step as regards debt or a future part of 
that, as after a long “frugal” resistance, in the end, common bond issues take place 
(when the Commission appears on the market as a borrower, while the guarantee 
is provided jointly by the Member States). On the other hand, this operation 
comes with the condition for Member States and institutions that it is one-off 
which does not create a precedent for the future. Taking into account that the 
debate was intense even without the pandemic and that government deficits and 
sovereign debt increased substantially due to the national pandemic measures 
precisely where deficit and debt levels were already exceptionally high to begin 
with, the extraordinary situation was more of a pretext, and it remains to be seen 
whether common debt issuance can be prevented from becoming a recurring or 
even permanent instrument. 
The aforementioned uncertainty with respect to future development paths poses 
a separate dilemma for countries, including Hungary. This is because the issue is 
complicated, in that the groups of “responsibility-takers arguing for risk reduction” 
and “diffusers arguing for risk sharing” do not overlap with the rich and the poor. 
Historical experiences and cultural traditions are just as important in countries’ 
positions as development rankings. Ultimately, it comes down to the assessment 
by countries’ current leaders as to what has a greater chance and importance for 
the country’s future. Diffusing or sharing risks and ultimately responsibility in as 
large a community as possible, which also means that countries are less able to 
take responsibility for their own fate, but expect to be better off together with the 
others, or retaining the control over one’s own fate to the necessary extent, even 
if it is more difficult and a greater responsibility. This is a question of deeply rooted 
world views. Moreover, the decision is difficult, if not impossible, to correct later 
on. The problem is not that if things do not go well, a euro area member cannot 
not leave the system at any time. The system is comprised of democratic states that 
abide by the rule of law. No one will be forced to join or leave the bloc against their 
own will. However, an exit would entail much heavier losses than what could be 
expected in the case of Brexit. In other words, a hasty decision can only be corrected 
at the price of huge losses, if at all, which can only be endured once per one, two 
or even more generations. So, careful, cool-headed deliberation is in order.
8  Among the concepts about the EMU’s reform, one should mention the so-called Five Presidents’ Report, 
presented by the heads of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the 
Eurogroup and the ECB in June 2015.
9  Part of Next Generation EU is the Recovery and Resilience Facility, which provides loans of EUR 360 billion 
and grants of EUR 312.5 billion, EUR 672.5 billion in total, to Member States.
117
Thoughts on the Dilemma of When to Introduce the Euro in Hungary
5. For the assessment – To what extent has the euro met or not met 
expectations?10
European integration and its flagship product, the euro, have contributed to 
stability. Although it has been unable to halt the realignment within the global 
economy, i.e. the downward trend in Europe’s relative importance, it has proven 
to be more resilient to crises than ever thought. How many times has the euro, or 
at least the membership of some countries, been declared doomed! It seems that 
in critical situations the political will has always been stronger, so that the system 
was able to overcome crises, even if at the price of compromises. But was it able 
to facilitate convergence within the bloc?
Economic convergence can be assessed from several aspects. The expectation 
and assumption in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty was that by introducing the euro, 
members would waive their monetary policy autonomy, in exchange for achieving 
greater stability and economic growth by eliminating the uncertainties arising from 
exchange rate movements and reducing borrowing and transaction costs.
In the preliminary phase of euro introduction, there was a special focus on the 
developments in nominal convergence. The assumption was that the prices of the 
goods marketed in the euro area would level off, inflation would converge, leaving 
some room for productivity increase in the converging members, while the rules 
on fiscal discipline would prevent the decentralised fiscal policies from leading 
to disorder with spillover effects felt in other members. The fiscal requirements 
were supplemented with the “no bailout” rule to underline the strictness of fiscal 
discipline and the inevitability of responsibility.
In itself and in theory, convergence as expressed in income per capita is not 
necessarily a condition for economic integration, but it is perhaps its most important 
political goal and promise. Increasing welfare was an express aim of the “ever closer 
union”. According to the dominant attitude around the time when the concept of 
the euro was born, the elimination of exchange rate risks and obstacles diverts 
capital towards converging countries and regions. However, labour flows shift 
towards the countries with higher wages. Nevertheless, it should be recalled, partly 
in light of today’s debates, that the risk of divergence was also taken into account, 
for the off chance that economic resources would concentrate in the regions that 
were already better supplied with human resources and infrastructure. That is why 
structural and cohesion policies were and still are vitally important, not only for 
the beneficiaries of redistribution, but also for the viability of the entire system.
10  This section is based on Virág (2020) and Acocella (2020).
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The trends so far do not show that the introduction of the euro brought about 
a convergence in income levels (Franks et al. 2018). Even within the core, there 
is a significant difference between the high German incomes and the lower-than-
average French wages, and especially Italian incomes, which have stagnated for 
about two decades. It should be noted that even within the same country, different 
periods may show variation. A good example for this is the period of slow growth 
after the introduction of the euro, followed by a rapid rise in the wake of the Hartz 
reforms. The performance of the countries that joined later is also not compelling 
evidence for the expected convergence effect. In contrast to the impressive 
convergence process of the Baltic states, which had a lower level of development to 
begin with, in Slovakia, Slovenia and Finland GDP per capita measured at purchasing 
power parity relative to the euro area or the EU-27 decreased rather than increased. 
Nonetheless, within the EU-27, there is a clear trend of the V4 Group converging 
rapidly, sometimes even catching up with southern cohesion countries (Tokarski 
2019).
It is worth mentioning that the analyses have shown that the income convergence of 
the 12 founding countries slowed down after the introduction of the euro and then 
stopped altogether, and in fact, some divergence can also be detected. Meanwhile, 
on average, the countries that joined in 2007 or later continued their convergence, 
although there are huge differences even within that (Alcidi 2018).
The yield advantage is straightforward in the countries using the euro. This is 
not so important in today’s low interest rate environment, but this situation is 
only temporary, and it is difficult to predict how long it will last. Its importance is 
reflected in the fact that even though the national debt of euro area members has 
risen significantly, the costs of debt servicing have dropped from over 5 per cent in 
1995 to 1.6 per cent today. A similar trend can be seen in Hungary as well. Prior to 
the pandemic, servicing a debt of around 60 per cent cost over 4 per cent of GDP, 
whereas in the times of the extraordinary monetary easing, a debt of approximately 
80 per cent can be financed at a cost of around 2 per cent of GDP.
In theory, the convergence of economic structures is not a necessary condition for 
successful monetary policy, unlike the flexibility and adjustability of the labour 
market and goods market. The lack of these explains the recent rising efforts to 
coordinate and harmonise traditionally Member State policies, such as welfare 
systems, minimum wage setting and social security systems.
Among the indicators reflecting nominal convergence, the development of 
inflation rates shows that most of the reduction in differences occurred during the 
preparation for the euro’s introduction. Until 2015, there were not very significant 
but quite persistent differences, and the upper band was consistently occupied by 
the same members (Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal), and these differences 
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continuously undermined their competitiveness. A separate analysis is needed 
to determine whether the pandemic influenced this situation. During the 2008–
2009 crisis, the convergence of inflation rates did not continue.
In terms of the convergence of business cycles, the picture is less clear. Some 
researchers say that the harmonisation within the euro area is greater than 
outside the group, but the level does not seem to increase over time. Others have 
found that although business cycles have become more harmonised, the size of 
fluctuations has increased. It follows from this that while the harmonisation of 
the cycles gives more chance for a successful common monetary policy, there are 
periods where the levels of optimal easing or tightening differ.
There were high hopes about the euro’s impact on trade development and trade 
diversion, in other words that some of the trade with those outside the bloc would 
be diverted to within the euro area. Two things should be noted from a Hungarian 
perspective. First, the share of the EU and the euro area is so high in Hungarian 
exports, but also in imports, that increasing it any further is not a sensible objective. 
(In 2019, 80.9 per cent of Hungarian exports went to the EU (HCSO 2020), which is 
one of the highest proportions among Member States.) Second, interconnectedness 
in trade is currently experiencing a realignment, irrespective of the introduction 
of the euro. In 2020, Germany’s volume of trade with the Visegrád countries was 
greater than with China and Russia combined, and almost double the figure with 
France. Hungarian exports to Germany were half of French exports and surpassed 
Russia’s exports in 2020 (ECB 2020).
6. Unplanned changes – Unity in diversity?
It would be interesting to examine the patterns outlined based on the experiences 
so far that can be useful for the future. Is the oft-cited pattern true that the euro has 
divided members into two groups: the southerners with recurring balance issues 
and the westerners with permanent balance of payments and trade surpluses? One 
might venture to make several statements about this.
First, in Europe, the economic, institutional and socio-cultural dividing lines do 
not overlap. In fact, there is currently a sort of realignment, diverting some of the 
traffic within the euro area in a euro area–non-euro area direction, mainly due to 
a dynamically growing German–V4 connection. 
Partly because of this, the worries that introducing the EU later than planned 
would automatically place countries on the wrong side of a new dividing line in 
Europe do not seem warranted. A Europe of concentric circles or the emergence 
of a “core” and a “periphery” along the lines of the euro does not seem realistic, 
if only because the real structural obstacles to completing convergence are just 
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as much within the “core” as outside of it. Analysts assess trends differently from 
several aspects, but they all agree on one thing. All scenarios should be based 
on the premise that the basis for the European structure is the balance between 
the large, dominant continental powers, where maintaining the Franco–German 
cooperation is an axiom, and in the political reality Italy falls almost within the same 
group, and although the rankings will continue to be contested for a long time, the 
largest players are followed by the middle of the pack with Spain and Poland. The 
differences are particularly huge within this core. These attract less attention than 
the north–south skirmishes, but they are still important. One only needs to mention 
the differences between Germany, France and Italy.
Of course, all members would wish to tailor the common solutions to their own 
experiences, traditions, philosophy and institutions, but these are different. Germany 
and the like-minded Netherlands, Austria, Finland within the euro area, as well as 
Sweden and Denmark outside the club use a market economy model based on solid 
public consultation, in which economic growth relies heavily on exports and the 
openness of the markets. By contrast, the institutional capacities and traditions of 
Mediterranean members rely less on planning growth strategies. The traditional 
main tool of addressing challenges in competitiveness is the devaluation of the 
currency, i.e. adjustment through the exchange rate. Compared to these, the French 
model is unique in that the state plays a much greater role than in the others, and 
economic growth is based more on domestic demand than on exports (Tokarski 
2019). (It may not require such a stretch of imagination to search for the roots of the 
European strategic autonomy coined by Macron, adapted to the need that Europe, 
the domestic market for France, should be protected against external competition 
by environmental, fiscal and employment-based market protection measures, and 
also against internal competitors with improving competitiveness in goods and 
services, mainly from the east, on the EU’s single internal market.)
7. Attempts at managing the diversities
As already noted, size does matter. Of course, all members are responsible for 
adherence to the common rules, but the responsibilities of the small, medium-
sized and large countries differ as regards the negative consequences for the entire 
system arising from breaking the rules. What makes the operation of the system 
difficult is that experience has shown that adherence to the rules and responsibility 
are not directly correlated. It should be recalled that even if the toolkit for enforcing 
the fiscal rules that are so important for operating the system has been refined 
(Two-Pack11, Six-Pack,12 Fiscal Compact13), these tools have never actually been 
11  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_13_457
12 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_13_979 
13  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3A1403_3 
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used. What should be an even bigger red flag: their use was considered in earnest 
only once, when the suspension of cohesion funds was foreseen for Hungary, which 
has not introduced the single currency and exerts no major spillover effects due 
to its size. In the famous German, France and Spanish cases, there was no political 
power to impose the sanctions. It remains to be seen how to consistently enforce 
rules in the case of large and powerful members. Therefore, it is also impossible 
politically in smaller and poorer countries.
If reforms cannot be enforced with punitive financial measures, the question 
remains how to encourage members to implement the often not very popular 
reforms that are expected to entail improved competitiveness and the conditions 
necessary for long-term, sustainable and balanced growth. This led to the calls for 
the so-called economic semesters.
As part of the semester, the Council offers recommendations, based on 
the Commission’s proposal, with a qualified majority, to all countries, and 
implementation is also monitored. However, the practices are controversial here, 
too. Ever since the Juncker Commission defined itself as a political actor and has 
been acting like it instead of the good and innocent practice of “exchange of 
economic policy experiences and advice” used in the OECD, the approval of the 
recommendations has increasingly become politically contested, where objective 
expert analyses have been replaced more and more by ideological, unmeasurable 
debates, for example on the rule of law. Aside from this, another problem is the 
extent to which institutions without political responsibility can take over the 
role of elected governments, parliaments and decision-makers. Who can voters 
hold accountable for decisions that turn out to be wrong? It is difficult to force 
governments with a political responsibility to implement tough reforms against 
their own will, with the claim that the Commission’s apparatus knows better what 
the Member State needs than its elected leaders. This is why Member States have 
implemented only 7 per cent of the “recommendations” in the past ten years.14
The attempts were taken to a new level by the agreement in December 2020 on the 
multi-year budget for 2021–2027 and the Reconstruction Fund of EUR 750 billion. 
In the case of the latter, the international community was concerned with the 
possibility of a Hungarian and Polish veto. Yet three other issues, which were just 
as important and may be crucial for the euro area and European integration as 
a whole, were also discussed. First, the issue of a separate budget for the euro 
area was abandoned for some time due to the pandemic and the Reconstruction 
Fund. The significant step that was urged so much by the French and southern 
countries as a step towards complementing the euro’s structure was not made. 




But there was a practical measure, which had just as much theoretical significance, 
although interestingly it was not taken within the framework of the euro area 
but of the EU-27: a decision was made on common bond issuance and thus the 
communitarisation of some of the debt. This is a breakthrough in meeting French 
and southern demands, even if it is claimed that this was a one-off, which does not 
create a precedent. Third, a special new situation emerged in enforcing reforms, 
too. The grants and preferential loans that are calculated based on the damage 
caused by the pandemic, and are therefore mainly geared towards the south, can 
only be drawn down if the beneficiary member country can present for approval 
a reform programme subject to phased performance and payment requirements, 
which, when implemented, is expected to yield structural reforms that, if upheld, 
will eliminate the need for further external assistance, which makes the claim that 
this is a one-off programme more credible. Devising, discussing, approving and 
especially implementing the programme will be an unprecedented institutional and 
also credibility challenge for all stakeholders. According to the accepted process, 
the “goodwill” of not only the Commission but also of the 26 other Member States 
will have to be obtained for the programmes. The question will be whether in 
a strained market situation, for example the Netherlands delays or even prevents 
the approval of, say, an Italian programme that would be the key to survival, or the 
disbursement of an upcoming instalment. Or how will the approval of a Hungarian 
or Polish programme by Sweden or Finland go? How will this change the decades-
old practice that uncomfortable decisions are usually made by Member States 
without looking each other in the eye and placing the Commission in between them, 
and can it change it at all? How much tension will be generated by this system? Shall 
the process be objective and evidence based or turn into an instrument serving 
political or ideological objectives. These are tough questions, and the answers shall 
have far-reaching consequences.
8. Conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn from this for Hungary’s euro introduction? The 
answers can be found in three dimensions:
•  the further development of the euro area’s structure, 
•  the impact of introducing the euro on Hungary’s European policy,
•  the cost–benefit calculation of the direct material effects of joining.
The structure of the euro area has come a long way since its creation. It has 
become able to manage a crisis, and the instruments necessary for doing so 
have been devised. However, the conflicts arising from the different views of the 
Member States, primarily regarding risk reduction and sharing have continued. 
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The establishment of a fiscal union would transfer important powers from the 
Member States to the EU. There seems to be no sufficient political will for this, 
even if without it the structure remains unfinished.
It has not been proven that the euro area means a kind of higher quality and that 
remaining outside is certainly negative in itself, while joining it definitely entails 
positive effects. Structural improvements can be made outside, and even those 
inside can fall behind. It is not only, or not primarily, about the currency; there are 
winners and losers among the founders and the new members, too.
The border of the euro area does not denote a line between good and poor quality 
within the EU. It has already been established that the political affiliation was 
decided with the EU and NATO accession, and no trade diversion effect should be 
expected. In a wider European policy context, the question is rather what kind of 
Europe we would like to see in 10, 20 or 50 years, where we would feel comfortable. 
To put it simply: a “strong Europe based on strong members” or a federal structure 
where a major part of Member States competencies are exercised through common 
institutions. From a Hungarian perspective, even without answering this deeply 
political question, the integrity and level playing field of the internal market seem 
to be more important than the common currency. Cohesion policy should facilitate 
convergence, the position of less dominant countries and companies should be 
protected by competition rules, and the fairness of rule enforcement should not 
be distorted by institutional, political and/or self-interests.
The experiences so far have shown that other than the lower yields, the advantages 
are not automatic, neither for the founders, nor for those that joined later. There are 
examples of falling behind and convergence in the case of founders and those that 
joined later, and the same holds true for those that stayed outside. The real question 
is the “reformability” of the given country in a political, social and economic sense. 
There are cases where reform attempts are met with opposition, and also where 
a country can implement meaningful reforms in a relatively short period, which 
happened in Germany at the turn of the 2000s and after 2010 or in Latvia before 
and after 2010. In any case, transition countries have vast experience in this regard.
The consequences affecting the freedom of decision-making should be taken into 
account, as it is ultimately a question of sovereignty and also an institutional one. 
On the one hand, euro membership opens up new opportunities for participating 
in decision-making, since the decisions about the euro are taken by, understandably 
and rightly, the participants, and only them. This increases countries’ influence over 
the decisions that affect them. As people say, the countries can shape the decisions 
that impact them rather than merely suffering the consequences. On the other 
hand, the option is lost to pursue an independent monetary policy that is best 
aligned with a country’s own economic objectives and circumstances according to 
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its best judgement. The single monetary policy has to take into account northern, 
southern, eastern and western considerations, all at the same time. This also 
confirms that the introduction of the single currency should be considered only 
when it can be assumed with reasonable certainty that there are no more unique 
aspects, for example related to convergence or lower competitiveness, that would 
warrant, or even require, autonomy in monetary policy.
The lessons and conclusions are not straightforward. 
Further research should be conducted to see how realistic the assumption is that 
the convergence process of a converging country requires adjustment through the 
exchange rate, because otherwise it would experience other negative consequences, 
for instance a deterioration in its trade balance or a growth or employment sacrifice. 
Or precisely the opposite, a fixed exchange rate is necessary to provide normative 
pressure in competitiveness that is vital for structural changes and increasing value 
added. It is interesting to see the experiences of Bulgaria and the Baltic countries 
with the “currency board”, i.e. an exchange rate pegged to the euro.
It has been established that a structural change can mean success outside, and 
countries can fall behind within the club if they fail to adjust to the challenges. 
Euro membership may be a huge advantage to the vulnerable in a great turmoil. 
Experience shows that normally the very strong and the competitive can acquire 
surplus resources due to the euro, while vulnerability can often lead to losses.
It all depends on value choices, self-confidence and the perception of various risks. 
This paper advocates the following “stance”.
The introduction of the euro should not be considered the fixed point to which 
Hungary’s vision should be aligned. Instead, the country’s vision should be 
developed, and the country should examine how the introduction of the euro fits 
into that. This paper argues that what we will see is that a liveable, good country 
requires preparation for the changes that adjust the factors of success. This calls 
for fine-tuning human resources, the physical infrastructure and the structure 
of the economy as a whole to meet the technological and other challenges. This 
is what will make countries competitive. Hungary should assess the horizon at 
which it can achieve this. Meanwhile, it should be borne in mind that the shocks 
experienced by the world in 2008–2009 and now, during the pandemic, will not go 
away. Realistically, no crisis-free periods longer than 10–15 years can be expected. 
In times of crises, a safety net tried and tested in crisis management and yield 
reduction may be needed. People should also be aware that the introduction of 
the euro not only means a safety net but also the narrowing of the nation’s room 
for manoeuvre. The question is whether the country believes that it can implement 
the necessary changes better and faster alone, rather than as part of a system 
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with numerous participants. Furthermore, time is of the essence. If the external 
vulnerabilities can be reduced rapidly, the chance of success while staying outside 
is greater, but if not, it is better to choose the “common roof” that provides greater 
security. In simple terms, if the country thinks that debt levels can be significantly 
and steadily reduced while implementing the structural reforms necessary for 
boosting competitiveness, introduction of the euro should be postponed until the 
current uncertainties have cleared up. But if this does not seem to be realistic, 
an accession date as soon as possible should be set, and it should be viewed as 
a compass that guides the country into a safe haven in due course. Although this 
latter option seems to be easier, the author argues that in the long run, the more 
arduous, first way is safer.
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What Happened in the Neighbour? The Past 
Decade of Romania’s Economic Convergence*
Katalin Kis
While further enhancing Hungary’s convergence strategy, one should take a look at 
the convergence process of other countries in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
region, as well as the underlying reasons, the achievements, the issues encountered, 
the structure of growth and the development of balance indicators. The economic 
convergence in Romania is a good example of the benefits and drawbacks in this 
process. In the decade prior to the coronavirus crisis, Romania exhibited one of the 
most rapid convergence in the CEE region in terms of level of development. Starting 
from 51.6 per cent in 2010, the country reached 69.4 per cent of the European Union’s 
level of development by 2019, coming close to Slovakia. In the years leading up to 
the Covid-19 crisis, Romania was among the top performers in economic growth in 
GDP terms. This growth was based on the significant expansion of disposable real 
incomes, the dynamic rise in household consumption, growing investment due to 
the stable investment climate and the government’s housing market programme 
as well as a major improvement in productivity, partly related to the ICT sector. 
Nevertheless, improving productivity often conceals overheating, and after 2015, 
wages increased more than productivity. In addition, the deterioration in the current 
account deficit, together with the increasing deficit and government debt related to 
the coronavirus crisis, all point towards a negative trend in balance developments. 
The fact that Romania was able to converge in terms of GDP per capita as measured 
at purchasing power parity was due to dynamic growth, a substantial population 
decline and statistical effects. 
1. Economic convergence in Romania – GDP per capita and what lies 
behind it
In the decade prior to the coronavirus crisis, Romania exhibited one of the most 
rapid economic convergences in the CEE region. Thanks to this fast growth, the 
country’s level of development rose from 29.6 to 51.6 per cent of the EU average 
between 2002 and 2008. However, in the years prior to the global financial crisis, 
the period of rapid growth led to a build-up of imbalances and an overheating of the 
economy. Therefore, as the impact of the 2008–2009 economic meltdown started 
to be felt, real economic convergence was interrupted in Romania, too. The crisis 
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forced the country to make significant consolidation efforts, which entailed the 
signing of a standby arrangement with the International Monetary Fund and the 
introduction of reforms. After 2011, the Romanian economy was once again on track 
for growth, before changing gears in 2013 to become one of the top performers 
in European convergence. The level of development increased by 17.2 percentage 
points in the past decade, and by 2019 it came close to Slovakia, at 69.4 per cent 
of the European Union’s level of development (Figure 1).
GDP per capita at purchasing power parity grew by almost 50 per cent in Hungary 
between 2010 and 2019, while the same figure was almost 75 per cent in Romania. 
Romania’s convergence progressed at a faster pace than economic growth, due to 
dynamic growth, a substantial population decline and statistical effects (Figure 2).
In the past decade, one of the largest population declines in the European Union was 
registered in Romania. The population of Romania diminished by around 5 per cent, 
whereas the same figure was 2.5 per cent in Hungary. Approximately 75 per cent of 
this decline is attributable to emigration. In 2019, 18.4 per cent of Romanian citizens 
were living abroad, typically employed in lower-skilled jobs as migrant workers 
in Italy, Spain, Germany or the United Kingdom (OECD 2019). The connection 
maintained by the workforce abroad to the home country is crucial, and the question 
is whether the economic growth and increasing welfare can entice Romanians to 
return home from abroad. According to an OECD (2019) survey, in 2015–2017 the 
Figure 1
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employment rate of the low-skilled and moderately skilled Romanians returning 
was higher than those who had not emigrated, while the reintegration of graduates 
was less successful. The former could be explained by the younger age structure 
of the emigrating population, while the latter is probably attributable to the 
differences between the economies of the host country and Romania. It remains 
to be seen whether the growing productivity of the Romanian economy and the 
rise of the ICT sector1, which now produces greater value added, will contribute 
to the reintegration of higher-skilled Romanians into the domestic labour market. 
In Romania, the increase in GDP per capita was greatly influenced in recent years 
by a major statistical factor, namely the ‘adjustment’ of purchasing power parity. 
The time series development of GDP per capita data measured at current prices 
and purchasing power parity (PPP) is shaped by real GDP and population shifts as 
well as by changes in relative prices and the methodology. The PPP methodology 
had a varying effect on the countries of the CEE region: in Slovakia, for example, it 
pushed down GDP per capita considerably, while lifting it significantly in Romania 
in the past decade. Accordingly, when assessing real economic convergence, this 
should also be borne in mind, as it is uncertain to what extent the change in the 
PPP methodology reflects an actual shift in welfare, since it may simply show 
the difficulties in capturing the value added of the ICT sector that has expanded 
considerably in recent years.
1  Information and communications technology
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The biggest factor in Romania’s convergence has been the dynamic expansion in 
GDP. In the years preceding the coronavirus crisis, economic growth in Romania 
was exceptional both in Europe and in the CEE region, putting Romania among the 
top performers in GDP terms. GDP in Romania grew by over 35 per cent between 
2010 and 2019. This growth was based on the significant expansion of disposable 
real incomes, leading to a dynamic rise in household consumption, growing 
investment due to the stable investment climate and the government’s housing 
market programme as well as a major improvement in productivity, therefore the 
focus of the paper will now be shifted to take a closer look at these.
2. The structure of Romania’s growth
In 2010–2019, the rise in Romania’s GDP was dominated by capital deepening and 
increased productivity (Figure 3). On average in the past 10 years, the investment 
rate was at 24.5 per cent, slightly higher than in Hungary (21.8 per cent), although 
in recent years Hungary has been able to overtake its peers in the region again 
thanks to an investment-driven growth model. A breakdown by sector shows 
that the investment activity of Romanian households contributed substantially to 
growth. In Romania, the demand side of the housing market has been supported 
by government-guaranteed preferential loan products since 2009. In that year, the 
First Home programme was introduced, mainly focused on providing preferential 
loans to those purchasing their first home. The loans were granted with an 
own contribution of 5 per cent and a 50 per cent state guarantee, allowing the 
beneficiaries to access loans at below-market rates. Until the end of 2018, the state 
guaranteed over 264,000 loan contracts, totalling RON 23 billion (HUF 1,700 billion). 
In 2019, an amended housing loan programme was launched called New Home, 
mainly aiming to enable beneficiaries to purchase larger homes. On the supply side, 
labour force migration has been a serious problem in the Romanian construction 
industry in recent years, therefore the government increased the minimum wage for 
construction workers in January 2019, and it also introduced tax breaks in the sector.
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The growth in capital-intensive industrial sectors was also driven by FDI. In recent 
years, Romanian FDI has been stable, similar to Hungary’s, at around 40 per cent of 
GDP. In 2019, EU countries accounted for 87.5 per cent of Romanian investments. 
The country has a stronger southern orientation than Hungary, and besides German, 
Austrian and Dutch investors, a large portion of FDI comes from France, Greece and 
Cyprus. In the Romanian car industry, the largest players are the French Renault 
and the German-owned (or indirectly US-owned) Ford, while car industry suppliers 
are mostly German and American firms. Italian textile enterprises were among the 
first to move their production to the country to take advantage of cheap Romanian 
labour, while Austrian companies played an important role in Romanian privatisation 
even before EU accession (Adarov et al. 2021).
From a geopolitical perspective, Romania’s value is raised by its mineral deposits, 
and it is strategically situated between the Balkans and the Black Sea. Hungary’s 
eastern neighbour has boasted substantial oil and gas production in the recent 
decade, even by EU standards, and the sector is largely dominated by foreign 
multinationals. The potential economic advantages of the close cooperation with 
NATO and the United States were already seen in the past decade. These were 
mainly related to the military modernisation of Romania, investments in military 
facilities and the revival of the defence industry. The US is the largest FDI investor 
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in the country outside the EU, although defence developments, important from 
a geopolitical perspective, are not dominated by this form of financing (Adarov et 
al. 2021).
After 2015, Romania’s labour productivity increased considerably by regional 
comparison, and by 2019 it had surpassed Hungary and Slovakia. Nevertheless, half 
of the productivity advantage relative to Hungary is attributable to the composition 
effect (Figure 4). Overall, Romania’s manufacturing output has lower value 
added than in Hungary. In manufacturing, both countries are dominated by the 
production of transport equipment. In technologically advanced industries, such as 
pharmaceuticals, electronics and battery production, Hungary is more specialised. 
The relative underdevelopment of manufacturing is offset by the services sector. 
The share of Romania’s services sector within economic output has increased by 
over 10 percentage points in the past ten years, and the economic restructuring was 
also felt in rising productivity. In Hungary, this restructuring was performed earlier, 
therefore around half of Romania’s advantage in improved productivity comes from 
the composition effect (Figure 4). All in all, the productivity of Romanian services 
is higher than in Hungary. Approximately 65 per cent of Hungarian workers are 
employed in the services sector, while only 48 per cent work there in Romania.
Figure 4
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Following a rapid improvement, the productivity of the ICT sector has far outstripped 
the EU average. The demand driving the enormous growth in the sector was the 
result of companies’ intermediate consumption (Figure 5). After 2010, Romanian 
firms purchased much more products and services from the ICT sector than the 
businesses in the V4 countries2. Romania’s ICT sector is based on programming. 
The proportion of people studying and graduating in ICT fields has jumped in recent 
years, while employment levels in the sector were up by more than 50 per cent in 
the past ten years. Furthermore, the strength of Romania’s services sector lies in 
architecture and engineering, management consulting as well as advertisement 
and market research.
Nevertheless, improving productivity often conceals overheating, and after 2015 
wages in Romania increased more than productivity. Between 2010 and 2019, 
net real wages in Romania soared by almost 71 per cent, due to the minimum 
wage-raising cycle launched in 2016 and major state wage adjustments (Figure 
6). Romania’s participation and employment rates have also gone up in the past 
decade, although they still fall short of the region’s average.
2  Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
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As a result of the large wage hikes, household disposable income has increased 
quickly by international comparison. The expansion in incomes was also influenced 
by remittances, as the share of Romanian emigrants is high. The proportion of 
remittances relative to GDP was the highest in Romania in the CEE region, coming 
in at around 2.9 per cent of GDP in 2013–2019.
In line with the great expansion in incomes, the main driver behind Romania’s 
economic growth was the uptick in household consumption, supported by a high 
propensity to consume (Figure 7). The consumption growth of 1–5 per cent in 2011–
2014 had increased to 10.9 per cent by 2017, before returning to 4 per cent in 2019. 
The consumption rate has been extremely high recently, standing at around 63 per 
cent of GDP in 2019, compared to Hungary’s 49 per cent. Within consumption, 
an especially large proportion (far outstripping the EU average) is attributable to 
Romanian households consuming food and communication services, which could 
suggest some statistical bias.
Figure 6
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3. The price of rapid growth – The build-up of imbalances
In addition to the growth in wages that exceeded the growth in productivity, the 
deterioration in the current account deficit, together with the increasing deficit and 
government debt, even before the coronavirus crisis, all point towards a negative 
trend in balance developments. Around 10 years ago, the global financial crisis hit 
the Romanian economy in quite a vulnerable state. GDP shrank by 5.5 per cent 
in 2009. To manage the crisis, Romania signed an approximately EUR 20 billion 
standby arrangement with the International Monetary Fund in March 2009. Many 
measures were taken to ensure the disbursement of the loan, mainly affecting the 
expenditure side of the budget. Owing to the austerity measures aimed at restoring 
balance, the ESA deficit of the budget declined steadily until 2015. However, the 
Romanian government pursued an expansionary policy before the coronavirus 
crisis, and the rising spending on pensions and the massive pay rise in the public 
sector all contributed to a swelling of the budget deficit. In terms of government 
debt, Romania’s was the lowest in 2010 (at 30 per cent of GDP), and it increased 
only marginally until 2019. In 2020, Romania’s deficit and debt grew due to the 
combined effect of the measures decided on prior to the crisis, automatic fiscal 
Figure 7
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stabilisers and the steps taken in the wake of the coronavirus crisis. Their rise was 
checked by the fact that pensions were increased by only 14 per cent, instead of the 
promised 40 per cent, and the previously decided doubling of the child allowance 
was not implemented either.
The economic growth in Romania in recent years, which was spectacular by 
European standards, was mainly supported by the dynamic rise in household 
consumption, which entailed an overheating of the economy and was coupled with 
increased external vulnerability of the country. In Romania, the current account 
balance has been deteriorating since 2015 (Figure 8). The current account deficit 
relative to GDP rose from around 0 per cent in 2014 to 4.9 per cent in 2019, making 
it the highest in the CEE region, which is primarily due to the import-intensive nature 
of consumption (IMF 2019). Gross savings have recently diminished considerably, 
which suggests that consumption growth increasingly surpasses income growth. 
In the CEE region, the transfer balance typically supports the economy’s external 
balance position. In Romania, the transfer balance was improved by the utilisation 
of EU transfers as well as remittances from those working permanently abroad. The 
deficit of the income balance is low in the country by regional standards, which 
may be explained by the low return on equity of foreign-owned companies. Net 
external debt diminished from 24 per cent of GDP to under 7 per cent by 2019, 
although the extent of the contraction fell short of that in Hungary on account of 
the large current account deficit. 
Figure 8
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All in all, Romania’s economic convergence progressed at a fast pace in the past 
decade, which, however, led to a deterioration of balance indicators. Convergence 
was faster than economic growth, due to dynamic growth, a substantial population 
decline and also statistical effects. The main driver behind Romania’s economic 
growth was the uptick in household consumption, supported by large wage 
increases and a high propensity to consume, however, this resulted in a huge 
deterioration in the current account balance. Productivity increased considerably 
by regional comparison. The IT sector expanded significantly, and the associated 
demand was mainly generated by companies’ intermediate consumption. This could 
be the key to the productivity of the Romanian corporate sector. However, half of 
the productivity advantage comes from the composition effect, and some of the 
productivity increase is due to an overheating of the economy.
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The Role of Gold in the Digital Age*
Ádám Banai – Pál Péter Kolozsi – Sándor Ladányi 
This article follows the change and evolution of the role of gold in the modern 
economy. It points out the current resurgence of its reserve asset function and the 
reasons for this, including, in particular, the centuries-old trust in it and its credit-risk-
free nature at a time when the FinTech revolution is challenging both the legitimacy 
of the forms of money we know at present, and the role of the state. 
1. Introduction
One of the most important megatrends of our time is technological development, 
digitalisation. Given the disruptive nature of these changes, it is no exaggeration to 
say that we are entering a new age, the “digital age”, where it is not simply a matter 
of taking more and more advantage of technology, but of our everyday lives being 
so pervaded by digital tools that almost all of our lives are being transformed.
The shift from the physical to the virtual particularly affects finance, as this is the 
sector where the technological leap has been one of the fastest and most radical. 
While progress is happening at a dizzying speed — we can transfer money from one 
account to another in seconds, business solutions based on blockchain technology, 
incomprehensible to many, are becoming more widespread, and we can trade with 
people tens of thousands of kilometres away from us by using our mobile phones 
— we are still left with an oddball. A financial instrument that with its past and 
physical characteristics is almost the incarnate denial of the digital age, yet “its star 
does not fade”, it does not lose its appeal and it has not dwindled into oblivion. In 
fact, it is becoming increasingly popular. This is none other, than gold.
2. The evolving role of gold
Gold owes its historic role to the properties that enabled it to perform money 
functions extremely well. Initially, as a commodity currency, gold fulfilled the 
functions of a means of exchange, means of payment, an accumulation instrument 
and a benchmark of value. It was recognised as money by economic agents because 
of its durability, its divisibility and the confidence it created in the monetary system 
due to its limited quantity. 
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Gold first served a monetary policy function in the modern sense in the classical 
gold standard system between 1880 and 1914. During this period, some countries 
committed to converting their national currencies into gold at a fixed rate. It was 
essential for the central banks to provide the gold backing needed to maintain 
the system. The First World War also drastically undermined the existing financial 
system, and by the end of the war the gold reserves of European countries had 
been greatly depleted, with a significant proportion going to the United States. 
Gold continued to play an important role in the Bretton Woods system established in 
1944: the participating countries held their reserves primarily in US dollars, and the 
United States guaranteed the conversion of dollars into gold at a fixed rate. From the 
late 1960s onwards, however, tensions increasingly grew with divergent economic 
developments, the resulting upwards and downwards pressure on exchange rates 
as well as the imbalances of the balances of payments leading to the collapse of 
the system in the early 1970s.
With the break-up of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, so-called fiat currencies 
were introduced. In the fiat system, the stability of the money is no longer ensured 
by its physical convertibility into a precious metal, but by the legal requirement to 
accept it, or by the strength of the real economy of the issuing country.
Despite the change in gold’s monetary policy function, it is still a priority for central 
banks, which currently hold 35,395 tonnes of gold accounting for almost 14 per 
cent of global central bank reserves. The 10 countries with the largest gold reserves 
hold 67 per cent of the total gold reserves of central banks, i.e. there is a high 
concentration of gold reserves (Table 1).
Table 1
Top ten countries with the largest gold reserves (June 2021)
Country Quantity of gold reserves 
(tonnes)
Proportion in reserve 
(per cent)
1. USA 8,134 78
2. Germany 3,361 75
3. Italy 2,452 70
4. France 2,436 65
5. Russian Federation 2,292 22
6. China 1,948 3
7. Switzerland 1,040 6
8. Japan 846 4
9. India 695 7
10. Netherlands 613 68
Source: World Gold Council
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In recent times, as a result of changing central bank, economic and geopolitical 
developments, the perception of gold reserves and the role of gold as a credit-risk-
free asset with no dependence on any issuer have increased. As a consequence 
of these developments, many central banks, chiefly in developing countries, have 
increased their gold reserves. Russia and China have increased their gold reserves 
dramatically: the Russian central bank has increased its gold reserves from 500 
tonnes to 2,292 tonnes since the outbreak of the global economic crisis in 2008, 
while the Chinese central bank has increased its gold reserves from 600 tonnes 
to 1,948 tonnes over the same period. Gold also plays an important role in the 
international reserves of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the Central Bank of Hungary, 
MNB): the MNB decided to increase Hungary’s gold reserves in 2018 and 2020 
based on long-term national and economic strategy considerations, and the gold 
reserve increased from 3.1 tonnes to 31.5 tonnes and then to 94.5 tonnes. This 
moved Hungary from the middle to the top third of the international ranking.
3. Evolution of the financial system
In uncertain historical times, gold has always been in the spotlight, but the question 
is what the beginning of the 21st century is like in this respect, and what it means 
from the aspect of gold.
Few now doubt that the digital age will bring about a transformation of society, and 
in particular the economy and the financial system as a whole, and even money 
itself will be transformed. Money is in many ways a constant, yet it has evolved 
considerably over the last centuries. The social functions fulfilled by money have 
been relatively stable, but the world has progressed from ancient coins, through 
Chinese paper money in the 9th century, Arab cheques (Sakks) and medieval 
northern Italian banking, to modern money. In the current financial system, the bulk 
of the money in circulation is not created by central banks but by commercial banks 
in the lending process. Digital development has also brought about a significant 
change in this respect, as the FinTech revolution is challenging both the legitimacy 
of the previously known forms of money and the role of the state.
What are the dangers of the digitalisation of money? The most striking implication 
is that the role of cash in transactions has declined significantly in many developed 
countries over the past decade (in Sweden, only about a tenth of the population 
currently say they are cash users), and looking ahead, the trend is likely to continue 
as the appeal of cash for the new generation of digital-age citizens may continue 
to decline. At first glance, the decline of cash may seem to be a “formality”, but in 
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fact it affects the very foundations of the financial system: the existence of cash is 
a fundamental condition for the safe functioning of the two-tier banking system, 
since scriptural money is in fact a private banking obligation on cash, the means 
of payment guaranteed by the state. In addition to prudent lending by banks and 
deposit insurance guarantees, the safety of account money is based on trust in cash.
We have arrived at the basis of any well-functioning financial system, which is 
broad social trust — confidence that money will be widely accepted, that payment 
transactions can be carried out, that the financial system will ensure financial and 
price stability, and that the value of money will be stable. It is no exaggeration to 
say that the simplest and most complicated question in finance is what money 
is. There are many possible answers to this question, but what all definitions 
have in common is that without social trust, there is no money — that is, while 
digitalisation has brought significant changes to the financial system, without trust, 
the money of the digital age cannot work either. Digital currencies include a wide 
range of substantially different currencies: commercial bank deposits, central 
bank deposits, virtual currencies as well as cryptocurrencies brought to life by the 
digital revolution which face perhaps the biggest challenge in terms of trust, as they 
proclaim that institutional trust can be replaced by trust in a decentralised system 
and a technological solution.
Trust can also be a key concept in the relationship between gold and the digital 
age. Throughout history, it has also typically been the backing behind money — the 
means of “escape” in the event money becomes useless — that has strengthened 
social confidence in money, and gold, which is valuable and very scarce, played 
this role for a long time. It was an important milestone in the evolution of money, 
when money broke away from gold (this was the “demonetisation of gold”), and 
now the question is what can become the “collateral” of the digital age, assuming 
that the backed nature of money is preserved. There are several possibilities, but 
if we accept that data and energy are the key resources of the digital economy, it 
follows that the range of possible collateral can certainly be extended to include 
these two factors.
However, besides the appreciation of other factors and collaterals, the overall 
confidence in gold remains high due to its historical and cultural role, making gold 
a very tangible point of reference even in the digital age of virtuality. Digitalisation 
brings a new world in technical terms, but it does not affect the characteristics that 
give gold its value, the most important of which, trust, is linked to the human mind, 
faith, psyche, the “collective memory” of humanity.
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4. Gold in the digital age
Can the digital age end the special role of gold; will the “golden age” draw to 
a close? The relevance of this question is well illustrated by Fed Chair Jerome 
Powell’s statement earlier this year that “bitcoin could be a substitute for gold 
rather than for the dollar”. If this is the case, then gold may indeed be relegated 
to the background, especially since bitcoin, often proclaimed “digital gold”, is only 
one of the representatives of the cryptocurrency family, as other coins with smaller 
and larger capitalisation have also appeared in the financial world in droves over 
the past few years. Therefore it’s worth taking a look at how gold compares to its 
digital rivals.
A key question is whether these two types of assets really mean the same thing to 
users. What are the features that link these assets and what are the factors that 
separate them? If cryptoassets were to be described in one word, perhaps the best 
word would be “freedom”. They are not regulated. They have not been created by 
a government of a country or a multilateral organisation. It is easy and fast to trade 
with them across borders. Of course, these are somewhat overshadowed by the 
fact that there is no supervisory or consumer protection authority to protect against 
abuse. And the asset class itself is incredibly speculative; you can suddenly get 
rich with these assets in their current form, or just as suddenly lose everything. In 
addition to freedom, this dream-like potential success may be attractive to investors, 
while several factors hamper the development of social trust: the effectiveness of 
cryptotechnology is questionable, abuses are substantial and frequent, the role 
of the black market is significant, and there is no actor with a vested interest in 
stability. Gold, on the other hand, is more associated with trust and stability of 
value — and for good reason.
It is perhaps already apparent from the above that the potential target audiences 
for the two instruments, although similar in many of their needs, are different 
overall. Similarly to cryptoassets, gold is also out of control of countries, authorities 
and governments, but its acceptance at the state level is significant. Just think of 
it as one of the most important reserve assets for central banks. Although there 
are many regulated markets, gold can also be obtained anonymously in various 
forms. In this sense, it offers similar freedom to cryptoassets, although overall 
trading is significantly more cumbersome and expensive than in the case of its 
digital competitor.
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It is also worth considering how gold and bitcoin react to business cycles. If we try to 
place cryptocurrencies in the traditional investment valuation framework, the value 
of a crypto-network (and thus a cryptocurrency) is determined by the number of 
transactions and the number of expected future transactions. It is easy to see that 
the higher the number of transactions and expected transactions, the more valuable 
the given network. The number of financial transactions is positively correlated with 
the business cycle, and therefore cryptocurrencies can be considered as pro-cyclical 
(“risk-on”) assets, as opposed to the defensive (“safe haven”) gold, so by this logic 
the two assets react differently to changes in business cycles and risk appetite. 
However, what the two instruments may have in common is that neither of them 
is issued by a specific entity, so there is no need to be afraid of credit risk. 
As discussed above, gold has served as a means of payment for thousands of years 
and is therefore deeply embedded in the human psyche, and its function as a store 
of value is also largely due to its prominent role in the collective consciousness. By 
contrast, in just over a decade bitcoin has proven to have a very limited capacity to 
perform payment functions (bitcoin can process 7 transactions per second, while 
Visa has a maximum capacity of 65,000 transactions per second). The question is 
whether such a short time and relatively limited diffusion have been enough for 
the majority of society to endow bitcoin with a feature as a store of value similar to 
gold? Over time, decentralised, anonymous market operation can become a barrier 
to the development of full social trust. From time to time, the bitcoin market has 
been subject to serious allegations of market manipulation. There are no such 
problems with the gold market, so from this point of view it can be considered 
a more stable, safe and regulated market. This raises further questions about 
bitcoin’s gold ambitions, as how can an asset act as a store of value if its exchange 
rate is subject to heavy manipulative attacks?
The short but volatile history of bitcoin makes it difficult to integrate into traditional 
portfolio allocation decisions (see Figure 1). Professional institutional investors take 
a number of quantitative factors into account when constructing their portfolios. The 
market capitalisation and liquidity of bitcoin is not sufficient for most institutional 
investors, which could significantly hinder its propagation. Beyond, but still related 
to, the liquidity constraints, bitcoin’s volatility is extremely high (bitcoin’s average 
annual volatility since its launch in 2010 has been about ten times that of gold), 
which most institutions with strict investment policies cannot tolerate.
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The high volatility is also partly due to the unclear position of regulators. In the US, 
the cryptocurrency family has come under the spotlight primarily due to concerns 
about money laundering, terrorist financing and tax evasion. The growing concern 
of the US government and regulators is driven by the hacking attack on the Colonial 
Pipeline and the extortion case in bitcoin. The story of the fuel company is not 
unique, as cybercriminals are known to have a predilection for demanding ransom 
in bitcoin in software extortions. This phenomenon has led to some companies 
setting aside funds in bitcoin to pay potential future ransoms in preparation for 
cyber attacks.
In addition to the United States, China and Europe are becoming increasingly active 
regulators regarding cryptocurrencies. In China, bitcoin has been targeted mainly 
because of capital restrictions and increased state control, and the digital currency 
project of the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has also created a strong conflict of 
interest. As a result, the PBoC called upon Chinese state banks to block transactions 
in cryptocurrencies. In Europe, the European Central Bank (ECB) compared the 
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development of bitcoin’s exchange rate to previous financial bubbles in its latest 
Financial Stability Report, calling the cryptocurrency itself risky and speculative. 
Beyond financial stability concerns, the ECB has also drawn attention to the huge 
carbon footprint of bitcoin mining and potential illegal use of the cryptocurrency.
5. Conclusion
The digital age is upon us, especially in finance, but gold is “hanging in”. After all, 
the financial system is based on trust, and gold remains synonymous with security 
despite all the technological advances. While its price may be volatile, millennia 
of experience tell us that whatever extreme event we face, gold will have value. 
Understandably, the decade-long history of cryptocurrencies, considered by many 
to be the main challenger to gold, does not allow for this kind of confidence, and, 
what’s more, there are growing signs that they will be synonymous with risk for 
some time to come.
The fact that central banks continue to believe in gold, mainly because of its long-
term positive properties, is an indication of its continued importance. Gold is one 
of the most important reserve assets as a line of defence against severe crises, 
acting as a fallback asset in times of heightened risk aversion and crisis situations, 
increasing a country’s resilience to market turbulence. By holding a physical gold 
reserve, the central bank does not face credit risk even in a crisis; it has a diversifying 
role and helps to reduce the concentration of the reserve by spreading the financial 
risk thereof. Due to the aforementioned legacy of confidence, by holding physical 
gold the central bank is able to boost confidence in the country both domestically 
and abroad, especially as the role of gold as a store of value could increase if fears 
of a sustained rise in global inflation intensify.
The lessons of economic history so far suggest that gold may also play an important 
role in the revolutionary transformation of money, and the ongoing evolution of 
the financial system is likely to increase the importance of gold in central bank 
reserve management. The added value of thousands of years of tradition and crisis 
resilience has been proven many times in history for gold, which can remain highly 
relevant as a modern investment instrument, especially in times of inflation.
Even though it is one of the most traditional tools, gold is not immune to progress. 
Over the past decades, many developments have been made to address the biggest 
problem with gold: its availability. For a relatively long time, ETFs and certificates 
have allowed even small investors to benefit from the advantages and returns 
offered by gold. And digital technology has brought new advances in this. There are 
also cryptocurrencies on the market that are backed by 100 per cent gold, allowing 
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quick access for anyone even in small amounts. The new technologies have thus 
provided gold with another opportunity to strengthen its prominent role even more 
widely, rather than ending the “golden age”. 
All the evidence suggests that gold is not lost in the digital age. At most, it will be 
transformed.
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David Shambaugh, author of the book Where Great Powers Meet, is a Gaston Sigur 
Professor of Asian Studies, Political Science & International Affairs and Director 
of the China Policy Program of the Elliott School of International Affairs (George 
Washington University, Washington DC) as well as a Senior Fellow at the Brookings 
Institution. In 2015, he was chosen as the second most influential China expert 
in the United States, but he is an acknowledged expert in China as well. His main 
fields of research are: internal affairs, external relations, military as well as security 
and Asian international relations of China. In addition, he was an advisor to the 
US government as well as various private foundations and companies. His book 
published in 2013 entitled China Goes Global was chosen by The Economist as one 
of the best books of the year. 
In his work, David Shambaugh seeks answers to questions such as: What toolkits 
do Beijing and Washington have in the region? What historical heritages do the 
two great powers carry in connection with the region? What is the attitude of 
the ten countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to the 
United States and China, and how can they thrive between the two great powers? 
According to the basic thesis of the book, Southeast Asia is of extreme importance 
in itself as well, but this region is also a microcosm of the global great power rivalry 
between America and China. As for the structure of the book, the author first 
discusses the contest between the USA and China and then examines what leeway 
Beijing and Washington have in the region, what historical footprint they left in the 
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Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and in its ten member countries, 
and also what policy these countries are pursuing in connection with the two great 
powers. Finally, he tries to find out what is expected in the region in the future 
in relation to the rivalry of the two great powers. According to Shambaugh, the 
extensive competition between the United States and China is one of the main 
determinants of international relations and is expected to remain such for a very 
long time. Therefore, developments in the Southeast Asian region may have global 
consequences as well.
In the first chapter, the author establishes that in today’s complex field of 
international relations there is one single factor sweeping everything aside and 
rising to the surface: the overall competition between the United States and the 
People’s Republic of China. He presents the outset and the current situation of the 
rivalry between the two great powers and then discusses the ensuing increasingly 
popular conclusion that there is a new cold war going on in our world. He explains 
that although the latest rivalry between great powers is similar to the cold war era 
to some extent, it is also different in many respects. In the author’s opinion, the 
greatest difference is that China – unlike the Soviet Union – has become organically 
interlinked with the international institutional system. According to experts’ 
unanimous opinion, the competition between China and the USA is becoming 
increasingly intensive in the Southeast Asian region, and they also agree that this 
contest may even be influenced by the ten ASEAN member states. Nevertheless, 
the author calls attention to the fact that other regional, so-called ‘middle powers’ 
– such as Japan, India, Australia and the European Union, and, to a lesser degree, 
Russia as well – also play a key role in the Southeast Asian strategic game of chess. 
The author then presents Southeast Asia itself, describing it as an extremely 
dynamic region. He notes that the region is comprised of eleven nation-states, ten 
of which are ASEAN members, and with its total population of 636 million people, 
Southeast Asia is one of the most populous areas in the world. He emphasises that 
the large population is coupled with a diversity of religions as well, and this diversity 
determines almost everything in Southeast Asia. In the author’s opinion, this is the 
reason why it is so difficult for ASEAN countries to act together in order to reach 
common goals. Finally, the author of the book outlines when and how the powers 
of the world appeared in the region and what impact it had on Southeast Asia.
The next comprehensive part is constituted by the second and third chapters. They 
analyse the presence of the United States in Southeast Asia. The second chapter 
provides details of the American heritage of Southeast Asia, i.e. of the historical 
role of United States and of the relations with the Southeast Asian region under the 
individual US presidents. The third chapter takes us to the present, describing the 
current role of America in Southeast Asia. The author also considers this important 
to discuss, because in his opinion the presence of the United States in the region 
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is clearly undervalued or even deemed self-evident by many observers. On the 
whole, Shambaugh believes that the presence and impact of the USA in Southeast 
Asia is extensive and significant in various categories, even if it is less perceptible 
compared, for example, to the presence of China. He highlights three areas where 
the USA still plays a defining role: trade, security and soft power. He considers the 
part taken by US diplomacy to be the weakest area.
The next main part of the book discusses the presence of China in Southeast Asia, 
as previously in connection with the United States. The fourth chapter examines 
how relations changed over China’s thousand-year history and during World War 
II, and what the attitude of Chinese leaders to the region was like. The fifth chapter 
already gets down to China’s current role in Southeast Asia. As he did for the United 
States, the author of the book discusses the levels where China is present. He 
defines the Chinese presence in four relationship dimensions: diplomacy, relations 
between people, trade and security. However, he stresses that the degree of 
Beijing’s influence is not the same in the four different dimensions, but varies across 
categories and countries as well. He notes that China’s economic and trade impact 
is the largest of the four dimensions, and this is the most dynamically growing one. 
He places society-level relations between people to the second place, followed by 
diplomacy and then security.
In the sixth chapter, the author of the book examines how much leeway ASEAN 
has between the two great powers, as he stresses that none of the countries in the 
region are under the sole influence of China or the United States. He thinks that the 
most important common feature of the ten member states is the ambivalence they 
show towards both great powers, and that they do not really trust any of them. 
He also outlines the advantages and disadvantages for ASEAN that may originate 
from relations with China and the United States. First, the author examines the 
region as a whole, and then discusses the individual countries separately as well: 
he briefly presents Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, 
Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines, before analysing their relations with the 
United States and China.
In the final seventh chapter, the author searches for an answer to the question 
of what the outcome of the competition between China and the United States 
in Southeast Asia may be: polarisation or coexistence while competing? Certain 
comparative advantages and disadvantages can be pointed out in the case of both 
great powers in connection with their interactions with the individual Southeast 
Asian countries, as both have strengths and weaknesses. Shambaugh notes that 
since 2017 a very significant collective shift towards China has been observed, 
but he adds that although the position and influence of China in the region has 
increased considerably, this should not be overvalued. The author’s opinion on 
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China’s diplomatic and political influence in the region is that at present it exceeds 
that of the United States, and its military potential and presence are also increasing 
steadily in parallel with that. In addition, the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative and the 
ensuing regional infrastructure construction provides a particular comparative 
advantage for China. The United States is striving to be present in various areas 
of the life of Southeast Asian countries these days as well, i.e. we can really speak 
about a multi-dimensional actor. Nevertheless, continuing the train of thoughts, 
the author calls attention to the fact that raw military power remains the greatest 
strength and most important means of the United States. The United States is still by 
far the most important factor in supporting the security of Southeast Asian military 
forces. In addition, everyday life in Southeast Asia is almost completely interwoven 
by the cultural attraction of the United States: it is present in the media, in films, 
in various sports, in higher education, technology and investments. To sum it up: 
it is far greater than China’s cultural impact on the region.
While China is attempting to widen and deepen its presence in all Southeast Asian 
countries with intensive work, in the author’s opinion the United States’ attitude 
in this area is rather negligent. This is what Shambaugh derives the all-pervasive 
and currently prevailing narrative, which is generally known in connection with 
the region, from: China is an ‘unavoidable’ dominant power, while the importance 
of the United States is decreasing and declining inevitably. Nevertheless, using 
an empirical approach, this book concludes that this narrative is not precise and 
does not completely conform to the facts. According to its conclusion, the United 
States continues to have deep roots and has much more comprehensive power in 
the Southeast Asian region than China. At the same time, it also acknowledges as 
an unquestionable fact that the American influence is declining, and according to 
David Shambaugh China may eventually conquer Southeast Asia if the United States 
fails to pay enough attention.
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Samuel Kirwan’s book is published as part of the “The Economy: Key Ideas” series, 
which aims to introduce undergraduate students to new and established, and 
possibly controversial, basic concepts, theories and models that economists use 
to understand and explain how the economy works.
The author is a fellow in the Department of Sociology at the University of Warwick. 
His main area of research is the sociology of everyday indebtedness. One of his 
flagship projects examines how households live with and manage their various 
debts, with a particular focus on the growing problem of “priority” debts, namely tax 
and rent arrears, understanding debt relief orders and other insolvency measures, 
and analysing how debt shapes family and social relationships. Prior to this, the 
author worked as a research fellow at the University of Bristol on the “New Sites for 
Legal Consciousness” project, and researched the work and experiences of advisers 
at the Citizens Advice Service.
To promote financial inclusion – the subject of this book – and to overcome financial 
exclusion, governments have been working for decades in both developed and 
developing countries, and have devised various strategies with the practical aim of 
making basic financial services available to all, whether individuals or businesses, 
at affordable prices. According to the World Bank, in 2017, around 1.7 billion 
adults worldwide did not have a bank account, and at least 200 million small 
businesses in low- and middle-income countries were unable to access credit.1 This 
significantly hampers the economic development of poor communities. Financial 
inclusion has now become the dominant and relatively uncontroversial framework 
for addressing poverty and development opportunities in both developing and 
developed countries.
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Drawing on a series of illustrative case studies, Kirwan analyses the involvement 
of the poor in finance, focusing on the different types of policies implemented for 
this purpose, the reasons for their success and failure in developed and developing 
countries, and the potential social impact and effectiveness of such economic and 
financial interventions. The book also explores a much broader range of issues 
related to financial inclusion: it digs into the causes of poverty by class and gender, 
and the consequences of income and wealth inequalities. It gives a glimpse into 
the role of government policy in tackling inequality and notes that in practice it 
costs more to be poor, for example financial services are more expensive for the 
poor than for the rich.
The author’s aim is to introduce the concept of financial inclusion and at the same 
time to question it to some extent from a social science perspective. The book is 
highly critical of the concept of financial inclusion and the areas of intervention. 
Existing power structures can deepen and exacerbate forms of inequality, despite 
their well-intentioned action to reduce financial exclusion, rooted in the real needs 
of individuals and with significant potential to improve lives. The author aims to 
provide a complete picture of financial inclusion by focusing on more than a single 
institutional area, a specific concept or an intervention. The guiding questions of 
the book are less concerned with the successes of financial inclusion, and instead 
focus on the distinct and common characteristics of the various initiatives and 
programmes that are grouped under this term.
The chapter entitled “What is financial inclusion?” provides an insight into the 
theoretical issues of financial inclusion. The chapter describes the key definitions 
of the term financial inclusion, the differences in their application across different 
geographical and institutional contexts, their relationship with related terms, and 
the key institutions and other actors constituting the area of financial integration 
(e.g. Accion, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, the Grameen Bank, the World Bank). After setting this institutional 
and conceptual scene, it presents five different stories of financial inclusion, i.e. 
different accounts of how financial inclusion has been implemented and approached 
on each continent. Each story serves as a basis for exploring different manners of 
financial inclusion and specific manifestations of financial inclusion.
The chapter on Financial inclusion as a tool of poverty eradication focuses on 
microcredit and microfinance and examines how the provision of small loans, 
particularly to women in rural communities through group lending structures, has 
become one of the solutions to rural poverty problems in the Global South. It 
explores the experience of microcredits in Bangladesh and India, detailing how 
microcredits have transformed existing power structures and how they have 
been used alongside other forms of debt. In this context, it indicates that the 
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now widely known financial institution involved in financial inclusion, Grameen 
Bank in Bangladesh, has been the target of severe criticism since the early 2010s, 
including the apparent accusation that microcredits are a “death trap” for the poor 
in Bangladesh.
The chapter Financial inclusion as the production of new markets: the case of reverse 
redlining describes how, in the United States, certain ethnic groups were – in the 
past – discriminated against when selling or renting housing in certain areas of the 
country. The previous exclusion of vulnerable consumers has been coupled with 
continued socio-economic marginalisation. The author highlights how processes 
of financial inclusion, by eradicating some forms of historical discrimination, 
can perpetuate this discrimination through adverse financial conditions for the 
excluded groups. Through the concept of financial feminisation, it explores how 
women’s financial inclusion is often a double-edged sword bringing not only 
new opportunities, but also new responsibilities and risks. Kirwan highlights the 
potentially harmful effects of financial inclusion strategies such as the proliferation 
of subprime mortgages in the US.
The chapter Financial inclusion as financial subjectivity: the case of financial 
capability in the UK deals with the fact that the problem of financial exclusion and 
inclusion in the UK has intertwined with the issues of financial capabilities and 
their development as well as financial education programmes. It finds that in the 
Global North, financial inclusion has focused on changing individual habits and 
knowledge. It outlines the changing contours of this idealised financial subjectivity, 
highlighting the tensions between asset-based wealth and a system of financial 
capability focused on debt avoidance and saving. Policy debates should focus 
more on the unequal risk-sharing and gender inequalities created by financial 
services, and consider alternative approaches and potential interventions beyond 
existing infrastructures. It suggests that marginalised communities should be better 
equipped not just to adapt to financial life, but to play a critical and active role in 
shaping the foundations of the financial system.
The chapter entitled Financial inclusion as policy project: the case of conditional 
cash transfers examines conditional cash transfer schemes in Latin America, which 
provide welfare payments to low-income families. To receive financial support, 
the family must meet certain conditions. These schemes aim to reach the poorest 
people directly, promote human capital accumulation, reduce poverty and income 
inequality and eliminate the intergenerational transmission of poverty. The author 
explores how financial inclusion can be a political project to transform the behaviour 
and habits of the given population over time. It addresses a key question that is 
rarely asked in discussions on financial inclusion, namely the meaning of money. 
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If money is presented as the answer to the people’s problems, how does this fit in 
with current financial practices?
In the chapter Financial inclusion as transformations in financial practice: the case 
of mobile money, the author describes the practice of the development and use 
of mobile money in Kenya and in sub-Saharan Africa, where mobile money and 
the “airtime” transactions it generates have become a form of social interaction 
following the etiquette of mobile phone use. Mobile money has become a way of 
smoothing the distribution of money between networks, mitigating the worst effects 
of disasters and saving money on education. In contrast to the other chapters, 
the direction of the financial inclusion process in this setting was not driven by 
government or financial institutions (although these also played a significant role), 
but rather by the creative need for which consumers used new technology to meet 
a specific financial need. The chapter looks at how financial inclusion is used to 
measure the changes created by mobile money, but in a way that does not grasp 
the fundamental shifts in financial practices and relationships that it enables. In 
Kenya and sub-Saharan Africa, the success of mobile money as a tool for financial 
inclusion is measured primarily by the extraordinary increase in the use of formal 
banking mechanisms it has enabled, rather than the broader changes made possible 
by society.
The concluding chapter of the book summarises the various critical themes 
explored in these stories of financial inclusion. It stresses that financial inclusion is 
an undeniably powerful and influential term, bringing together diverse groups of 
actors and shaping policy and practice on a wide scale. While its dominance is most 
noticeable in the reflections on development, its roots lie partly in the social policies 
of the Global North, where issues of financial inclusion and exclusion have been 
explored over a longer period of social change. According to Kirwan, the objectives 
of poverty alleviation and social progress can best be achieved by giving people the 
tools to adapt to difficult financial situations. Rather than simply treating the poor 
as passive subjects who need more money, this approach recognises the complexity 
of their financial practices. This uses the ability to be creative and flexible, allowing 
them to improve their own lives. It raises the main challenges of the concept of 
financial inclusion and a series of questions that need to be asked when financial 
inclusion is seen as a solution to social problems. The chapter concludes by setting 
out an agenda for critical financial inclusion. It acknowledges and supports valuable 
work in the field of financial inclusion, while moving the assessment of success away 
from the false binaries of exclusion/inclusion and formal/informal financial services, 
and give marginalised groups a meaningful role in defining the role of finance in 
their lives, raising awareness of the importance of involving them in shaping the 
process of financial change.
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Although this book was originally intended for university students, it is also 
a valuable resource for researchers who wish to understand the socio-economic 
dimensions of the subject in more depth. This book serves as an introduction to 
the concept of financial inclusion for readers interested in social science. I also 
recommend it to all socially sensitive readers for its practical examples.
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Vernon L. Smith – Bart J. Wilson:
Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations for the Twenty-First Century
Cambridge University Press, 2019, p. 215.
ISBN: 978-1316648810
Hungarian translation:
A közgazdaságtan humanizálása: Az erkölcsi érzelmek és A nemzetek gazdagsága 
a 21. században 
Pallas Athéné Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2020, p. 235
ISBN: 9786155884917
The Hungarian edition received an impetuous title: ‘The humanisation of economics’. 
Moreover, this combination of words certainly seems to be an oxymoron for many, 
also catching our attention easily. Humanising economics. On the one hand, readers 
could expect the book to eventually shed light on a new path, following which the 
authors and the reader together will make economics humane. On the other hand, 
many may approach the book reluctantly, saying that economics is more precise 
and methodological than humane, and it should not even be made humane. In 
contrast to these attitudes, in the book the authors show that economics is already 
essentially and originally humane. One could also say that it is not this branch of 
science that they want to humanise, but the picture we have formed of it. They 
undertake all of this by tracing economics back to its roots in many respects, in an 
approach, which is deeply humane. One of the authors, Vernon L. Smith, received 
the Nobel Prize in Economic sciences in 2002 for his study of alternative market 
mechanisms. He is a professor of economics and finance at Chapman University, 
California. In addition, he is a founding member of the University’s Economic Science 
Institute and its Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy as well as 
a Distinguished Fellow of the American Economic Association. The other author, 
Bart J. Wilson, is a professor of economics and law at Chapman University. He is 
*  The papers in this issue contain the views of the authors which are not necessarily the same as the official 
views of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
Balázs Sárvári is a Senior Methodological Expert at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank and an Assistant Professor at 
the Institute Department of Economics of Corvinus University of Budapest. Email: sarvarib@mnb.hu
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a founding member of the Economic Science Institute as well as a founding member 
and Director of the Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy.
If the market is considered to be the location where people make economic 
decisions, the neoclassical approach performs well in the analysis of these 
impersonal relations. However, if these relations are embedded in personal 
interactions, the resulting picture is much different. This is the starting point 
(Chapter 1) of the fascinatingly complex book by Vernon L. Smith and Bart J. 
Wilson. With the title (Humanomics) they also want to stress ‘the very human 
problem of simultaneously living in these two worlds, the personal social and the 
impersonal economic’ (p. 2). In their argumentation they return to the thoughts 
of Adam Smith, where the personality of people, or more exactly their emotions, 
sentiments, passions and affections (Chapter 2 separates these aspects of human 
life with inspiring precision) as well as fellow feeling and a sense of propriety still 
played a greater role.
The importance of these concepts was highlighted by the fact that the neoclassical 
approach was typically unable to predict the outcomes of two-person interactive 
games. The models of ultimatum and trust games were created in the 1980s, and 
laboratory experiments using them were conducted in the following decade. The 
studies focused on cooperation between actors and found cooperation of a degree 
that was incompatible with the pursuit of self-interest of the neoclassical approach. 
The answer of Adam Smith is that human decisions are driven by self-love and not 
by the pursuit of self-interest. The book is the restoration and proof of this thought.
The interpretation of the meaning of words is an abstract level, and therefore it 
is justified to project Smith’s answer to the practical level of economics as well 
(Chapter 3). The book’s authors address criticism to contemporary economics and 
cognitive psychologists, who in their opinion, ‘maintain the positivist tradition, 
having merged it with Benthamite utilitarianism’ (p. 36). The result of this is that 
when discussing the preferences they almost only deal with the choice. Meanwhile, 
they lose sight of the decision-maker’s taste, behaviour and conduct – all of the 
reasons and contexts that may have played a determining role in the decision. It 
was exactly the importance of context that was explored by laboratory experiments 
carried out in the 1990s. In these experiments, the participating persons ‘regularly 
make choices that would result in lower cash payoffs for themselves when another 
available alternative would have made them materially better off’ (p. 38).
This paradox of preferences posed a challenge to researchers. One of the directions 
of looking for an answer was the separation of individual and social preferences. 
The other direction, Smith’s answer, ‘eschews outcomes and their utility, including 
social preferences, and begins with actions as signals of rule-following conduct’ 
(p. 41). If we approach the individual’s decision from the direction of compliance, 
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i.e. context, the elements determining the individual’s social relations become 
more important. For example, these elements include his/her ability to tell right 
from wrong, or what the individual is incited to do by sympathy or resentment. 
The authors consider this approach to be an independent model, the axioms of 
which are contained in Smith’s work The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Model value 
is an important element in the book, because the authors highlight the positivist 
slogan typical of economics as well: ‘It takes a model to beat a model’ (p. 60). 
Accordingly, they not only criticise the neoclassical framework, they also offer 
another model or axiom system in its stead.
This concluding thought of Chapter 4 must necessarily be followed by a presentation 
of the axioms themselves and the related principles (Chapter 5), occasionally 
complemented with formalised proofs. Of course, we are not in a position here to 
describe all of these in detail, but the concept is made perceptible if one reads the 
2nd axiom and the 6th principle, one after the other. The 2nd axiom reads: ‘Human 
beings judge the sentiments and passions of each other’ (p. 71). The 6th principle 
reads: ‘The circumstances or context of an action acquires importance because it 
enables human beings to read intentions and find meaning in each other’s actions’ 
(p. 78). For our interpretation it is important to underline that morality for Smith 
is not an exogenous element (stemming, e.g. from beliefs), but means the rules 
that are followed by people and that can be observed through decisions. These 
rules are remembered by people as they more and more often opt for actions for 
which they may expect to be praised, and less and less often for those for which 
they may be blamed. Reading the book, it becomes clear that by proceeding in 
this manner the authors can give real answers to the decisions observed in the 
laboratory experiments.
The authors continue their argumentation with conclusions regarding the prediction 
of context-specific actions (Chapter 6). This is a more readable approach to the 
formal structure of Smith’s model. One of its steps is that they separate beneficence 
and justice, which also means direct preparation for the interpretation of the 
decisions observed in the experiment. Following that, the formalised language 
returns (Chapter 7). By introducing new concepts, they verify that the system stems 
from human sentiments and not from conscious human sense. A good example 
for this is their wording that ‘positive reciprocity arises from a sense of gratitude, 
negative reciprocity from feelings of resentment’ (p. 100).
Following that, the text is a description of game theory modelling and the concrete 
experimental observations. First, the authors deal with trust games (Chapter 8) 
and then with ultimatum games (Chapter 9). They present games during which 
the participants ‘routinely and deliberately depart from playing payoff dominant 
strategies’ (p. 111). Before looking for the reasons, they reject the idea of avoiding an 
analysis of the problem in detail by citing the concept of altruism or the preference 
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called social. Namely, in their opinion this is not about unselfishness (for example), 
but human sympathy and self-control is expressed in these decisions. The games 
described present human decisions and the explanatory power of Smith’s model in 
an exciting form. Among other things, the authors demonstrate that participants are 
typified by their first decisions, as they determine their susceptibility to sympathy 
to a great degree.
Relying on the observations, the authors construct new trust games (Chapter 10). 
During that, in one of the most interesting subchapters, they provide a detailed 
comparison of the traditional model and the one resting on Smithian foundations. 
In addition, they also demonstrate that what is written in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments predicts the observations of trust games and many other experimental 
observations as well – and prediction capability is an extremely strong feature of 
a model. In light of all this, the authors go even further and propose a revision of 
the formal structure of the traditional game theory (Chapter 11). Within the context 
of the mathematical formalisation of human behaviour, they present where the 
traditional game theory model failed and what amendments allow the elimination 
of these failures as well as how the Smithian model can be applied during these 
steps.
One of the main attributes of this model is that it takes the various narratives into 
account, and therefore this is the main subject of Chapter 12. Context became very 
important when the results of the experiments went against the utility maximisation 
approach. Context became the element through which researchers attempted to 
capture what may divert decisions in these simple situations from what works in 
the case of much more complex market decisions. On one side, there is traditional 
economics, where the main emphasis is on the payoffs and the steps in the game 
theory. On the other side, there is Smith’s approach, where the story, human 
relations and narrative memories are also determinants. In order to illustrate that, 
the authors share a narrativised trust game as well with the reader. In the closing 
chapter (Chapter 13), they give an answer to the classic Smithian dilemma. They 
link his two main works to one another, and with that they take up the position 
that the volumes should be considered as continuation or complement, and not 
as two completely different approaches.
This book is recommended to everyone for whom humanomics (or humane 
economics) is not an oxymoron, or for those who are at least open to becoming 
acquainted with this side of science as well.
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